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Introduction1
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE – A FRAMEWORK
The implementation of the idea that individuals, wherever they are and regardless 
of their official status, may be accountable for crimes against humanity 
breaks away from the Westphalian paradigm that each State is responsible for 
prosecuting (or not) its citizens. After the Cold War, several international 
criminal jurisdictions were created, namely the ad hoc courts for the former 
Yugoslavia and for Rwanda and a permanent criminal jurisdiction, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). Power no longer serves as a means for 
impunity in the same way. Those leaders involved in conflicts have learned to 
fear international criminal justice as a “sword of Damocles”. On the other 
hand, the creation of international criminal jurisdictions has become a means 
to consolidate peace in post-conflict situations so as to restore justice. 
The foundation of the ICC in 2002 – and the preference for a permanent a juris-
diction rather than ad hoc courts – represents the pinnacle of international 
criminal justice. The Court is even referred to as a paradigmatic institution 
in terms of the universalistic perspective of International Law, which aims 
at a reinforced international public order. As Bogdandy and Dellavalle state, 
“in the global context, the development of a truly international public order 
and of true International Law is now largely dependent on the development 
of International Criminal Law” (2008: 2). The creation of the ICC should be 
viewed not merely as an innovation but, above all, as a civilizational con-
quest for the defense of human dignity and the promotion of peace. 
1  The text represents the personal opinion of the authors and cannot be understood in any way as the official position  
of any other person or institution, including the United Nations or the Government of Portugal.  
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However, the criticisms addressed to the universalistic narrative, namely in what con-
cerns a global imposition of institutions and liberal legal standards, also impact 
the Court. Hard criticism has been made against the ICC regarding its struc-
tural fundaments which reflect, to a certain extent, a concern regarding the 
imposition of “Western” liberal ethical and legal solutions. On a more func-
tional level, criticism has also been made against the power attributed to the 
United Nations Security Council in relation to the Court, which suggests 
political intrusion in a criminal body, and that up to now the great majority of 
situations being investigated and prosecuted by the Court related to Africa, 
which leads to suspicion on its selection criteria. This criticism raises questions 
as to the bases of the ICC. 
The ICC is no longer in a state of grace and the risk of marginalization is increasing 
(Kowalski, 2011).  In 2016, Burundi, South Africa and Gambia have notified 
their decision to withdraw from the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
At the same time criminal justice is becoming universal, alternative forms of jus-
tice are being promoted in situations in which serious international crimes 
have been committed. In Rwanda, for instance, justice was a core element 
for reconciliation. Given the limited role of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the limitations of the Rwandan legal system, tra-
ditional collective structures were used to administer justice after the geno-
cide (the Gacaca courts) with emphasis being given to the restorative 
dimension of justice. The case of Rwanda is, therefore, a good example of 
how alternative forms of justice may be mobilized with a restorative pur-
pose (Kowalski, 2009). This has fueled the debate on international criminal 
justice and its complementary jurisdictional role. 
Reflecting on the ideals that are at the basis of international criminal justice should 
be permanent so as to allow the development of a discourse of ethical legiti-
macy needed to provide international criminal justice with an effective ability 
to resist and change. Yet, for there to be legitimacy, criticism, deconstruction 
and uncovering must take place. This means that the hope in international 
criminal justice – and in particular in the International Criminal Court – has 
to be linked to the hope in critical thought and in the will of all relevant inter-
national actors – States, international organizations, civil society, victims.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE BETWEEN TWO CULTURES 
Peace and Law are ancient concepts of theorization and of social construction. Their 
scientifically autonomization, their conceptual development and their aca-
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demic acceptance and in practice have never been and will never be simulta-
neous. Yet, their aims are similar:  material and emotional well-being of 
human beings. In the last hundred years, the debates between realism and 
idealism/liberalism have influenced both International Relations (Richmond, 
2008) and International Law (Koskenniemi, 1992), including in what con-
cerns theoretical construction of peace. The term “peace” is today a struc-
tured and extraordinarily multilayered concept. In terms of International 
Law, its wide material and personal scope, as well as the imperative nature of 
some of its rules pave the way to a “Law of Humanity” (Pureza, 2002). Peace 
is a concept that has evolved from the idea of negative peace to the present 
idea of positive and structured peace (Galtung, 1975; Richmond, 2008). This 
peace is composed of several elements from different fields which evidences 
an aspiration for a holistic well-being in a non-violent environment. 
International Law may play a role in standardizing the elements of peace and 
ensuring their effective and fair implementation. The academic divide 
between International Relations and International Law (Beck, 1996) leads to 
what Young (1992: 174) described as the “syndrome of two cultures”. The 
divide between those two scientific fields are, to a certain extent, the result 
of the discourse promoted by authors of each of those fields as well as of 
political and diplomatic practice which tends to have a (moderate) Cartesian 
perspective of diplomatic legal and political discourses. International 
Relations authors tend to view International Law as marginal or as a danger-
ous myth (Kewenig, 1973). The state-centered world order and the impos-
sibility to enforce sanctions would make legal regulation irrelevant. Others 
have questioned the contribution of Law to peace (Boasson, 1968), namely in 
what concerns the activity of international criminal courts (Meernik, 2005) 
or the conventions on human rights (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). 
There are also those who believe the opposite: the international order will only 
truly be order, and the international society will only be a community when 
international social relations are regulated by Law (Tomuschat, 1993; 
Fassbender, 1998). Abbott (2005) even describes international lawyers as 
architects of global governance. International Law scholars often view 
International Relations as a theoretical rather than an active and changing 
political discourse, limited to the analysis ad nauseum of relations between 
States and the power relations that they are condemned to be part of. 
Moreover, it is sometimes referred that, considering that the history of Law 
can be dated to Roman Law and that of International Law in particular to the 
“legal theologians” and to Grotius in the 16th and 17th centuries, International 
Relations are still a young and immature scientific field of the 1950s. From a 
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more subjective perspective, this discourse adds to the corporate sense of 
superiority of certain International Law scholars over International Relations. 
This then fuels reactions of International Relations’ scholars who declare the 
irrelevance of International Law. In any case, and as Pureza points out, this 
syndrome of two cultures is grounded on the different perspective each field 
has: International Relations has an expository and analytical point of view 
while International Law has a prescriptive and normative one” (1998). 
“International criminal justice” has been widely analyzed. This is, in fact, a subject-
matter that requires a wide and encompassing approach which includes 
themes belonging to different scientific fields, as for example: the typifica-
tion of serious crimes against the international community; the functioning 
of the courts; the contribution to the development of International Law; the 
promotion and protection of human rights; the relevance of the individual 
in the international space; the impact in the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts; or the States’ foreign policy towards the ICC. This is usually an 
analysis carried out separately by different scientific fields, and “interna-
tional criminal justice” has drawn more attention from International Law 
than from International Relations. 
There is, however, space and relevance for a discourse under a multilayered 
approach. Firstly, “international criminal justice” can be a case study for 
several of the current theoretical problematics under the radar of 
International Law and International Relations scholars. Moreover, “inter-
national criminal justice” has the potential to become a discourse element 
congregating those two fields, which have stubbornly been kept separate. 
Additionally, “international criminal justice” may benefit from an inte-
grated approach by International Law and International Relations, which 
would enrich and providing it with new perspectives.
THE PROJECT “INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN TWO CULTURES” 
The project “International Criminal Justice: A Dialogue between Two Cultures”, 
developed in the Observatório das Relações Exteriores (Observare) at 
Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, aims to be a hub that brings together 
researchers, experiences and methodologies from both International Law 
and International Relations. Whenever deemed relevant, researchers from 
International Law may be asked to step out of their comfort zone and that, 
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though keeping their scientific background, deal with issues usually studied 
within the scope of International Relations (and vice-versa). The research 
center invited authors, national and foreign, with different scientific back-
grounds and who have either an academic point of view or practical experi-
ence within the scope of international criminal justice. 
This research project has four objectives. The first is to design a discourse on 
“international criminal justice” that combines International Law and 
International Relations perspectives on common themes, contributing to 
more creative and well-founded responses. The second is to identify point of 
convergence and divergence (and their consequences) on common themes 
to those scientific fields. The third objective is to find new proposals for 
some of the current issues in international criminal justice. Finally, this pro-
ject also aims at providing research results that evidence a wide perspective 
of international criminal justice that may benefit researchers, diplomatic 
agents, international justice agents or students. 
THE BOOK “INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A DIALOGUE 
BETWEEN TWO CULTURES”
The contributions to the project, in the form of scientific papers, were published 
in Portuguese and/or in English at JANUS.NET e-Journal of International 
Relations. The present volume is a compilation of those papers. 
The first chapter, entitled “International Criminal Justice and the Erosion of 
Sovereignty”, was written by Miguel de Serpa Soares. The author empha-
sizes the fact that the International Criminal Court is still “in its teens” in the 
world legal order. However, as it affects institutional balance and the powers 
in force since 1945, the Court evidences the tensions between supranation-
alism and the erosion of State sovereignty, which the author views differ-
ently depending of being big or small/medium-sized States in terms of 
“judicial sovereignty”. The text analyzes in detail the process that led to the 
inclusion of the definition of crime of aggression as well as the conditions to 
exercise jurisdiction in the Rome Statute (the jurisdiction over the crime 
was already included in 1998) at the Kampala Conference in 2010, conclud-
ing that the compromise obtained evidences the differences in position 
between, on the one hand, the five permanent members of the Security 
Council, whose objective was to maintain the prerogatives the United 
Nations Charter assigned to them in determining situations of aggression 
and, on the other hand, a set of different alliances between groups of coun-
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tries whose common element was the defense of ICC independence before 
the Security Council, as well as autonomy in the legal determination that a 
crime of aggression was committed. The author considers that the compro-
mised attained at Kampala represents a defeat for the five permanent mem-
bers of the Security Council and, just like the Rome Statute, it has created 
gaps in the punishing monopoly of States and the Security Council. The 
paper concludes that the existence of an international criminal justice is in 
opposition with the idea of state sovereignty. Yet, the relation between the 
two should not be viewed as antagonistic but rather as complementary to 
and transformative of the concept of sovereignty itself. However, so that the 
ICC may impose itself, especially before more powerful States, Miguel de 
Serpa Soares contends that it must consolidate impeccable jurisprudence, as 
did the Court of Justice of the European Union or the International Court 
of Justice and. As such, time must be given to this new institution.
Francisca Saraiva has authored the second chapter entitled “Major violence 
(crimes) against the international community”. The author notes that ICC 
has provide the international community with a permanent legal mecha-
nism to dissuade and repress barbarous and extremely cruel acts. Yet, the 
result attained by the Rome Statute in 1998 and by the definition of the 
crime of aggression at the Kampala Conference in 2010, was nevertheless 
influenced, in the author’s point of view, by the negotiation strategies of the 
great powers, organized considering their long term interests, which led to 
selective multilateralism. In particular, the author contends that the hostil-
ity towards the Court from the United States of America is not due to 
American power vitality but is a political survival strategy so as to delay the 
rise of new hegemonic powers which will take the United States’ place in 
the international system. The negotiation of the crime of aggression showed 
that what was in question in the ICC was the right of big powers to maintain 
their freedom in strategic (and warfare) action and to protect their own 
humanitarian agenda. 
Mateus Kowalski brings to the discussion a concern about the place of the ICC 
within the universalistic approach to international relations and the world 
order. In the chapter entitled “The Stormy Waters of the International 
Criminal Court: Universal Fight Against Impunity or Liberal 
Universalization?”, the author examines on the type of universalism the ICC 
represents. The author notes that a rational approach to international social 
relations is different from an ethical one. The rational approach is based on 
a unique rational process and its prioritization - a universal process which 
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can be extended to all human beings. Therefore, it would be possible to 
identify a wide range of interests and objectives common to the global com-
munity, usually universal and self-evident when deriving from a correct 
deductive rational process which leads to unique and universal truths. An 
ethical approach, on the other hand, resorts to a more subjective analysis 
based on a minimum common ethical ground reached through dialogue: 
diversity, plurality and locality are in this case more relevant. While the 
rational approach may lead to universalization of localized specific moral 
models (e.g. the liberal Western model) promoting its hegemony, the ethical 
approach promotes diversity by considering non-reducible differences and 
common human phenomena in which only a minimal common ethics is 
universal. In his paper, the author argues that the answer to this structural 
question is crucial to understand if the Court is essentially a hegemonic tool 
to expand the predominant Western liberal model or rather a mechanism to 
fight impunity with due regard to diversity and rooted on an axiological 
concern. Against this backdrop, Mateus Kowalski observes that the ICC is 
immersed in stormy waters given that it is not always possible to separate a 
universalizing liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. 
Nevertheless, the author concludes that the Court is essentially defined by 
the universalization of the fight against impunity through reference to a 
minimal common ethics, even if at times and to a limited extent may serve 
as a hegemonic tool.  Therefore, the author concludes that the Court has to 
be seen as an important pathway towards the defense and promotion of 
human dignity and justice. However, there has to be a constant vigilance 
against its instrumentalization. 
In a contribution entitled  “The International Criminal Court and the evolution of 
the idea of combating impunity: an assessment 15 years after the Rome 
Conference, Patrícia Galvão Teles evaluates the International Criminal 
Court´s first years of operation, taking stock of the institution’s activity. The 
main challenges which confronted this institution at the age of fifteen are 
described and analyzed, namely: a) the quest for universality, complementa-
rity and cooperation; and b) the dilemma between peace and justice. The 
paper focuses the specific situation of Kenya, where the President and Vice-
President of the Republic were suspected of committing crimes against 
humanity. Considering the positions taken by the African Union, the text 
discusses whether the introduction of immunity from criminal jurisdiction, 
albeit temporary, to Heads of State and Government while in Office could 
come to represent a step backwards for the idea of combating impunity for 
the most serious international crimes.
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Sofia Santos, in the chapter with the title “The International Criminal Court and 
the construction of International Public Order”, discusses how envisioning 
an international public order means envisioning an order sustained by a 
legal and institutional framework that ensures effective collective action 
with a view to defending fundamental values of the international commu-
nity and to solving common global problems, in line with the universalist 
vision of International Law. The author argues that the establishment of the 
ICC added an international punitive perennial facet to international human-
itarian law and international human rights law and linked justice to peace, 
to security and to the well-being of the world, reaffirming the principles 
and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the affir-
mation process of an international criminal justice by punishing those 
responsible for the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole faces numerous obstacles of political and normative 
character. The article identifies the central merits of the Rome Statute and 
ICC’s practice and indicates its limitations caused by underlying legal-
political tensions and interpretive questions relating to the crime of aggres-
sion and crimes against humanity. Finally, the article argues for the indis-
pensability of rethinking the jurisdiction of the ICC, defending the catego-
rization of terrorism as an international crime, and of articulating its mis-
sion with the “responsibility to protect”, which may contribute to the con-
solidation of the ICC and of international criminal law and reinforce its role 
in the construction of an effective international public order.
In a chapter with the title “The Prosecutor within international criminal justice”, 
Almiro Rodrigues discusses the duties and powers of the Prosecutor within 
international criminal justice and how to some extent they equate those of the 
Prosecutor at domestic level. However, they differ substantially and methodo-
logically within the framework of international criminal justice. The challenges 
posed by the investigation and prosecution of crimes on a large scale or massive 
criminal violations committed years ago in a sovereign foreign country are 
unique. Thus, it is both remarkable and surprising in many ways that the legal 
investigating tools available to the international Prosecutor have produced 
results that one can see and quantify. Although the challenges remain, the 
author argues that the work of the Prosecutor within international criminal 
justice is a considerable achievement in the fight against impunity for serious 
violations of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.
Luís Moita, in the chapter entitled “Opinion Tribunals and the Permanent People’s 
Tribunal”, highlights that justice is not necessarily confined to formal courts 
and tribunals, providing an interesting reflection on the “Permanent People’s 
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Tribunal” as an alternative forum of justice. The author notes that there is a 
dialectic relationship between public opinion and the enforcement of justice by 
the competent authorities. History contains numerous examples where inter-
national opinion movements stand against judicial decisions, since, either by act 
or by omission, established jurisdictions sometimes pronounce questionable 
verdicts or leave unpunished crimes that were committed. That may take a 
variety of forms, ranging from international commissions of inquiry to truth 
and reconciliation commissions. Among such exercises of citizenship from civil 
society, the author singles out the so-called “opinion tribunals”, whose first 
major initiative was due to Bertrand Russell in the 1960s. Following this tradi-
tion, the Permanent People’s Tribunal has been very active between 1979 and 
2014, organizing deliberative assemblies and pronouncing decisions in a “quasi-
judicial” framework. Even when dealing with internal issues of a particular 
country, they address global issues and the echoes of their deliberations extend 
beyond national borders. Luís Moita notes that critics of the Permanent 
People’s Tribunal point a finger at its resemblance with justice used for ideo-
logical purposes. However, the author argues that the legitimacy of this and 
similar initiatives, backed by current International Law, is defendable for their 
capacity to shake consciences and for being a legal innovation at the service of 
the rights of peoples. The author concludes that legal normativity is a tool for 
progress and humanization. Opinion tribunals and in particular the Permanent 
Peoples’ Tribunal have shared responsibility for contributing to avoid the impu-
nity of crimes committed and for fostering the enforcement of law, not as an 
oppressive norm but rather as a liberating matrix.
Miguel Santos Neves, in his chapter entitled “Human Rights, International Criminal 
Law and the Challenges of a Victim-Centred Reparatory Justice: the ICC 
Contribution” explores the contribution of the ICC’s legal framework and 
the Court’s recent practice to the promotion of human rights in general and 
in establishing a paradigm shift towards a victim-centred criminal justice, 
looking at the innovations introduced, their effectiveness, limits and systemic 
impact. The author argues that the ICC Statute is the symbol of a new rela-
tionship between international human rights law and international criminal 
law. He claims that, from a human rights perspective, the fundamental 
achievement of the Court is the enhancement of the status and rights of vic-
tims. Miguel Santos Neves also points out some shortcomings of the system 
established by the ICC Statute in what concerns the victims, including the 
difficulty in achieving a significant participation of victims in the proceedings; 
the fact that the way reparations are established and awarded do not neces-
sarily ensure individual, prompt and adequate reparation of victims, and fail 
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to protect them from victimization; and the underfunding of the Court 
which may negatively affect the implementation of the restorative justice 
paradigm. The author concludes that Member States, non-governmental 
organizations and civil society have a major role in providing finance and 
political support to the work of the Court so it may fulfil its purposes and 
thus become an important part of the global system of human rights.
The final chapter authored by Patrícia Galvão Teles entitled “The ICC at the Centre 
of an International Criminal Justice System: Current Challenges”, brings an 
update on the current challenges facing the ICC. The author argues that the 
ICC has entered into its second decade of operations and has established 
itself at the centre of an international criminal justice system, comprising 
also domestic jurisdictions and other international courts and tribunals. 
However, many challenges continue to face the ICC and, indeed, are part of 
its own features and stem from the specificities of International Law and 
International Relations. Recent political events are testing the Statute’s uni-
versality, the system of complementarity with national jurisdictions, the 
reliance on State’s cooperation and the possible exercise of the Court’s juris-
diction with regard to the crime of aggression. These challenges illustrate 
how the ICC and international criminal justice inhabit both the cultures of 
justice and politics and how these two aspects have to be taken into account 
in order for such challenges to be overcome, so that the mission of a perma-
nent and central instrument for the fight against impunity, that historically 
started in Rome in 1998, becomes an inherent part of today’s world.
FINAL REMARKS
The project “International Criminal Justice International: A Dialogue between Two 
Cultures” allowed to place in the same space of reflection perspectives not only 
from two different scientific areas but also from diverse functional contexts. In 
our view, this diversity of scientific and functional backgrounds has resulted in 
a very rich analysis of relevant aspects of international criminal justice.
The outcome of this project indicates the importance of strengthening the idea of 
interdisciplinary research as a methodology for the reading, analysis and 
socio-international construction, as well as to the need for scientific 
research that contributes to the overcoming of the “two cultures syn-
drome”. Law does not dismiss other disciplines such as philosophy, history, 
economics, political science, sociology or even psychology. In particular, 
International Law cannot dismiss political science in the form of International 
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Relations. Just as the field of International Relations should not dismiss 
International Law as means of analysis, as a mechanism of transformation 
and as a normative vehicle (regulating and protecting) of essential aspects 
related to the value system and to social everyday life.
A final note on the challenges currently facing international criminal justice. The 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
appear to have been relatively successful in fulfilling their mandates and have 
indeed contributed in an innovative way to the individual criminal account-
ability of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international con-
cern. The International Criminal Court, which is intended to be the universal 
and permanent result of those previous experiences, today faces a barrage of 
structural criticism with accusations that the Tribunal is biased against African 
countries, that it undermines ongoing peace processes or that it interferes in 
the internal sovereignty of States. Moreover, the Court often faces difficulties 
with regard to the judicial cooperation with States. The situation is currently 
particularly challenging with several States having already indicated their 
withdrawal, or their wish to withdraw from the Rome Statute.
The centrality of the International Criminal Court in the international criminal 
justice system and the challenges the Court is facing are clearly reflected in 
the articles published in this book. An opinion that seems to be transversal 
to the book is the recognition of the great potentialities of international 
criminal justice for the promotion and protection of human rights as well as 
for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The success of the Tribunal is 
therefore essential for the civilizational progress of today’s turbulent inter-
national society and for the well-being of all individuals. This success 
depends above all on the political will of States. However, the active par-
ticipation of civil society in this debate, including academics and practition-
ers in the areas of International Law and International Relations, is abso-
lutely crucial not only in creating a moral reserve of international conscience 
but also in pointing out ways and propose creative and sustained solutions 
oriented towards what should matter the most – the human-beings.
In concluding, we wish to express our sincere gratitude to all authors for the 
knowledge that they lent to the project “International Criminal Justice: A 
Dialogue between Two Cultures” and now compiled in this book. It is our 
hope that this extraordinary group of thinkers may continue to reflect 
together on these relevant matters, and provide ideas and act on them 
towards a more just and peaceful world.
Mateus Kowalski and Patrícia Galvão Teles
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INTRODUCTION
International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court are institutions 
still in their early years in terms of world legal order. Ten years after its 
implementation, the International Criminal Court is an institution that still 
has to prove its credibility in international criminal narrative in the preven-
tion of international crimes that “affect the international community as a whole” 
and that “are a threat to peace, to security and to the well-being of Humanity”, in 
the words of the Rome Statute. All international legal bodies are restraints 
to the legal and even constitutional sovereignty of States. However, the rela-
tions between these institutions of legal supra-nationalism and States do not 
necessarily have to be antagonistic or competitors. Affirmation of any legal, 
supranational, regional or universal, legal order will always go through peri-
ods of conflict and rivalry that represent the time needed for national sov-
ereignties to adapt to new scenarios. In the case of the International 
Criminal Court, this tension is heightened because, inevitably, institutional 
balances and an arrangement of powers in place since 1945 are affected.
The times to come will be a period for observing rather than for explaining. We 
will observe the way in which the Court will create a judicial language 
against impunity and how complementary relations with national jurisdic-
tions will be defined.
International Criminal Justice  
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STATE SOVEREIGNTY: A FLEXIBLE CONCEPT
Before analyzing some specific instances that will allow us to reflect on the emer-
gence of International Criminal Law and the erosion of sovereignty, it is 
important to state some basic facts.
The first is that there are two separate but overlapping realities in international legal 
order and these correspond to two different paradigms of thought. The 
“Grocian” (or “Hobbsian”) paradigm, based on a state perspective of interna-
tional relations and the ”Kantian” paradigm, cosmopolitan and universal1.In 
the first case, sovereign States develop cooperation relations with the single 
purpose of better pursuing interests they considered national interests. In the 
second case, States develop cooperation relations also bearing in mind the 
interests of an international community separate from the States themselves.
In 2013, the State is still the primary subject of International Law and interna-
tional society is basically the result of the interaction among territorially-
based political communities, independent, protected by formal legal equal-
ity and having certain essential features. Simultaneously, the recent dynam-
ics in international relations and the huge development of International Law, 
in particular after 1945, lead us to acknowledge the existence of real condi-
tions, perhaps restraints, to the sovereign powers of States. In the latter case, 
the explosion of multilateralism, the appearance of international subjects 
such as international organizations, some including supranational elements, 
the restraints to jus ad bellum, the relativization of the principle of State 
immunity2, the consolidating of a Humanitarian International Law and a 
Human Rights International Law, as well as the concept of international 
crimes and the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court, all 
contribute to the idea of a relative, flexible Sovereignty, in any case a sover-
eignty that needs to adapt to external factors affecting its powers, whether 
these are legal rules or competing centers of political and judicial power.
It is not important to understand the concept of sovereignty as mere emanation of 
realistic thought in which power politics is at the core but rather identify in 
international legal narrative, in casu, in International Criminal Law, the real 
implications of these possible restraints.
1  Cassese, A (2005). International Law, Oxford: University Press, p.20 and in particular texts by M. Wight e H. Bull 
mentioned in footnote 11.
2  Under Portuguese jurisdiction on the jurisdictional immunity of States, see Margarida Salema D’Oliveira Martins 
(2011). “Comentário ao Acórdão do Tribunal da Relação de Lisboa relativo ao Processo 135/06.2TVLB.L1-7”.  
In Anuário Português de Direito Internacional 2011, M.N.E. p.119.
31
Miguel de Serpa Soares
Noteworthy is to establish the basic idea that sovereignty is made manifest in power 
and independence. Identified as a feature of territorial State, sovereignty is 
essentially the possibility to enforce all powers of authority on a specific 
territory and on all the individuals living therein. These powers are put into 
practice through the adopting and enforcing rules (administratively or judi-
cially) and in the ability to restore the Law, either though coercive enforce-
ment of sentences or through jus punendi. As a consequence, the sovereign 
State has the right to exclude enforcing the powers of authority by any other 
State within its territory and the other State has the duty of non-interfer-
ence. Choosing this basic concept, which corresponds to an absolute and 
realistic sovereign paradigm, is for analytical purposes only, so as to decon-
struct the concept.
In 1928, the referee Max Huber stated that: “La souveraineité dans les relations entre 
États signifie l’independance” 3. 
Independence affirmed against other subjects of international Law and a funda-
mental consequence of international legal personality exclusively acknowl-
edged by International Law, in accordance with the formula of legal imme-
diacy referred by Allain Pellet (Pellet, 2002,p 424). In 1758, Vatel wrote 
that “Un nain est aussi bien un homme qu’un géant: une petite republique n’est pas 
moins un État souverain que le plus puissant royaume” (Vatel, 1863,p 100)
In the formal and legal translation of this principle, nothing fundamental has 
changed since the 18th century: article 2, nº 1 of the United Nations 
Charter lays down this principle of formal equality among States and, thus, 
adopts several principles which ensure that equality and independence.
Based on these elements, potestas or internal authority and independence, sover-
eignty should be seen as the ability States enjoy of enforcing their preroga-
tives, both internally and externally, as well as the ability to influence the 
development of international law.
The current analysis of the conditions under which States exercise their sover-
eignty cannot ignore the historical process by which modern States were 
formed, which is intertwined with the process of how the Jus Gentium have 
developed.
Claim by States that they are superiores non recognescentes beings stems essentially from 
the rebellion by the princes against the double authority of the Emperor or 
the Pope and their refusal to acknowledge the secular universal authority of 
both (potestas directa). The fact that each community aspires to exercise sover-
3 Decision on 4 April 1928 «L’Île des Palmes», Recueil des Sentences Arbitrales II-838.
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eign powers within its territory and to relate with other political communi-
ties without the interference of other secular authorities embodies this first 
“aggressive” concept of sovereignty, which must be affirmed against other 
existing powers. Interestingly, the Portuguese are also at the base of extreme 
reactions against secular authority by the pope and in speeding the creation 
of the Modern State. The Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, based on the assigning 
of new territories and seas exclusively to Portugal and Spain by papal edict 
added to the anger of other European nations against the power of the Pope 
and the old order civitas christianna. Sovereignty was argued as a claim for a 
space of freedom, freedom to gain territory, freedom to navigate and do 
commerce against a secular authority with a transcendent foundation4.
The destruction of medieval order, symbolized by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, 
marks the foundation of the modern State and of International Law. 
However, in the beginning, State sovereignty is still included in the sover-
eignty of the prince; only with the onset of liberal constitutionalism at the 
end of the 18th century, subjects are considered citizens and “the sover-
eignty of the prince” becomes the sovereignty of the State. The affirmation 
of sovereignty-power, seen as exclusive jurisdiction and supremacy of public 
powers over citizens and territory, and of sovereignty-independence, the 
capacity for direct and autonomous relation with other powers reached a 
climax during 19th century legal positivism which only ended in 1945.
In this international legal order, basically consisting of a European public legal 
order, in the concert of “civilized nations”, the principle of quasi-absolute 
State sovereignty has become the basis for all international relations and 
Law5. The slow historical process leading to the collapse of this concept of 
absolute sovereignty starts after the 1950s. 
The first interventions by International Law on defining the restraints to State 
sovereignty are in the Right to War. The freedom to initiate war as an essen-
tial feature of the sovereign State is limited firstly through the first attempts 
to regulate jus ad bellum, a process which started with the foundation of the 
International Red Cross and the Hague rule of law. Jus ad bellum remains 
unchanged until the Briand-Kellog Pact in 1928.
4  On the historic development of the concept, see H. Steinberger (2000). “Sovereignty “ in Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law – IV,  R. Bernhardt ed. North Holland:Max Planck Institute.
5  And, according to Martti Koskenniemi (2008), especially a justification for International Law resulting from European 
history and culture as a means to justify the colonial expansion in Africa by means of a distinction between civilized and 
uncivilized peoples, the latter having no Sovereignty which was an exclusive feature of civilized nations in The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations – The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960. Cambridge: University Press. p. 127.
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From 1945 onwards, the international legal acquis and the multilateral institutional 
framework starts to be formed and develop in which sovereignty will be exer-
cised. The United Nations Charter and the principle to forbid the threat to use 
force as means of conflict resolution, Humanitarian International Law includ-
ing, namely the Geneva Conventions, the legal protection of the individual, 
even if in its early stages, through the adoption of different universal and 
regional treaties on human rights, the sophisticated formulas of joint exercise 
of sovereignty, as in the case of the European Union, and finally, the emergence 
of International Criminal Law, all create a mulch-layered reality in which the 
idea of absolute sovereignty cannot be reconciled with the idea of absolute 
sovereignty6. All these changes imply specific restrictions in exercising state 
sovereignty, largely based on legal rules that discipline the freedom of States.
So as to reflect on the current nature of sovereignty we must also establish the 
concept of sovereignty that is at stake. Is it a military, monetary, economic 
or judicial sovereignty? A sovereignty as exclusive powers of authority over 
citizens and territory? A legal sovereignty as an imperviousness of interna-
tional legal order to International Law or as an ability to influence the pro-
duction of international laws? Sovereignty as an exclusive set of rights and 
prerogatives or sovereignty that also includes the duties of States?
For the author of this text, a Portuguese citizen, in March 2013, the following 
statement must be made: Portugal is a member of the European Union, to 
which the country transferred several of its sovereign powers, namely mon-
etary sovereignty, and is currently under the intervention of a troika of 
foreign institutions under a financial assistance program. This intervention 
implies a restraint to its sovereign powers so as to make fundamental politi-
cal choices. Portugal signed, among many other treaties, the European 
Union Treaty which includes several provisions on European citizenship. 
Portugal accepts the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice, it is under the jurisdiction of the Luxembourg and the Strasbourg 
Courts and has signed the Rome Statute. Portugal does not have its own 
currency, has no relevant military power and has its Constitution which is 
6  For the sole purposes of this analysis, we use artificially simplified versions of concepts. The concept of absolute 
sovereignty cannot in itself be acknowledged in theoretical terms except as a denial of International Law, a concept 
accepted since long by the international legal Doctrine. 
As G. Scelle states in 1932, “La notion de souveraneité est donc incompatible avec celle de droit objectif comme avec celles 
de sujet de droit. C’est une tâche vaine de vouloir construire le Droit, et en particulier le Droit international, sur la notion 
de la souveraineté de l’Etat. Là encore, le concept ne peut aboutir pratiquement qu’à soustraire la volonté des 
gouvernements à l’emprise du Droit, à détruire la notion de compétence et, avec elle, celle de légalité» (Scelle, 1932,p 14).
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mainly in agreement with International Law7 and which even automatically 
accepts laws from general International Law. Portugal is not a permanent 
member of the Security Council, does not have significant natural resources 
beside a wide EEZ, its diplomacy has limited material resources and its 
population is rather small in world terms.
The understanding of what may be the erosion of national sovereignty cannot be 
separated from the national perspective of each observer nor from the strat-
egies of adaption by each small or medium-sized State.
A permanent member of the Security Council will likely assess the erosion poten-
tial of its sovereignty differently from the author. Exercising sovereignty in 
Portugal is largely based on a link with the multilateral system, in the joint 
exercising of sovereign powers, namely within the framework of the 
European Union and in an openness to those outside its legal order. An 
American or a Chinese citizen will probably view the same phenomenon 
under the perspective of real restraints that full participation in a multilat-
eral system may bring to its powers. This is especially true in Law and in 
International Criminal Law in particular. Through observing the relation 
between the permanent members of the Security Council and the 
International Criminal Court we aim to evidence this idea.
THE END OF THE PUNISHING MONOPOLY OF STATES: CRIME AND 
PUNISHMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
In 1919, article 227, n.º 1 of the Treaty of Versailles laid down that “Art. 227 – Les 
puissances alliées et associées mettent en accusation publique Guillaume II de 
Hohenzollern, ex-empereur d’Allemagne, pour offense suprême contre la morale inter-
nationale et l’autorité sacrée des traités. Un tribunal spécial sera constitué pour juger 
l’accusé en lui assurant les garanties essentielles du droit de défense. Il sera composé 
de cinq juges, nommés par chacune des cinq puissances suivantes, à savoir: les États-
Unis d’Amérique, la Grande Bretagne, la France, L’Italie et le Japon.
Le tribunal jugera sur motifs inspirés des principes les plus élevés de la politique 
entre les nations avec le souci d’assurer le respect des obligations solennelles 
et des engagements internationaux ainsi que la morale internationale.
7  See Miranda, Jorge (2010).  “O Artigo 8º da Constituição e o Direito Internacional” in Augusto de Athayde/  
João Caupers/ Maria da Glória F.P.D. Garcia (eds.) Estudos em homenagem ao Professor Doutor Freitas do Amaral. (p. 415).
Coimbra: Almedina.
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Les puissances alliées et associées adresseront au Gouvernement des Pays-Bas une requête le 
priant de livrer l’ancien empereur entre leurs mains pour qu’il soit jugé»8.
The ending of this story is well-known: Kaiser William II took refuge in the 
Netherlands, whose Government refused his extradition invoking the nonex-
istence of a competent international court as well as a preliminary incrimi-
nating rule. Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze the language used at 
Versailles (“international morals”, “high political principles among nations”), 
as well as a true novelty which was the a Sovereign was described as a defend-
ant, accused of  “offense suprême” (supreme offense, yet not qualified as 
crime), to “ international morals”9. Equally noteworthy is the subtle and 
continuous change in international legal language which emerges after the 
appearance of International Criminal Law and progresses with the successive 
attempts at rules and limiting the “warring” sovereignty of States.
In 1814, the Declaration of Vienna against Slave-trading refers to civilized 
nations”, essentially European nations, slowly shifting the moral speech, in 
particular that of European powers, in a speech on International Law, 
gradually translated in legal rules. The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 
and in 1907 mark the first coding process of the laws of war and the so-
called “Martens Clause”10, included in the preambles of the Conventions 
II of 1899 and 1907 stated that “until a more complete code of the laws of war 
is adopted, the parties consider adequate to declare that, in the cases not included 
in the provisions adopted, the populations and the warring parties are under the 
protection and observation of the Rights of People, considering they derive from 
customs among civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the demands of public 
conscience”11. 
Noteworthy is also that some of this language survived the new world order after 
1945: article 38, nº 2c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
still refers to the general principles of Law recognized by the “civilized 
nations” as a source of International Law.
8 «Pages d’Histoire -1914-1919» (1919). Paris: Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault. 108.
9  In 1932, Hans Kelsen in his course in the Hague Academy, used the examples of the Versailles rules on the responsibility 
of the Kaiser to evidence the idea that only States could be subjected to International Law would be a false one  
in R. Kolb (2003). Les Cours Généraux de Droit International Public de l’Academie de la Haye(p.82). Brussels: Bruylant.
10  In 1883, the same Fyodor Martens, Professor at the university of St Petersburg, defined International Law as follows: 
“Les États indépendants jouissant de la civilisation européenne constituent le domaine régi par le droit international et 
jouent un rôle actif das la communauté internationale (…) C’est de cette action des États civilisés que provient le droit 
international » (Martens, 1883,p 307).
11  See Kowalski, M & Serpa Soares, M. (2011) “Cláusula Martens” in M. A. Ribeiro, F. P. Coutinho & Isabel Cabrita (eds) 
Enciclopédia de Direito Internacional.(p.91) Coimbra: Almedina.
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The peace of Versailles originated the first instances of institutionalization of multi-
lateralism, such as the failed Society of Nations as well as the transference of 
a criminal narrative to international scenario. The Legal Advisory Committee, 
appointed by the Society of Nations recommended in 1920 that an 
International Supreme Court should be founded with competence to try 
crimes committed against international public order and the universal law of 
nations. This court would also be assigned competence to define the list of 
crimes and applicable punishments, the means to enforce them as well as its 
rules of procedure. In 1920, Elihu Root asked the following question on this 
project: “Are the Governments of the world prepared to give up their individual sov-
ereign rights to the necessary extent?” (Ferencz, 2000,p 40)12. 
The question, obviously rhetoric in 1920, was not answered in a positive way 
before the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 and even then it was only 
partially positive.
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials led to the collapse of the Sovereign’s punishing 
monopoly and are a turning point in the erosion process, the adaptation 
rectius of state sovereignty. Several perspectives are possible on these his-
toric trials: from considering it was all mere winner justice to a judicial 
catharsis of guilt and redemption; historians, political scientists and lawyers 
will hardly understand these events in the same way13.
In the aftermath of the victory by the allies in 1945, two possibilities opened to 
the winners: mere execution or imprisonment of the losers and their pun-
ishment following a trial. Benjamim Ferencz, the youngest member of the 
American prosecution team in 1945, says, in a rather humorous and acid 
tone about the British that “In fact, the Foreign Office still did not favor 
war crimes trials. To avoid long legal proceedings, that might become a 
propaganda forum for Nazi leaders, the United Kingdom preferred a 
«political disposition». Always noted for their «fair play», the British argued 
that «execution without trial is the preferable course». Exactly who was to shoot 
whom and when to stop shooting was not made clear” (Ferencz, 2000,p 
42).
12  Elihu Root was the American Secretary of War (1899-1904) and Secretary of State (1905-1909) with President 
Theodore Roosevelt. Nobel Peace Prize in 1912, Root presided to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Elihu Root’s political thought was made public in his book (1927) Politique Exterieure des États-Unis et Droit International: 
Discours et Extraits. Paris: A. Pedone.
13  For a contemporary critical perspective on Nuremberg and Tokyo, see G. Mettraux (ed.) (2008). Perspectives  
of the Nuremberg Trial. Oxford: University Press and Yuma Totami (2009). The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit  
of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Harvard: University Press.
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The London Agreement on 8 August 1945, which led to the creation of the 
Nuremberg court, resulted mainly from the American perspective 
which, with the Soviet support, managed to be imposed on the remaining 
allies. In a vaguely grand speech about the trial, Judge Robert Jackson, 
Chief Prosecutor of the American team at Nuremberg, said: ”That four 
great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of venge-
ance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is 
one of the most significant tributes that Power as ever paid to Reason” (Ferencz, 
2000, p 37).
The Charter of the International Military Court established as crimes under its 
competence for which individuals may be held accountable the crimes 
against peace, crimes of war and crimes against humanity, thus creating, for 
the first time a criminal list of international crime - the origins of the 
International Criminal Code. Article 6 typifies (“the following acts or some 
of them”) as “crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there 
shall be individual responsibility”: crimes against peace (the precedessor of the 
“crime of aggression” adopted in the Kampala Conference in 2010); crimes 
of war (“namely the violations of the laws or customs of war”); crimes 
against humanity (“namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deporta-
tion and other inhumane acts”). A national criminalist today cannot but 
wonder in face of the open typification of these crimes.
There is ample literature on the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as well as hard criti-
cism, in particular American criticism, on the exceptional nature of an ex 
post facto justice.
The discomfort of some judges at the time, namely in terms of the crimes against 
peace, stemmed from the knowledge that the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
International Military Courts operated outside the framework of Criminal 
Law principles, namely the principles of nullen crimen sine lege and nulla poena 
sine lege. Judge William Douglas expressed his criticism on criminalizing 
“crimes against peace” as follows: “(I) thought and still think that the Nuremberg 
trials were unprincipled. Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and clamor of 
the time” (Glennon, 2010,p 75).
In 1946, Federal Judge Charles E. Wyzansky stated the following on criminalizing 
war of aggression: “The body of growing custom to which reference is made is custom 
directed at sovereign states and not individuals. There is no Convention or Treaty which 
places obligations explicitly upon an individual not to aid in wagging an aggressive 
war” (Glennon, 2010,p 76) and to the question whether the bases for 
Nuremberg may lie in the general principles of Criminal Law common to 
all “civilized nations”, he said that “(…) it would be a basis that would not satisfy 
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most lawyers. It would resemble the universally condemned law of June 28, 1935 
which provided: ‘Any person who commits an act which the law declares to be punish-
able or which is deserving of penalty according to the fundamental conceptions of the 
penal law and sound popular feeling, shall be punished’. It would fly straight in the 
face of the most fundamental rules of the criminal justice – that criminal laws shall 
not be ex post facto and there shall be nullum crimen et nulla poena sine lege – no 
crime and no penalty whiteout an antecedent law” (Glennon, 2010,p 76).
This debate was equally present at the Tokyo trial, two judges having voted against 
the final decision to sentence. The dissenting opinion of the Indian judge 
Radhabinod Pal, absolving all defendants at Tokyo is an extremely relevant 
text in the recent history of International Law, representing, under the 
appearance of a confrontation between naturalism and positivism, the first 
serious challenge to international legal order by western empires and is 
worth being reread today14.
However, Nuremberg and Tokyo are a turning point in International Law. Despite 
their flaws, these trials mark the beginning of a criminal narrative in 
International Law. Offenses to morality or to the laws and customs of the 
“civilized nations” are clearly defined as criminal conduct, though ex post 
facto, and considered of individual criminal liability. The hanging of some 
Nazi convicted at Nuremberg and the conviction of Hideki Tojo, Japanese 
Prime Minister at the time of the attack to Pearl Harbor are highly sym-
bolical moments of this turning point. State sovereignty is no longer the last 
and ultimate protection of its citizens, of its policy-makers and military high 
ranks maxime. International legal order, even considering that the order in 
1945 included mainly the winners of WWII, is more important than state 
sovereignty and holds the individual directly accountable in criminal terms. 
Drawing a parallel with Anglo-Saxon doctrine on the disregard of legal per-
sonality, in Nuremberg and Tokyo, there was a lifting of the sovereignty veil, 
disregarding state personality as subject with international liability and focus 
on the political or military leader as subject of criminal liability, tradition-
ally protected by state sovereignty. The hanging of those convicted in 
Nuremberg and Tokyo ends the State punishing monopoly: crime and its 
punishment are no longer exclusively defined and enforced by the Sovereign. 
Even with the physical disappearance of the individual.
14  Documentation on the Tokyo processes is available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp On the Pal doctrine 
see Kirsten Sellars (2011) “Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo”. European Journal of International Law. 21, 1095. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp
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Something changed since the exile of Kaiser William II: the lawyer took hold of the 
area belonging to the historian and the diplomat at the time when the nar-
rative on War is no longer the sole responsibility of history and the peace-
treaty makers. Through the hands of the judges, the narrative of War 
becomes a legal and judicial narrative, as is made evident in the thousands of 
pages with minutes from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. The best evidence 
of how the Law has taken possession of areas reserved to sovereign States is 
the new criminal speech in international law and the definition of crimes 
and their sentencing. Despite its flaws (criticized since that time), the fact 
that criminal speech is now present at international level and the gaps in 
States punishing monopoly are irreversible.
In the period after 1945, the concept of individual criminal liability before 
International Law, withdrawn from States exclusive power to punish its 
nationals, began its slow consolidation process. First through adopting the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
adopted by the General Assembly in 194815. Noteworthy is that the term 
“genocide” did not exist before 194616, the extermination of the Jews was 
tried and punished at Nuremberg as a crime of war or a crime against 
humanity. The narrative of the Law itself has undergone a change in the new 
order established in 1945: genocide, universal jurisdiction and universal 
punishment are terms that did not exist or were almost nonexistent in the 
period of almighty sovereignties17.
On 11 December 194618, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a set of Resolutions with significant impact for the later develop-
ment of International Criminal Law. In particular Resolution 95 restated the 
principles of International Law recognized in the Nuremberg Charter and 
appointed a Commission to prepare an International Criminal Code.
15  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (approved through Resolution by Assembleia 
da República nº 37/98, of 14 July in DR, 1ª Série-A, nº 160.
16  Term created in 1946 by the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin, author of the preliminary draft of the 1948 Convention. 
See Kowalski, M. & Serpa Soares, M. (2011) “Cláusula Martens”. In M. A. Ribeiro/F. Pereira Coutinho & I. Cabrita 
(eds) Enciclopédia de Direito Internacional(p.143). Coimbra: Almedina and L. May (2010) Genocide: a Normative 
Account, Cambridge: University Press. p. 2010.
17 Except for the crime of sea piracy.
18  Resolutions AG 94(I), 95(I) and 96(I) on (i) the appointment of a Committee for the Study of Coding International 
Law, (ii) affirming the principles of international Law laid down in the London Charter and the mandate awarded  
to a new Committee to write an International Criminal Code and (iii) condemning genocide and assigning a mandate 
to organize a convention on the subject.
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The founding of international criminal courts ad hoc for Yugoslavia and Rwanda are 
a relevant step in this process. The collapse of the Soviet Empire, symbolized 
by the fall of the Berlin War, provided a new political scenario and a cycle of 
significant economic growth. According to Henry Kissinger, in 1990: “The 
world was entering a post-sovereign era” characterized “by the rule of law 
aspects of international law over traditional State sovereignty”. It is in this 
“mood of triumphalism” (Kissinger, 2011,p 454, when speaking on the main 
political spirit in Washington) or in the “naive and rather obtuse spirit” 
(Cutileiro, 2003,p 12), in the words of Ambassador José Cutileiro, Coordinator 
for the European Community Peace Conference in Yugoslavia in 1992, pre-
sided by Lord Carrington, that the Nuremberg principles are recovered. The 
concept of global justice, embodied in the idea of Nuremberg as having com-
petence on international crimes, appeared in this period of “global optimism” 
(Koh, 2003,p 1503) which was in full force from 1989 and 2001. This gener-
alized optimism of a global justice was made manifest not only in the creation 
of ad hoc Courts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda but also in the creation of mixed 
courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, the Lockerbie trial, the indictments in 
Spain and Chile against Pinochet. It reached its peak with the signing by 
President Clinton of the Rome Statute in 2001, before the USA began its 
period of open hostility against the International Criminal Court.
William Schabas19 declares that the idea of an international criminal justice was 
vaguely approached by George Bush and Margaret Thatcher in the 1990s 
when discussing the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, according to preliminary 
studies by the American army. The idea would have been viewed positively 
by some European leaders but resulted in nothing.
After mid-1992, the USA were the biggest promoters for adopting Security 
Council Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993. This Resolution, adopted 
by consensus, is special because it was based on article VII of the Charter, in 
particular in articles 39 and 41, a new interpretation of the United Nations 
Charter. As Paula Escarameia points out, the Charter “was probably not 
thought based on the principle that impunity of international criminals was a threat 
to or a breach of world peace and security and that the Council may, therefore, create 
courts with competence to try them. Thus, though that interpretation may be possible, 
it was only viable at a moment when world polarization had disappeared (..)” 
(Escarameia, 2003,p 34).
19  W. Schabas (2004) “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court: It’s All about the Security Council”, 
European Journal of International. 15,p 707.
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This rather unprecedented consensus among the five permanent members allowing for 
the approval of Resolution 827 was somehow a consensus on the role of inter-
national law in the restraints to States sovereign prerogatives. However, it evi-
denced selective justice as it was a consensus of “some” to be applied to “others”.
A specific and rather obvious example of the tension between international crimi-
nal justice and sovereignty occurred when the Security Council was discuss-
ing Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 on the creation of the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda; Rwanda itself, a non-permanent 
member of the Council, voted against it.
Analyzing the role of the two ad hoc Criminal Courts above mentioned is not in 
the scope of this paper. However, two elements should be emphasized: (i) 
from a purely legal perspective, these courts contributed to the develop-
ment of an international criminal corpus juris and (ii) they prepared the way 
for a non-selective and permanent (and independent) criminal justice by 
adopting the Rome Statute20.
THE ROME STATUTE: A PERMANENT AND INDEPENDENT JURISDICTION
After 1946 several attempts were made to codify International Criminal Law21.  In 
July 1994, the Committee submits its draft statute of the Court and in 1996 
it presented a draft for the Criminal Code. The approach of 1994 project by 
the Committee for International Law was extremely conservative and basi-
cally defined a model of criminal justice fully integrated in the United 
Nations system and, in particular, dependent on the Security Council. This 
project proposed a mode inspired in the ad hoc versions for Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda in a rather paradoxical way - an ad hoc type of court but permanent.
Among its most striking features was its full subordination to the Security Council, 
the only body with trigger mechanism and the fact that there was no 
Prosecutor with power to independently investigate and submit cases to 
court proprio moto.
20  So as to analyze the contributions of these courts see Pocar, F. (2010). “The International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia” In R. Bellelli (ed) International Criminal Justice.(p.67) UK: Ashgate, p. 67 and E. Mose (2005)  
Main Achievements of the ICTR. Journal of International Criminal Justice. 3,p 920.
21  The General Assembly Special Committee for the Criminal Jurisdiction present a draft statute for an International 
Criminal Court in 1951. In 1953 the General Assembly tried to create two new Committees to create an International 
Criminal Court and a Special Committee to establish a definition of aggression through Resolution AG 697 (VII)  
of 5 December 1952. Following the adoption of resolution AG 3314, on 14 December 1974, on the definition of 
aggression, the Committee for International Law started writing an international criminal code and its jurisdiction.
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The history of the negotiation on the Court Statute during the Intergovernmental 
Conference in the summer of 1998 in Rome is in itself a very significant 
element for our analysis.
It is important to understand the dynamics of negotiation processes in a enlarged 
multilateral environment. In June 2010, the author participated in the 
Portuguese delegation to the Intergovernmental Conference in Kampala, 
Uganda, convened to adopt, in particular, the amendments to the Rome 
Statute on the crime of aggression. This type of negotiations is a formidable 
diplomatic mechanism involving hundreds of people assigned with the nego-
tiation of legal texts to be adopted by the largest number of States possible. 
During the two long weeks of negotiation in Kampala, final compromise on 
the texts of the amendments was reached on the 25th hour on the last day 
of the Conference, after its official date of conclusion. These negotiations are 
a series of lower or higher dramatic intensity, where alliances are formed 
and broken at an impressive speed, with a series of informal bilateral meet-
ings, by geographical groups, spontaneous groupings of States with ephem-
eral or permanent common interests, with alternative texts, proposals and 
counter-proposals.
This element should not be neglected: the process of negotiating this type of texts 
is also exercising differentiated sovereignty. The ability to manage negotia-
tions, aggregate interests and form alliances and influence the final content of 
the law is evidence of the power and of specific interests of States in specific 
solutions. In Kampala, as in Rome, this dynamic was made obvious: you can 
imagine the difference between the US delegation, which included dozens of 
delegates and promoted many bilateral meetings, a uniting element in the 
Informal Group of the five permanent members, author of written proposals 
adopted in the Final minute of the conference and the Portuguese delegations 
which included two representatives during the two weeks. And we must not 
forget that the USA are not even a State Party of the Statute.
Nevertheless, not even a State like the USA have enough capacity to influence the 
final meaning of a law produced in a multilateral environment. The history 
of the negotiations in Rome is a particularly significant example of this.
Philip Kirsch22 recalls that in the beginning of the negotiations, on 15 June 1998, the 
draft written by PrepCom was presented with about 1400 items about which 
there was disagreement, which were incomplete and hundreds of alternative 
proposals. Although the Statute was not approved in a consensus, its adoption 
22 Legal consultant from the Canadian Foreign Ministry, presided to the “Joint Committee” during the Rome Conference.
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was almost a miracle even if we consider that “The Statute is nor a perfect instru-
ment; no internationally negotiated instrument can be. It includes uneasy technical 
solutions, awkward formulations and fully satisfied no one” (Kirsch, 1999,p 2).
Negotiation agenda of the five permanent member at Rome was extremely heavy. 
Based on the direct testimony by David Scheffer23, the USA’s main goals 
were those of a court similar to the ad hoc courts and with an important role 
in the Security Council, having no independent power to investigate or sub-
mit cases, complementary and whose criminal list would be very limited. To 
sum up, a Statute that would take into consideration the fact that “United 
States has special responsibilities and special exposure to controversy over our actions. 
This factor cannot be taken lightly when issues of international peace and security are 
at stake.  We are called upon to act, sometimes at great risk, far more than any other 
nation. This is a reality in the international system” (Scheffer, 1999, p 12).
Still according to Sheffer “Throughout the Rome Conference our negotiators struggled to 
preserve appropriate sovereign decision making in connection with obligations to 
cooperate with the court” (Scheffer, 1999 ,p 15).
The end result did not live to American expectations, the delegation complained 
of process’s lack of transparency24 and asked for formal voting of the final 
project and voted against it, thus breaking the desired consensus. 
France, the only State that submitted its own Statute to the ICC (in August 1995), 
had a very restrictive perspective of a permanent Court without any type of 
independence and under the exclusive responsibility of the Security Council.
Alain Juppé’s government proposed a system which required three levels of 
authorization for a case to be submitted to the Court (that of the State 
where the crime had occurred and those of the national States of both the 
23 The Head of the American Delegation in Rome and Ambassador- at- Large for the Crimes of War. 
24  According to Scheffer “The process launched in the final forty-eight hours of the Rome Conference minimized the 
chances that these proposals and amendments to the text that the U.S. delegation has submitted in good faith could be 
seriously considered by delegations. The treaty text was subject to a mysterious, closed-door and exclusionary process 
of revision by a small number of delegates, mostly from the like-minded group, who cut deals to attract certain 
wavering governments into supporting a text that was produced at 2:00 A.M. on the final day of the Conference, July 
17. Even portions of the statute that had been adopted by the Committee of the Whole were rewritten. This ‘take it or 
leave it’ text for a permanent institution of law was not subject to the rigorous review of the Drafting Committee or 
the Committee of the Whole and was rushed to adoption hours later on the evening of July 17 without debate” 
(Scheffer, 1999,p 20). On another occasion, before a room of American army lawyers, Scheffer, when referring to the 
final outcome at Rome, declared the following on the limitations to American diplomatic power: “A negotiating room is 
not a conventional battlefield, but it is a theater of diplomatic conflict and cooperation. 
Within the negotiating arena, as in the courtroom, overwhelming force is defined by logic (…) Our superpower status 
and the magnitude of our military forces mean very little in these settings. That is the hard reality today. We need to 
adjust and turn that reality to our own advantage with winning strategies and not self-righteous tactics that impress no 
one but ourselves” (Scheffer, 2001,p 9).
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victim and the aggressor) after a very difficult internal process of agreement 
among the different French Ministries. The compensation for France voting 
for the Resolution was the introduction of article 124, the possibility of 
opting-out for a seven-year period in terms of crimes of war committed by 
French nationals (France and Colombia were the only States that used the 
possibility allowed by article 124)25.
The United Kingdom changed its position and, after the election of Tony Blair, 
abandoned the P5 alliance and joined the like-minded countries group, 
which provided the main support to the ICC project.
Four areas laid down in the Rome Statute include the key elements in the tension 
between sovereignty and judicial supra-nationalism, thus exemplifying the 
main ideas in the 1998 discussion of this issue26.
Firstly, the preliminary conditions to exercising the Court jurisdiction, laid 
down in article 12 of the Statute. Based of the criteria established for this 
precept, the court may exercise jurisdiction in cases the States (that are 
parties in the Statute or have declared they accepts its jurisdiction, pursu-
ant to article 12, n.º 3) (i) where the crime takes place (pursuant to article 
5) or (ii) of nationality of the defendant. This precept makes it possible for 
the Court to exercise its jurisdiction on individuals who are nationals 
from States not party to the Rome Statute.  Considering that one of the 
criteria for assigning jurisdiction is the place the crime was committed, 
resorting to article 12, n.º 1a) of the statute allows, in fact, that the court 
exercises its jurisdiction on nationals from States outside the Statute. 
From a conservative approach, this precept is an unacceptable shift in rela-
tion to the basic principle that international obligations derive from the 
consent of States pursuant to the general principles of the Law on Treaties 
(questions have been raised that the precept is compatible with article 36 
of the Vienna Convention on the 1969 Law on Treaties); its element of 
“universal jurisdiction” is also unacceptable as it allows that nationals from 
States that have not accepted to adopt the Treaty can be punished. From a 
25  “La position de la France a évolué au rythme d’un double arbitrage, difficile, entre le ministère de la Défense,  
le Quai d’Orsay et le ministère de la Justice d’une part (c’est à dire in fine de la décision du Premier ministre,  
ce que M. Lionel Jospin a fait pour les plus importants d’entre eux en avril 1998), et entre Matignon et l’Elysée d’autre 
part (son histoire et en grande partie secrète et reste à écrire, sauf à rappeler que les changements de premier ministre 
n’ont pas empêché que l’Elysée et le ministère de la Défense soient globalement sur la même ligne). L’article 124  
a été l’une des exigences du Ministère de la Défense et de l’Elysée» (Bourdon, 2000,p 297).
26  The content of the Statute would represent a compromise in relation to Westphalia legacy, according to Pureza, J.M. 
(2001). “Da Cultura da Impunidade à Judicialização Global: o Tribunal Penal Internacional”. Revista Crítica de Ciências 
sociais. 60,p 129.
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progressive approach, the precept was not up to expectations because it 
requires consent (by the State where the crime was committed or of the 
aggressor’s nationality), because of its nature as a treaty among states and 
the idea of complementarity (see below).
The second element concerns the powers of the Judge in article 15. Under n.º 1 
of this precept, the Prosecutor “may, on his own initiative, open an inquiry 
based on information on crimes committed that are under the jurisdiction 
of the Court”. Within the scope of his powers to investigate and in case he 
believes there is evidence supporting starting an inquiry, the Judge will ask 
permission to do so to the Investigating Judge. The Security Council can 
only intervene pursuant to article 16.
Articles 15 and 16 are the main innovations: for the first time at international level 
there a truly independent legal power (even if we consider all its restraints), 
independent from political interference and, in particular, from the interfer-
ence of the Security Council. The control over the Prosecutor’s power of 
investigation and inquiry is carried out by a judicial body, the investigating 
judge, a change in comparison with the previous model.
The third element is related with the power of the Prosecutor and concerns the 
role of the Security Council and its relation with the Court. Though the 
Security Council holds a privileged procedural position (under article 13, 
the submission by the Security Council to the Prosecutor of a situation 
does not require the consent of the implicated States), it is in huge contrast 
with the solution found for previous ad hoc courts and with the 1994 pro-
ject of  the Committee for International Law. In the 1994 project, the 
Prosecutor could only start a case after the Security Council had author-
ized; in the current article 16, the Security Council has only the power to 
suspend an already ongoing investigation. In the draft by the international 
law committee, as in previous ad hoc courts, exercising international 
criminal jurisdiction was completely conditioned to the powers of the 
Council and, as a result, to being vetoed by any of the five permanent 
members. This shift in balance is crucial: a permanent Member State that 
wishes to suspend an inquiry, either that it begins or that it develops, has to 
simultaneously ensure 9 of the 15 votes in the Council as well as the posi-
tive vote of the remaining permanent members.
Lastly, the fourth element concerns the commitment to complementarity/
cooperation in the international criminal system as a whole. The idea of 
complementarity, laid down in the preamble and in article 1 of the 
Statute, is the formula that allows to reconcile judicial sovereignty and 
supranational or national justice. In the European Union there was 
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heated debate on the affirmation of the principle of primacy and the 
affirmation of a judicial federal system, a debate where there was some-
times a conflict with constitutional courts from some Member-States. 
Similarly, in the international criminal system proposed by the Rome 
Statute, national criminal jurisdictions have primacy over the 
International Criminal Court jurisdiction. The latter cannot intervene 
unless as an alternative, in cases described in the Statute, which contra-
dicts the idea of universal jurisdiction. Articles 17 to 19 include very 
detailed rules on this dynamic between national jurisdictions and the 
international jurisdiction. Articles 86 and following establish different 
specific cooperation obligations, thus tempering this primacy of nation-
al criminal jurisdiction. According to Marten Zwanenburg “The principle 
of complementarity constitutes a deference to national sovereignty, which is con-
trary to a development in international law away from broader notions of sover-
eignty” (Zwanenburg, 1999,p 130). 
The discussing taking place today in terms of applying the principle of complemen-
tarity in the cases of Kenya and Libya are of extreme importance from the 
point of view of applying complementarity.
Considering the initial compromise adopted in Rome, William Schabas states that 
“The adoption of the Rome statute on the international Criminal Court represents a 
singular defeat for American diplomacy. The world’s only superpower found itself out-
manoeuvred by a constellation of small and medium powers, including some of its 
closest friends and allies (…) Faced with an accelerated pace of ratification and entry 
into force, the United States took several aggressive measures directed against the 
Court” (Schabas, 2004,p 720).
The degree of hostility, if not of active aggression, evidenced during the Bush 
administration against the court can only be understood if you consider the 
USA point of view that an international criminal justice that is permanent 
and independent is a threat to strategic interests, a serious attack to nation-
al sovereignty. President Clinton signed the treaty on the last day possible, 
in a possible strategy to change the text as Member party, and this signature 
was immediately withdrawn by the new administration, in the famous epi-
sode of unsigning27.
27  See the interesting paper by Swaine, E. (2003). Unsigning. Stanford Law Review.  55,p 2061, in which the author 
discusses the meaning of this practice in the Law on Treaties, its legality in view of the 1969 Vienna Convention  
and possible effects in negotiation and signing of international treaties.
47
Miguel de Serpa Soares
This escalating of hostility reaches its peak in 2002 with the adoption of the 
American Service-members’ Protection Act (ASPA). Regardless of the gap 
between republicans and democrats, American legal and legal-political lit-
erature is divided on this matter28.
In Portugal, as in several other States, the debate on the accession to the Rome 
Statute focused on the constitutionalization of the transference of sovereign-
ty. The starting point for a constitutionalist is the sovereignist perspective: the 
national Constitution preserves the commanding capacity of a political com-
munity over its territory and a greater or lesser openness to the outside by 
the constitutional order is in itself a constitutional issue.  Accession to the 
Rome Statute (as to other Treaties of European integration) is viewed as a 
surrender of sovereignty29, which must first be included in the international 
Constitution, with its amendment if necessary. Vital Moreira30 refers to the 
issue of accession to the Statute as an issue of judicial sovereignty: the capac-
ity to investigate and try crimes committed in its territory is an essential 
feature of State sovereignty (in the Portuguese case, constitutional laws 
describe the courts as bodies of sovereignty). Therefore, specific laws in the 
Rome Statute represent derogation of the “Criminal or judicial Constitution”. 
For a State like Portugal, judicial sovereignty, as any other type of sover-
eignty, has an adaptation strategy which includes flexibility in relation to its 
constitutional order. Article 7 of the Portuguese Constitution, amended in 
1997, solves the conflict with a solution of openness, of a sovereignty able to 
accept limited schemes of supra-nationalism or of real legal federalism.
FROM ILLEGAL WAR TO THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
On 12 June 2010, in Kampala, Uganda, the first amendments to the Rome Statute 
were adopted concerning criminalization of certain type of arms and the 
crime of aggression, in particular in terms of the conditions the International 
Criminal Court can exercise its jurisdiction.
28  See for example Wedgwood, R(1999). “The International Criminal Court: an American View”. European Journal  
of International Law. 10, p 93, Casey, (2002) “The Case against the International Criminal Court”. Fordham International 
Law Journal. 25, p 840, Monroe, L. (2001).”The United States and the Statute of Rome”.  
American Journal of International Law. 95,p 124.
29  The affirmation process of the principle of primacy by the Luxembourg Court was a latent conflict which lasted decades 
and included the constitutional courts and governments of Member-States. See Alter , Karen (2001). Establishing the 
Supremacy of European Law – The making of an International Rule of Law in Europe. Oxford: University Press.
30  Moreira, V. (2004). “O Tribunal Penal Internacional e a Constituição”. In V. Moreira, L. Assunção, P. Caeiro & A. L. 
Riquito, O Tribunal Penal Internacional e a Ordem Jurídica Portuguesa(p.20). Coimbra: Coimbra Editora.
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This progress opens very interesting discussion for the theme studies here and will 
contribute to future discussions on International Criminal Law. 
Article 6 of the London Charter on the International Criminal Court, which pre-
ceded the Nuremberg Trials, established, among the crimes submitted to the 
Court jurisdiction, “Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation 
or wagging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing”. 
The International Court Charter for the Far East, of 19 January 1946, included a 
very similar provision.
Indictment and conviction for the crime of aggression “the supreme international 
crime” was one of the most revolutionary and controversial issues in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo processes, there being a huge opposition between 
normativists and jus naturalists which remain until today.
The collective security system laid down in the United Nations Charter solemnly 
proclaimed the prohibition of the threat to use force, pursuant to article 39 
of the Charter, assigned competence to the Security Council to determine, 
among others, the existence of an act of aggression, as well as the appropri-
ate measures to restore collective peace and security.
During the period before the Rome Statute, there had been attempts at codifying 
International Criminal Law and they included the issue of the crime of 
aggression.
The fact that the General Assembly adopted Resolution 3314 on 14 December 
1974 is one of the most important milestone in this process, in particular 
the inclusion in article 5 of the declaration that “a war of aggression is a 
crime against  international peace”. The International Court of Justice ana-
lyzed issues related to the illegality of aggression in Nicaragua31 and referred 
some of the provisions in Resolution 3314. There was growing affirmation 
of the illegality of aggression, based on the system of the United Nations 
Charter, but still acts of aggression had not been clearly typified as an inter-
national crime. Though the prosecutions in Nuremberg and Tokyo were 
based on the assumption of an international crime of aggression having been 
committed (or a crime against peace as it was called at the time), the issue 
was not resolved until 1998.
The reasons leading to the crime of aggression not being definitely included in the 
Rome Statute are well-known and aimed only at making the compromise pos-
31 Decision of 27 June 1986 Nicaragua vs. the United States, in particular paragraphs 187 to 201.
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sible, a compromise that was difficult to achieve. Therefore, this discussion was 
postponed to a later date. Article 5, n.º 1 included the crime of aggression as 
submitted to the court jurisdiction but, under n.º 2 of the same precept, that 
jurisdiction could only be exercised with the adoption of amendments with 
the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
by the Court.
Between 2002 and 2009, a  Special Working Group for the Crime of Aggression, 
created by the first Assembly of States Party to the International Criminal 
Court and assigned to write a project of amendments, held several formal and 
informal meetings to attain the objective mentioned in article 5, n.º 232. The 
work carried out by this Group was the basis for the 2010 Diplomatic 
Conference.
The text adopted in Kampala suffers from the flaws commonly found in legal texts 
prepared, discussed and broken down in a multilateral scenario, as was men-
tioned when discussing the Rome Statute.
As a consequence of the clash of absolutely different interests and legal cultures, 
the texts resulting from the compromise are technically opaque and some-
what ambiguous, frequently allowing for different interpretations on what 
was agreed on.
The Kampala texts include amendments to article 8 (criminalizing the use of three 
new types of arms), a new article was added, article 8bis, which defines 
crime of aggression, and new articles 15 bis and 15 were added on exercis-
ing jurisdiction.
The 2010 amendments are based on a still rather complex system that separates (i) 
entering in full force of (ii) exercise of jurisdiction by the Court and the still 
(iii) possible differentiated activation of the jurisdiction when cases are 
resubmitted by the Security Council or submitted by States and following 
32  These results were influenced by the informality of several meetings held in academic environment and the process  
is known as the Princeton Process. Documentation on these meetings may be found in S. Barriga, W. Danspeckgruber  
& C Wenaweser (eds.) (2009) The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression. Princeton: The Liechtenstein Institute on 
Self-Determination at Princeton University. On the technical negotiations in the Special Group, see Barriga, S. (2010)” 
Against the odds: The results of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression”.In R. Bellelli (ed.) International 
Criminal Justice (p.621) UK:Ashgate and Clark, R. (2009) “Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, its 
Elements and the Conditions for ICC Exercise on Jurisdiction over it”. European Journal of International Law.20, 1103.
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an investigation initiated by the Prosecutor.33 There is limited possibility for 
opting out in some jurisdiction situations, subjected to final decision at the 
Assembly of States party after 1 January 2017.
The amendments will enter into force under article 121, n.º 5 of the Statute, i.e., 
they will enter in force individually for each State that ratifies them one year 
after being ratified. However, the fact that the amendments enter into force 
will have no effect on the Court’s jurisdiction; two general and special addi-
tional steps must be taken. For the Court’s jurisdiction to be activated, a 
minimum number of 30 ratifications must take place (preferably until the end 
of 2015) and a final decision must be taken by the Assembly of States Party 
(after 1 January 2017) allowing the Court to start exercising its jurisdiction 
(voted positively by 7/8 of the Assembly members). Besides these conditions, 
another set of special conditions have to be met, depending on the procedure 
involved. In case of resubmissions by the Security Council, the court may 
exercise its jurisdiction without conditions in case of any of the four crimes in 
the Rome list and no consent by the States involved is required. In case of 
submissions by States or investigations proprio motu by the Prosecutor, the 
following conditions must be met: all situations of aggression involving States 
not party are excluded from the court’s jurisdiction. For situations in which 
the aggression involves States parties to the Rome Statute at least in one of the 
States (either the aggressor or the victim) the amendments must be in force 
and cannot have been opted out in terms of accepting jurisdiction on these 
cases (in the moments prior to the aggression). Besides these, there are spe-
cific obligations in the relationship between the Prosecutor and the Security 
Council and the powers of the latter as a jurisdiction filter as well as its being 
able to stop ongoing investigations under article 16 of the Statute.
Considering the description above is rather simplified and does not account for spe-
cific issues in interpretation regarding the application of regime 121, n.º 5 of 
the Statute and of the opting out system for some situations, this provides us 
with a very clear idea of the maze of interpretations this type of texts arouses. 
The road towards the full functioning of the Court as far as the crime of aggres-
sion is concerned will not be straightforward.  In March 2013 only five State 
33  A clear explanation of what was agreed on in Kampala and the different issues in terms of interpretation regarding 
entering in full force and the conditions for jurisdiction exercise may be found in Barriga, S. (2012) “Exercise  
of Jurisdiction and Entry into Force of the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression”. In G. Dive, B. Goes  
& D. Vandermeersch (eds.) From Rome to Kampala: the first 2 Amendments to the Rome Statute(p.31) Brussels: Bruylant and 
also in Clark, R. (2010) “Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the First 
Review Conference of the Court, Kampala, 31-May-11 June 2010”. Goettingen Journal of International Law. 2,p 689.
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have ratified the Kampala amendments, which makes it seem difficult that the 
Court jurisdiction will be ensured after 2017 on the crime of aggression.
Besides the referred procedural aspects, some significant amendments introduced 
in 2010 are of major importance for the theme we are discussing.
The most important aspect of the Kampala compromise concerns the relations between 
the Security Council and the Court in terms of the latter’s exercise of jurisdic-
tion. In fact, this was a key issue in the negotiation process and in the gap 
between two opposing positions. This gap is easy to understand: on the one hand, 
the five permanent members of the Council advocating the prerogatives the 
United Nations Charter grants them in situations of aggression and, on the other 
hand, a set of different alliances among countries that only share the fact that they 
advocate independence of the Court before the Security Council, as well as a 
certain judicial autonomy in establishing the existence of a crime of aggression.
According to what is laid down in numbers 6 to 8 of the new article 15 bis34: “6 - If 
concluded there are sufficient grounds to open an inquiry regarding a crime of aggres-
sion, the prosecutor should ensure first that the Security Council has verified the exist-
ence of the act of aggression by that State. The prosecutor should notify the United 
Nations Secretary-General of the case to be presented in court, as well as any other 
relevant information or documentation. 7 - Upon verification by the Security Council 
of the existence of an act of aggression, the prosecutor may open an inquiry in relation 
to the crime of aggression. 8 - Whenever the act of aggression is not confirmed within 
six months from the notification date, the prosecutor may open an inquiry in relation 
to an act of aggression as long as the inquiry office has authorized the opening of an 
inquiry in relation to an act of aggression pursuant to procedure laid down in article 
15, and except if the Security Council decides otherwise, pursuant to article 16”.
The text above was only possible after huge negotiation effort and mostly represents 
the defeat of the position of the five permanent members. The latter defend-
ed that the Court should be activated based on a green light proposal: in those 
cases submitted by the States or by the prosecutor, the latter could only pur-
sue the investigation after a request by the Security Council to do so35. The 
proposal that was approved is, thus, closer to a red light proposal: in case of 
inaction by the Security Council, the Prosecutor may pursue the investigation 
(authorized by the investigating judge) except if the Security Council decides 
otherwise (pursuant to article 16).
34 Translation from English originals into Portuguese by the Department of Legal Affairs from the Ministry in 2011. 
35  On the history and documentation of the negotiation and the different proposals submitted, see Barriga, S. & Kreβ, 
Claus  (eds.) (2012). Crime of Aggression Library: the Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression. Cambridge:  
University Press.
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The implications are rather significant: in the so-called green light proposal the 
Court jurisdiction is completely subordinated to a prior decision by the 
Council. In the second proposal, closer to the final Kampala text, despite 
the important conditions imposed on the exercise of jurisdiction in terms of 
the crime of aggression, this is a concurring jurisdiction (even if partially so) 
with the Council prerogatives to determine the existence of a situation of 
aggression (independently of its classification as criminal conduct). Though 
the Prosecutor being able to pursue investigation is restricted (requires 
authorization by the investigating judge), this restriction in judicial and inde-
pendent, and can also be stopped due to political reasons, considering the 
Security Council may suspend it for a 12 month period (renewable), never-
theless the impact in the Council’s prerogatives is obvious.
Firstly, the inaction by the Security Council in determining the existence of aggres-
sion does not necessarily lead to an impasse. This inaction has a time limit, 
six months, after which the Prosecutor may use his independent powers, 
though under judicial control. If the Security Council wants to stop an inves-
tigation (this halt has also a time limit), it will have to have 9 votes in the 
Council and ensure that none of the permanent members opposes its veto.
The dynamics of the action or inaction of the Security Council in determining the 
existence of a situation of aggression will be necessarily affected by there 
being a judicial alternative in criminal terms which can be put in motion in 
case of inaction.
Though an assessment of aggression for political reasons exclusively is the Security 
Council’s responsibility only, the Council’s inaction leads to no consequenc-
es. The Council adopts no resolution and nothing can be done from then 
onwards. Today, the Council does not have the monopoly in determining 
aggression as the Prosecutor and the Court may determine the existence of 
a crime of aggression. The specific balances of vote and veto within the 
Security Council are now crucial to halt jurisdiction rather than to allow 
Court jurisdiction, which is assigned to it by the international treaty, the 
Rome Statute.
Another especially interesting situation is the one that will occur when the Security 
Council, required by the Prosecutor to determine by means of a resolution the 
nonexistence of a situation of aggression. The Prosecutor, when pursuing the 
investigation, or later the Court reach the opposite conclusion and declare that 
a crime of aggression was committed. Or the opposite situation occurs: under 
its prerogatives the Security Council determines the existence of a situation of 
aggression and the Prosecutor or the Court conclude the opposite, that no 
crime of aggression was committed. Perhaps these are more theoretical than 
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practical possibilities but the two are consequences of the amendments intro-
duced in the Statute. And in these cases it is not worth it to state that the 
Security Council has an essentially political exercise while the Court has a 
judicial exercise. Even though from a different perspective - political or judi-
cial - the possibility that the same facts may be classified as aggression or not 
(situation or crime of aggression) is nonetheless disturbing36.
The history of determining the existence of aggression by the Security Council may 
easily be summarized considering the small number of cases about which there 
was such a decision. In truth, the Security Council assessed only one situation 
of aggression in five cases: South Rhodesia, South Africa, Benin, Tunisia, 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands and Iraq/Kuwait. In the cases of South Rhodesia and 
South Africa, the Council adopted different resolutions throughout the years, 
considering the “acts of aggression” against neighbor States as situations of threat 
against international peace and stability. In the case of Benin, the mercenary 
attacks in 1977 were equally classifies as acts of armed aggression. In the case 
of Tunisia, the Council classified the Israeli attacks as acts of aggression and 
condemned them. In the case of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, the Council 
expressed its concern with the Argentinian military attack in the archipelago 
though they did not classify it as an act of aggression. Lastly, the case of Kuwait 
being invaded by Iraq, undoubtedly the most evident situation of aggression in 
the past years, the different resolutions adopted never classified the military 
invasion of Kuwait or its annexing of territory as an act of aggression.
It is not bold to state that the Security Council’s natural tendency is towards inac-
tion: the Council naturally tends to not declare the existence of a situation 
of aggression.
This derives not so much from the balances related to votes and vetoes but mostly 
from the silent nature of the Council. Within the framework of the exercising 
of powers by the Council under article 39, silence may in itself be a decision: 
to not determine that in a specific situation there were acts of aggression may 
be a conscious option with very different motivations. The Council may even, 
through silence, aim to not resort to any of the possible measures under 
Chapter VII of the Charter, insisting on political and diplomatic solutions for 
events that indeed include acts typified as conducts of aggression. Regardless of 
the Council’s motivations, at the moment the Kampala amendments are able to 
be executed, there will be an alternative to that inaction.
36  Murphy, S. (2012). “The Crime of Aggression and the ICC”. George Washington University Law School, Legal Studies Research 
Paper 50,p 39, has created fear that the existence and expansion of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court may 
limit the Security Council’s ability to manage situations of armed conflict.
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The theme in itself includes a “constitutional” issue for public international order 
which are linked to the exclusive or not exclusive powers of the Security 
Council pursuant to chapter VII of the Charter, as well as the exact scope of 
article 103.
Before dealing with this issue, it is important to review some comments on the 
Kampala amendments. Zhou Lulu37 should be quoted here, firstly because 
international legal Chinese thought is not well known and secondly because 
Zhou Lulu participated in the Chinese delegation to the Kampala Conference. 
Zhou Lulu globally assesses the Kampala compromise on the conditions for exer-
cise of jurisdiction as a disturbing factor for international peace and security 
by introducing negative impact to the current international legal and politi-
cal system.
The ability awarded to the Court to assess situations of aggression in case there is 
inaction by the Council is not compatible with powers that article 39 the 
Charter awards the Council and the system of concurring competences 
between the two bodies affects the whole collective security system in force 
after 1945. The author also expresses great concern with the possibility of 
the two bodies (one of which, the Court, is independent from the United 
Nations system) being able to reach completely opposite conclusions as far 
as the existence of aggression in a real situation. In this situation, what type 
of obligations would arise for the States in article 103? The author refers 
implicitly that the precept would impose on States the disrespect for a Court 
sentence if that sentence would go against a prior decision by the Security 
Council. And the final result of different decisions by the Council and the 
Court would be that “(…) not only will the international community be faced with 
the disorder brought on by the lack of clear right-or-wrong standards, the fragmenta-
tion of international law will be exacerbated which may stimulate states to go more 
on their own ways. In the long term, this will be harmful to preventing acts of aggres-
sion and maintaining international legal order” (Zhou, 2012,p 35).
Guo Yang describes the possible conflict in terms of decisions, saying “(…) to 
authorize the Prosecutor to proceed with the case in disregard of the decisions of the 
Council will put the reputation and credibility of both institutions at risk if their 
decisions conflict each other. It will also put the States into a dilemma when faced 
with conflicting decisions because they are required to give priority to the obligations 
37  Zhou, L (2012). ”Brief Analysis of a Few Controversial Issues in Contemporary International Criminal Law”. In   
M. Bergsmo & Ling Yang (eds.) State Sovereignty and International Criminal Law.(p 21) Beijing: Torkel Opshal Academic 
EPublisher.
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from the Council under Article 103 of the Charter, which could hinder their co-
operation with the Court (…) The intervention of the Court under these circum-
stances might not be a contribution to peace and security” (Guo, 2012,p 97).
Much of this debate presupposes that the powers of the Security Council under 
chapter VII of the Security Council (rather the mixed interpretations of arti-
cles 24, 25 and 39 of the Charter) are exclusive powers in the scope of inter-
national peace and security and, as a results, excludes all concurrent powers. 
The idea that the powers of the Council are exclusive is based on the perspec-
tive that determining aggression is, in its essence, a political decision and, 
therefore, one that only the Council as a political body is able to take. This is 
a narrative of excluding any attempt to judicially assess aggression, of exclud-
ing any technical-legal assessment of conducts. This is an aggressive narrative 
against the existence of judicial powers independent from the Council aimed 
at eliminating any alternatives to the Security Council in matters of interna-
tional security. There would be several ways to counter this concept of exclu-
sive powers by the Council. Yet, you just have to consider that the uncompro-
mising defense of this monopoly would in fact create a difference between 
Giant States and other States that Vattel referred to, a situation in itself 
incompatible in legal terms with the sovereign equality laid down in article 2 
of the Charter. Ultimately, if the Court (or any ad hoc court) jurisdiction is 
made dependent of the veto dynamics would lead to absolute jurisdiction 
immunity in favor of five States for any international crime.
No reconciling is possible between judicial independence and political assessment, 
largely discretionary and cannot be contested, and an objective judicial 
assessment on the existence of certain conditions typified as criminal con-
duct in an already existing law. These assessments have different objectives: 
the Security Council assesses the existence of “situations” of aggression so as 
to determine threats to international peace and security while the Court 
assesses the practice of “crimes of aggression” so as to assign individual 
criminal liability and apply a possible sentence.
However, up to 199838, both were kept under Council control: the creation of ad 
hoc courts allowed for the Council claiming also the administration of inter-
national criminal justice, of crime and punishment, at least at an early stage. 
Two recent events, in 1998 and in 2010, have opened gaps in a punishing 
monopoly, which the 1945 order progressively took sovereignty from States 
38  That requirement challenges the view that the Security Council has the exclusive authority to determine  
an act of aggression” (Scheffer, 2010,p 16).
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to assign it to Super-Sovereigns at the Security Council.  Article 15-bis, 
paragraph nº 4, makes it hard to support this exclusivity, as David Scheffer 
points out “However, in order for the pre-trial Division to authorize the 
investigation of a crime of aggression, it will need to determine (…) that a 
crime of aggression arises from an act of aggression.
The expansion of the Court jurisdiction to areas exclusive to the Security Council, 
as is the assessment of (criminal) legality of War, may, if conducted according 
to model judicial patterns from a technical point of view will slightly alter 
existing balances.
As Kreβ and von Holtzendorff state, if the Court “(…) succeeds, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that world opinion will begin to slowly exert its soft power towards the 
expansion of the ICC’s jurisdictional reach” (Kreβ & Holtzendorff 2010,p 1179).
CONCLUSIONS
The existence of an international criminal justice that is permanent and independ-
ent is against the idea of state sovereignty in terms of judicial and punishing 
sovereignty.
However, it is not accurate to state that the relations between sovereignty and 
international criminal justice are simply of opposition, there is no need for 
choice between sovereignty and international criminal justice39. National 
sovereignties, usually subject to factors of erosion, have their own adapting 
and changing strategies, which can even be viewed as consented and not 
permanent cessions of items of power and independence. Noteworthy is to 
remember that the Security Council has already submitted real situations of 
aggression for the Court to assess.
In terms of criminal justice, it will not be the small and medium-sized countries that 
will have difficulties to adapt to the growing erosion of sovereignty through 
internal political consensus, more or less peaceful, but the big States, in par-
ticular the Super Sovereigns with a permanent position in the Security 
Council. Secondly, these difficulties will also arise from other Big Sovereigns, 
which do not have such a militarized sovereignty or the prerogatives granted 
to the differentiated legal status derived from being a permanent member.
39  See Robert Cryer’s comment: “An excess of sovereignty and state power can lead to international crimes,  
as in the Holocaust, but so can a lack of sovereign powers, as in Somalia or Sierra Leone. Ironically, we act through  
state sovereignty in order to restrict actions justified in the name of sovereignty” (Cryer 2005, p 1000).
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After 1945, the consensus among the Super Sovereigns allowed for the inclusion of 
criminal judicial mechanisms in international legal order as the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo trials. This model of selective international criminal justice has 
essentially a punishing function rather than a preventative function regarding 
international crimes and thus contribute to international peace and security. 
The survival of the Nuremberg model in the experiences in former Yugoslavia and 
in Rwanda is still an interesting proposal for the Super Sovereigns, which 
decide when, to whom and how punishment is used. Only in 1998 and now 
in 2010 does this model of selective justice is no longer under the control 
of its creators, really opening new possibilities, even if limited, and alterna-
tives to an established power scheme embodied in the composition of the 
Security Council. The malaise and even hostility shown by the five perma-
nent members of the International Criminal Court evidence that interna-
tional criminal justice is a possible judicial counter-power and is viewed as 
an undesired conditioning to sovereignty. This malaise may be seen as the 
result of a subtle shift from a model of international justice that is still, in its 
core, a sub-product of the interstate Westphalian-style model to one, per-
haps more sophisticated, cosmopolitan and universalist one. This malaise is 
also a consequence of the difficulties in communication between diplomats 
and lawyers: at its core, the diplomatic method is based on secrecy, cession, 
composition of interests even if achieved contra legem or praeter legem, while 
a lawyer cannot work outside the framework of pre-established and publi-
cized rules. And yet, international peace and security clearly require parallel 
intervention from Diplomacy and the Law and their tools. The interna-
tional lawyer cannot be restricted to mere writer of formulas agreed on by 
the diplomats, similarly, International Law is not only the Law on Treaties.
The judicial alternative has only formally been created: the International Criminal 
Court can only be affirmed through its technical credibility and through 
consolidating jurisprudence by means of its model application. The fact that 
international criminal law is still rudimentary should be progressively 
changed so as to be closer to interpretation and application of criminal rules 
used by the criminalist in internal legal orders, defining a set of patterns in 
the administration of criminal justice, based on clear precepts of universal 
“consciousness and morals”. 
 The events in the next few years will be critical to assess the credibility of this 
judicial alternative for world peace and security and for the fight against 
impunity: the implementation of the Kampala amendments, the dynamics in 
the discussions on complementarity and maturity process of a set of rules in 
International Criminal Law will be crucial tests to that very same credibility. 
58
International Criminal Justice and the Erosion of Sovereignty
Despite everything, we must bear in mind that in March 2013 the Rome 
Statute includes 122 States party and, therefore, the objective of universal-
ity is not naive or lyrical but a perfectly realistic goal. 
The International Criminal Court must be given time. That is why this is the time 
to observe but not yet the time to explain.
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INTRODUCTION
International life presents increasingly complex phenomena, such as the atrocities 
against innocent civilians and the systematic violations of war laws and cus-
toms by regular armed forces and resistance forces. 
For many, international criminal justice is the main tool in the fight against impu-
nity and iniquity of these behaviors, considering that it is in court that the 
victims are compensated for the acts of violence and arbitrariness by means 
of fair and unbiased trial of events and through dissuading future illegal 
actions. 
This is the justice that after the 1990s has been building a complex national, 
regional and global regime that has led before international courts individu-
als who are suspect of committing serious crimes against society as a whole 
and are therefore considered crimes under International Law. 
The entry into force of the Rome Statute in 2002 has provided the international 
community with a permanent criminal justice able to prevent and repress 
war and to punish those responsible for it. However, the particularly nega-
tive circumstances surrounding the negotiation and entry in force of the 
Statute have led to the court’s low level of autonomy which, according to 
many, has resulted in growing inadequacy of the Court’s objectives to the 
concepts for its creation.  
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In particular, the balance established in the Court’s Statute and the amendment 
approved in the Kampala Conference provide no guarantees considering 
there is the need to protect the Court from the interventionist policies of 
the great powers. On the one hand, the increasing empirical evidences of the 
growing number of internal conflicts, visible since 2005 and which has not 
yet reached its turning point, and, on the other hand, the policy for selective 
involvement in multilateral mechanisms, which is part of American involve-
ment in these conflicts, have raised turmoil in the international systems 
whose scope is yet to be fully understood.
The practical solutions found for these problems have not been satisfactory and it 
does not seem they will be so in the short run. These solutions, defended 
primarily by the small powers, evidence mobilization deficits because of the 
inability to attract great powers and even medium-sized powers, which tend 
to be autonomous in the issues they present to the Court and focus on the 
like-minded agenda.
In fact, the United States opposition to the Court’s jurisdiction (which has caused some 
embarrassing diplomatic situations) shows, in our opinion, that the chosen poli-
cy is counterproductive because it endangers the long term interests of the 
United States and of other technologically developed powers. In this sense, the 
analysis of events indicates that this is mostly a survival strategy by Washington 
before an international system in rapid change which it does not fully control 
anymore. It is true that many other States have also resisted the International 
Criminal Court. These are mostly great powers, such as China, India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey (which did not sign it; noteworthy is that the first 
three are nuclear powers) and the Russian Federation (which signed but did not 
ratify it), just to mention the most obvious. Some small and medium-sized pow-
ers – especially but not only from Africa – have also opposed to it with more or 
less vigor, motivation and success: from Libya to Saudi Arabia, from Cuba to El 
Salvador, from Mauritania to Sudan1.  It is, however, our contention that the USA 
are the country which has resisted more successfully (considering American 
power), more consistently (because better explained by authors such as Henry 
Kissinger and virtually all Secretaries of State for Defense, both Democratic and 
Republican) and more clearly, in the sense that they themselves have publicized 
it widely. It is important, therefore, that we focus some of our attention to the 
American administration, though we reserve the right to further conduct more 
fully, less “ad hominem” and reductionist analyses. 
1 http://www.iccnow.org/, retrieved on March 3, 2013.
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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Violence exists since the beginning of times but it has changed as humankind has 
built new societies.  In this sense, violence is a political and social construc-
tion in all organized societies. 
Generally, governments claim the responsibility to protect the citizens living in 
their jurisdiction. The State as a conflict mediator is, in fact, the main guar-
antee for social stability and internal peace. In times of war, the State claims 
the monopoly for the legitimate use of physical violence to maintain the 
political space of the community and ensure that the most essential asset, 
human life, is not placed at risk by external and internal threats to the com-
munity2.
The mechanisms of international criminal law are a result of the fact that the social 
contract between those governing and those governed has failed and funda-
mental human rights need to be defended before violence and impunity.
Hannah Arendt clearly explained the relationship between power and violence, which 
some consider umbilical. Arendt’s innovative conclusion was that the wielding 
of political power corresponds to the acknowledgment of State authority and 
not the affirmation of power through violence. After years of study, Arendt 
demonstrated that the wielding of power is neither linked with violence nor 
does it need violence to be enforced (Arendt, 1969a). This position contradicts 
the well-known thesis by Carl Schmidt on conflict as an element of power (of 
which war is an extreme manifestation) (Schmidt, 1932). Arendt nevertheless 
recognizes, like Schmidt, that power is the essence of government. If we con-
sider power from this perspective, authority should keep order by using vio-
lence as a power establishing strategy as little as possible.
This does not mean that power does not require violence from time to time as a 
tool of political action. Yet, according to Arendt, when power is fully wield-
ed, violence is not necessary. For Arendt, the use of power symbolizes, 
above all, the failure of power rather than its essence (Arendt, 1969b). 
For a significant number of governments, the conflicting character of politics pre-
vails over the idea that power must become authority to legitimize politics. 
This is why the United Nations’ founding fathers realized that the world 
needed a new social contract based on the principle of the illegality of vio-
2  Jean Bodin (1530-1596) contributed to the concept of State as sovereign power with internal and external sovereignty. 
Later, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1712-1778), theorized the social contract and its relation with 
sovereignty, namely the usefulness of the social contract for preventing social chaos in politically organized societies.
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lence as a mechanism for conflict resolution, except in the case of self 
defense or under the global collective safety mechanism. In this sense, the 
rules in the United Nations Charter intentionally dissociate the concept of 
power from the idea of violence, reiterating the perspective that violence is 
a tool that, though available, is not the essence of power. 
Theoretically, the institutionalization of collective security fulfills the urban dream 
of replacing the alliances and the balance of power by indivisible peace 
attained through national power being submitted to collective interest.  
Collective security works mainly as a tool to reduce abuse of power and prevent 
future eruptions of organized international violence at the service of a per-
manent objective – to ensure stability and the predictability of the interna-
tional system (Saraiva, 2001). 
Thus, the enlarged mandate of the United Nations Charter – reflected in the trip-
tych security/human rights/development – is, in fact, a formula that 
emphasizes security, which is in focus in the founding document, practically 
separated from the other two components. 
States have always been the main subjects of International Law. Little by little, 
though, the notion that rulers who plan and order barbaric and brutal acts 
that harm the common good of humanity should answer before the interna-
tional community as a whole. 
The idea that rulers have responsibilities they should answer for arose after WWI, due 
to the atrocities committed by the armies during the conflict. This new era of 
Criminal Law establishes, besides common crime, more atrocious and heinous 
crime, characterized by violence, cruelty and barbarity. Hence, the concept of 
international crime as “an act universally seen as criminal, a serious issue that 
raises international concern and that, for some reason, cannot be considered of 
the exclusive jurisdiction of a State which, under normal circumstances, would 
have control over it” (Military Tribunal V 1947-1948, Hostage case).
At the core of international governances is now a type of crimes against interna-
tional order committed by specific individuals, and these individuals may be 
assigned criminal accountability for their actions. 
From the point of view of international security, the contributions of the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and of the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal are indisputable for establishing the limits to rulers’ free-
dom. These trials are a first draft of an urban justice that represses the most 
serious international crimes of individual criminal accountability committed 
by political and military leaders, in this case German and Japanese leaders. 
They were, however, ad hoc courts which disappeared once the specific 
cases they had been created had been tried.
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Yet, in the period after WWII and in the next decades of the Cold War, the sig-
nificant increase in international crimes led the international community 
to set as an objective the creation of an international court permanently 
provided with sufficient power to enforce International Law on individu-
als accused of committing serious violations to Humanitarian International 
Law. 
At the end of the 20th century the conditions existed for this project to be put in 
practice. 
In the 1990s, the USSR started to break up and globalization was spreading fast, 
leading to new forms of violence and terror and conflict “civilnization”. The 
core feature of armed conflicts at the end of the 20th century is the nar-
rowing of the gap between fighters and non fighters. The result is increased 
pressure on those who are not linked to the conflict, the civilians – direct 
victims of the hostilities or killed by hunger or disease as a consequence of 
armed conflicts3. Technology has also made a great impact in the new con-
flict morphology and in the global effects it has in the international system. 
Finally, a third element, the narrative on the insecurity of the international 
system – the “war on terrorism”, presented as a response to the new ter-
rorist threat, is perhaps the most significant narrative created by the 
American foreign policy in the post bipolar era – is now so pervasive in the 
political debate that it has considerably influenced the creation of a perma-
nent international criminal court able to effectively repress those responsi-
ble for more serious international crimes.
These signs of change in the international system, which are part of a long term 
trend, suggest that the sovereignist paradigm is used up and that a model is 
gradually becoming more used in which sovereignty limited by accountabil-
ity where human fundamental rights are violated.
One of the achievements of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
completed in 1998, was exactly the fact that the crime of aggression (jus ad 
bellum) – as well as genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of war (jus 
in bello) – was included in its jurisdiction, unlike what occurred in the 
International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia and in the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda. In this sense, the Court is an 
international institution whose mission is to dissuade and repress extreme 
atrocity and cruelty and discourage the use of war as a mechanism for social 
change and political control over populations and resources.
3 On the development of this problem, see (2009) Human Security Report 2009/2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The truth is that the new Court has a mandate to prevent and repress war and 
punished those responsible for war but it cannot forget that there are other 
institutions able to limit the external sovereignty of States. This is, thus, an 
institution that is not alone. There is practical need to coordinate the ICC 
and the UNSC, as the latter is responsible for monitoring the full respect for 
the law preventing the strategic use of armed coercion outside the (restrict-
ed) framework of self-defense.
COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
In this section, we aim to analyze the decision made by the great powers at the end 
of WWII of providing the international system with a collective security 
mechanism.
As stated previously, the development of a collective global security model adopt-
ed by the United Nations in 1945 aims to ensure order, stability and conti-
nuity in a post-war world. The institutionalized model is largely driven by 
the powers assigned to the UNSC, which has the material resources and the 
political will to maintain a global system that can work in favor of all States 
in the international system. 
In theory “the sine qua non condition for collective security is collective self-regulation: a 
group of States tries to reduce the threats to security by agreeing to collectively punish 
any State that goes against the rules of the system” (Downs & Ida, 1994). 
In this sense, it is different from collective defense in three aspects. 
Firstly, the problems related with internal security of political space are more 
important than the external challenges to this group of countries. Secondly, 
the coalition of States within the space collectively has more power than 
their possible opponents. Finally, the system participants are united by a 
common objective: to react against any use of armed forces considered ille-
gal under International Law (Downs & Ida, idem).
The institutionalized mechanism is essentially reactive, based on surveillance of 
States that are not UNSC members, solely when these disrupt the system 
and go against the most fundamental collective interests, namely, the safe-
guarding of international status quo. 
However, the originally crucial principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs 
of States has, today, new parameters of analysis the UNSC must necessarily 
account for. 
We do not aim to preview new UNSC trends, nor would it be advisable to do so; 
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the most important is to emphasize that these parameters have decisive 
implications for the future of this institution.
One of the most important issues in the discussion regarding the limits to the use 
of armed forces is the possibility of armed humanitarian intervention in case 
of humanitarian disaster (under the doctrine of responsibility to protect, or 
R2P). Other possibilities are not completely legal, such as the forced (re)
implementation of democratic regimes or the preventative use of force if 
possession or development of massive destruction weapons is suspected 
(Saraiva, 2009,p 97).
In 1945, it seemed viable to build a system of global collective security based on 
legal convergence and spreading of consensus at international level. This was 
possible because there was a coalition of States strong enough to impose 
their will on other system members. During the Cold War, the balance of 
power United States/USSR prevented any public understanding from 
occurring which would allow the UNSC to act against perpetrator States. 
Yet, in this case, there was little interest in acting and no lack of capacity for 
acting. 
The crucial issue in post-bipolar geopolitics is completely different: the historic 
tension between law and power has increased after the falling apart of the 
USSR because the United States, the country that maintains order in inter-
national system since it won WWII, aims to keep its dominant position by 
resorting to military power to continue deciding the rules of the game and 
eventually stop the rise of a new hegemonic power.
One of the main guarantees of this strategy is the United States’ huge military and 
technological power which leads to a “revolution in military affairs”, a pro-
cess linked to new technologies in terms of long range shooting precision 
and permanent information on present forces and possible targets. “Clean 
war” allows for a strategy of protection against potential threats based on the 
perception that hegemony (American or otherwise) is a transient situation 
in the international system. Hence, it is not only important to face those that 
challenge American power but a need to delay in time the loss of hegem-
onic status, which is deemed inevitable (Saraiva, 2009,p 113).
In fact, the end of the Cold War was important in the change in the international 
agenda. The change was twofold: in terms of the themes included in the 
agenda and mostly the importance awarded to international issues. 
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Chart 1 – Armed Conflicts by Type (1946-2011)
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The dynamic triggered by the implosion of the USSR immediately influenced the 
occurrence of non international armed conflicts, which started to steadily 
decrease after 1989. No consequence was visible in conflicts among States, 
they are almost non-existent statistically, as visible in the chart below on 
armed conflicts from 1946 to 2011. 
In terms of the relevance given to problems in the decade after the fragmenting of 
the USSR and which coincided with the negotiation of the Rome Statute, a 
deep change occurred in the international perspective of assassinations, geno-
cides, looting and crimes of war in former Yugoslavia, in Rwanda, in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and many other forgotten places in the world.
Nevertheless, we cannot state that current strategic balance is the result of a new 
speech on the importance of human rights. What the strategic scenario has 
evidenced is that the international agenda has become more complex as a 
result of an important strategic revaluing of political violence and that rules 
forbidding the use of armed forces have become more fluid. As we sug-
gested earlier and is visible in the chart, from 2005 onwards, we can see an 
increase in armed conflictwhich, as a global trend, has not shown real signs 
of decrease. 
Simultaneously, a trend is obvious for a more systematic violation of laws and war 
rules – both in the institutionalized powers and in non State actors – thus 
keeping in pace with the rules of jus ad bellum.
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In terms of the other superpower, the omnipresence of the United States in the 
main armed conflicts is to be taken into account, considering that, as we 
have mentioned, the laws against war as jus in bello are looser (in terms of 
weapons and war strategies). This is partly a consequence of a deliberate 
strategy by more advanced military powers to take advantage of a plethora 
of innovative weapons and military equipment produced by western pow-
ers’ military industries. We reiterate it is partly a consequence though it may 
(and should) be seen from a wider perspective; this paper focuses on the 
case of the US but a more thorough and complete explanation may be found 
through complementary analyses of other superpowers, as well as of groups 
of small and medium-sized superpowers, such as the African powers and 
their alternative types of “resistance”. Thus, with this paper we aim to take a 
step (just one step) in that direction.
Another important aspect of the strategic scenario, sometimes overlooked, is the 
access to new technologies by some armed groups in the opposition, which 
has transformed them in global and informational movements, whose behav-
ior is similar to that of technologically advanced States. The matter is extreme-
ly important because what is at stake here is a real strategic balance in terms 
of relation between groups in the opposition and the existing authorities, 
though there is a huge imbalance in terms of capacity (Saraiva, 2009,p 156).
All these changes in strategic scenario have had consequences in the negotiation of 
the ICC Statute. The different opinions of great and small powers on these 
and other matters has led to long debates and negotiations which have almost 
always resulted in political concessions to the interests of the great powers.
There was only one case in which there was shared interest in making the ICC 
jurisdiction more flexible – that of the case of crimes of war. The military 
powers wanted to preserve the Network Centric Warfare, based on infor-
mation control, on air-space superiority, the use of unmanned air vehicles 
(UAVs) and on cyberspace operations, but they were aware that the new 
paradigm of conflict completely chanced the traditional concepts of war and 
combat. Non democratic regimes, on the other hand, concerned with the 
need to neutralize armed opposing movement, also considered it advanta-
geous to support the establishing of a transitional period for the crimes of 
war (Escamareia, 2003,p 18).
The discussion around the Court’s jurisdiction on the crime of genocide and crimes 
against humanity was more heated but the political divisions evidenced, 
though important, did not reach a critical point. The crime of aggression was 
rather unanimously considered as the most controversial political issue. In 
fact, in Rome it was almost excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction. 
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VIOLENCE, CRUELTY AND POWER 
Violence and cruelty are universal and timeless and are at the core of the chal-
lenges politics faces today.
International crimes and their typification correspond to systematic violations of 
human rights in armed conflicts and practices in arbitrary regimes by means 
of atrocities and acts of violence and cruelty over victims. This trivialization 
of violence is frequently linked to a need by perpetrators to assert their 
power projects, either political or economical.
There is no clear definition of atrocity. There are also no clear definitions of cru-
elty, violence and power, though there are proposals as to their differences. 
In terms of the concept of cruelty, several authors propose that cruelty is at a dif-
ferent level than violence and power because it involves the complete 
denial of the other’s existence (Rundell, 2012).
In Rundell’s opinion, here viewed essentially in a physical sense, it is an instrument 
of power. More precisely, it corresponds to a relation established between 
individuals, as power acknowledges the other’s existence, though cruelty is 
often a main feature of the opposition between the one that coerces and the 
one that is coerced inside and outside the battlefield.
We may, thus, conclude that torture, violation and extermination of another we 
deny the existence of is more difficult when there is a power relation, which 
limits useless cruelty though the relation is still under a zero-sum logic 
(Rundell, idem).
The more serious crimes against society as a whole are an attempt to limit the 
manifestations of cruelty and violence in politically organized societies 
where law and power are basically antithetical realities.
The crimes against the civilian population, genocide and crimes against humanity, are 
the visible side of a barbarian and cruel State that persecutes and kills common 
citizens as a political strategy to maintain power, in the context of armed con-
flicts or within their policies of repression. They are also expressions of vio-
lence used by irregular armed groups over defenseless populations. Generalized 
violence against civilians is now part of many people’s daily life, which allows 
for perverse coordination between this violence and external and transna-
tional conflict, thus creating a complex mix of tension that destroys societies.
The crimes of war are another aspect of violence and cruelty. As violations of law 
and war rules include acts committed during military conflicts that are con-
demned and forbidden both by international rules and by the Hague legisla-
tion, by the Geneva legislation and, ore recently, by the New York legisla-
tion. These crimes are framed by rules on the use of armed force in terms 
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of allowed weapons and methods of combat once the decision has been 
made to use armed force by States or resistance groups. 
Finally, noteworthy is import progress being carried out in institutionalizing the 
crime of aggression in regards to accountability of individuals involved in 
the decision to use force to attain political objectives in the outside. 
The agreement on this matter achieved in Nuremberg, then denominated “crime 
against peace”, has not only made it clear that peace, security and justice are 
deeply interdependent but that their concepts are not consensual.  Though 
fifty years have passed, the political and strategic tensions connected with 
crime have not been resolved despite the efforts of the delegations in Rome 
and Kampala, as will be made evident in this paper.
THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE
This is a nameless crime and an international crime under international custom. 
This is the crime, along with the crime of aggression, which has more political 
depth of all those listed in the ICC Statute 
Genocide has happened in all eras and is closely linked with intolerance towards 
human diversity (Nersessian, 2007,p 243). Genocide is the premeditated plan 
to exterminate or weaken national, religious, racial or ethnic groups. The plan 
aims to destroy political and social institutions such as culture, language, 
national feelings, religion and national groups’ own economic survival. 
Thus, “Genocide is a systematic criminal state and it develops in two stages: the 
first consists in destroying the national model of the oppressed group, and 
the second in imposing the oppressor’s national model on the remaining 
oppressed population.” (Nersessian, idem,p 246).
The origin of the word can be found in a treaty on National Socialism and its pol-
icy of occupation written in 1944 by a Jew, Raphael Lemkin, who was a 
Polish Law professor. In the Nuremberg trials, no defendant was convicted 
of the crime of genocide per se because, at that time, genocide was included 
in the crimes against humanity (Nersessian, idem,p 243). 
In fact, at the end of WWII, the legal lexicon did not include a category expressing 
the act of mass extermination of the Jewish people. Some years later, a con-
vention in 19484 defined and made autonomous a new type of international 
4  Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, United Nations General 
Assembly, 10 December 1984. 
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crime, “genocide”, which meant crimes against humanity, against the dignity 
of humanity. 
This crime’s barbarity and cruelty is so against the principle of humanity that it is 
politically impossible for Western democratic governments to ignore it, 
there being no possibility of not moving forward once the crime has admit-
tedly been committed. 
In this sense, the typification of this crime in ICC Statute, which merely transcribes 
its definition from the one adopted in the Convention for the Prevention 
and Repression of the Crime of Genocide (mentioned above) reassured 
most States involved in the creation of the ICC because the crime was still 
limited the intentional (physical and biological) destruction of a national, reli-
gious, racial or ethnic group (Cardoso, 2012,p 48). The adopted concept 
excludes, for instance, persecution or intentional destruction of political 
groups, allowing governments to not be held accountable for these crimes 
which, though considered serious, are not viewed as endangering common 
well-being.
Our comments aim to underline that legal concepts become merely instrumental 
in manipulating reality when used in political speech. This reference seeks 
to remember that reality is interpreted according to political interests, at 
each given moment being able to opt for a course of action in the name of 
the common good. 
In the case of the crime of genocide, its denial almost always indicates political lack 
of interest in punishing this type of crime. On the other hand, international 
accusation of genocide does not necessarily mean there is political will to 
repress and punish these actions.
This is made evident through one example, of the many available: the United States 
eagerly condemned the events in Darfur as genocide, at a time when the 
report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the situation in 
Darfur5, created at the request of UNSC and presided by Antonio Cassese, 
had been unable to obtain conclusive evidence of the intent to eradicate 
groups completely or partly, therefore concluding there was no genocide 
policy in Darfur but military actions to counteract rebel action by a political 
group (Hamilton, 2011). Having the means at their disposal, it would have 
been easy for the United States to support the Commission’s recommenda-
tion, which referred the need to reference the case to the ICC, thus allowing 
5  International Commission for Inquiry on Darfur, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the 
United Nations Secretary-General, UN Doc, S/2005/60, Jan, 25, 2005.
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for the trial of those responsible for the atrocities committed in Darfur. 
Instead of supporting the proposal, the United States suggested the creation 
of a hybrid African court. 
The crisis in Darfur evidences the existence of a moral duality in American politi-
cal thought (as in the case of similar interventions by great powers), simul-
taneously specific and universal, and that this duality raises political difficul-
ties when decisions need to be made.
In the beginning of September 2004, after the investigation promoted by the 
American administration on the crimes committed in Darfur, the State sec-
retary Colin Powell described the crimes in Darfur as genocide and 
President George W. Bush used the same term in a speech in the United 
Nations some weeks later (Hamilton, 2011). In the crisis in Darfur, 
American foreign policy broke with tradition and spoke about this type of 
atrocity. Yet, direct reference to the ongoing dehumanizing process in Sudan 
did not lead to decisive action towards the serious events.
Thus, American discourse practice does not confirm that the country assumes 
responsibility in international repression of the crime of genocide. Rather 
the opposite. UNSC resolution which reported the situation to the ICC was 
approved only because it was known that a majority of 9 countries (the like-
minded group) would vote for the text and place the United States in a spot: 
only American veto would stop the resolution from being approved.
The American administration opted for abstention and thus allowed resolution 
1593 to be approved which reported the case to the ICC (Mackeod, 2010). 
This decision, which apparently evidenced a commitment with interna-
tional criminal justice, does not in fact impose human rights international 
protection on the country because the American administration demanded 
in exchange for allowing the resolution to pass, namely jurisdiction immu-
nity before the ICC for American citizens involved in military operations in 
that region.
As this episode involves the United States, a great power with a very specific dis-
course, it evidences the contradictory and ambivalent discourse which 
attempts to reconcile the promotion of human rights (focusing on the princi-
ple of human dignity at the core) and the reaffirmation of its status as excep-
tional nation which, in this case, makes it possible to be exempt from abiding 
to the rules provided by the international regime of protection of human 
rights.
We conclude, in this case, that, from the point of view of the United States’ strat-
egy, international legal tools are closely linked with a national strategy to 
promote democratic regimes, within the framework of a wider and more 
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integrated security which includes, among others, defining spheres of inter-
est, maintaining hegemony and the country’s energy security. We believe the 
interventions of other great powers have a very similar dual pattern.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
We have been witnessing government-sponsored violence since the end of WWII. 
Governments that intentionally kill civilians use lethal policies such as genocide 
and politicide. 
As you have seen, genocide includes a policy of organized killing in which the vic-
tims are chosen because they belong to a specific group.
Policides, on the other hand, have a completely different pattern, victims are essen-
tially defined in terms of their hierarchical position or their opposition to the 
regime or to the ruling group. Politically, this concept reflects the need to 
gather in one single type a set of practices in authoritarian regimes to which 
there is no corresponding legal category in International Criminal Law (Krain, 
2005,p 364). 
In both crimes the aggressor’s intention is to destroy the target group, either par-
tially or completely (Krain, idem). Thus, what truly distinguishes the two 
crimes is not intent but target groups.
Mass murder is typically a crime committed by States but it can be applied to other 
perpetrators who control the region where the massacre takes place and operate 
as if they were a State and they are the authority in the region (Krain, idem).
For International Criminal Law, persecuting political groups is a crime against 
humanity in the framework of a generalized or systematic attack against any 
civilian population, and this attack6 is known in the framework of armed 
conflicts or outside that framework. 
However, as Cassese mentions, there is still no agreement on what practices to 
include in this type of crime. The Nuremberg Trials, when faced with this 
difficulty, decided to consider part of this category the “inhuman actions” 
carried out by the Germans. Despite the differences on the scope of the 
concept, the International Criminal Court for former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Court for Rwanda and the ICC generically agreed on 
this concept which defines the crime based on the inhumanity of the actions 
under analysis. 
6 ICC Statute, article 7.
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In Cassese’s opinion, this is a set of hateful offenses that constitute a serious attack 
on human dignity or a serious humiliation or the degradation of dignity 
(Mackeod, 2010,p  283). ICC Statute considers part of this group the 
crimes of sexual violence and the crime of apartheid, for example. 
The inclusion and definition of the crimes of sexual violence in the ICC Statute was 
one of the most significant victories of Portuguese diplomacy and in particu-
lar a result of Paula Escarameia’s7 commitment, who largely contributed to 
in-depth studying of these issues during the negotiations of the Statute and 
of the Crime Elements.
The impact of the crimes of sexual violence in armed conflicts has continuously 
increased. Governments’ security forces, military forces, military compa-
nies hired by western governments and armed groups in the opposition, all 
resort to psychological war so as to humiliate the enemy and destroy their 
and the population’s morale, as was made manifest in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(Zawati, 2007).  Considering that sexual offenses always have devastating 
consequences for the communities and that those responsible for these 
actions hope the social stigma stops the victims from openly speaking about 
the crime, thus drastically reducing their chances of being punished.
Systematic sexual violence is, therefore, a means to weaken society because their 
consequences do not only affect the individuals involved. 
Sexual violence has affected men, women and children. The rape of men in times 
of war is essentially a manifestation of power and aggression rather than a 
means to satisfy the perpetrators’ sexual desires. The winner violates these 
men as a way to guarantee they will never fight or lead others again. Men 
submitted to these abuse become outcasts. 
In contemporary societies, the social contract has been unable to oppose this and 
other acts of violence over civilians. The practical responses for this diffi-
culty have not been satisfactory. 
One of the most discussed solutions is the use of armed force in a scenario of 
humanitarian emergency where the physical integrity and survival of the 
civilian population are at risk because of human action.  However, imple-
menting a more flexible model of sovereignty does not seem to be viable, at 
least for now because a large part of the international community opposes 
to this change. 
Other solutions are, thus, needed. Yet, as seen previously, the technical and legal 
difficulties and the political reservations regarding the typification of some 
7 As Legal Advisor at the Mission of Portugal to the United Nations.
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behaviors as crimes against humanity make it more difficult the implementa-
tion of international criminal justice based solely on a  permanent universal 
jurisdictional institution. It is, therefore, obvious that the inter-relation 
between Law and international politics requires more thought.
Crimes against humanity deal with criminalizing human atrocities that endanger the 
security of those communities affected by that indignity and outrage. Thus, 
international responsibility not only includes the possibility to try these 
crimes as it is in politics that the defense of human dignity has its last resort.
CRIMES OF WAR
Crimes of war were defined by the ICC Stature based on the serious violations to 
Humanitarian International Law within The Hague Legislation and the 
Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols from 1977.
Crimes of war include two elements: the crimes are committed within the context 
of armed conflict and the crime is connected with that conflict. The different 
between crimes of war and crimes against humanity is the need for an armed 
conflict, international or not8.
Though the ICC gives primacy to the Nation-state, allowing it to try their citizens 
in case of serious violations to human rights and this way preventing these 
cases from being tried by the ICC (principle of complementariness), it was 
France, a western country, that demanded (and succeeded in it being 
approved in Rome) that a State that has become part of the Statute has a 
7-year period after it entered in force to accept the ICC jurisdiction over 
these crimes whenever committed by their nationals or in their territory 
(Escarameia, 2003,p 18). 
Currently, France is no longer in the transient period but the truth is that this 
clause may be used by other States in a Court created to act in a wide terri-
tory and supposedly has general jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the dynamic triggered by France was used by the United States 
that initiated a policy to protect its armed forces stationed abroad, either in 
peace missions or more muscular armed intervention (Escarameia, idem). 
All these developments evidence a securitization of human rights and a growing 
availability by the great powers to carry out humanitarian interventions as a 
justification for their unilateral military actions. 
8 ICC Statute, articles 7 and 8.
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Let us return, then, to our example: the United States. This logic justifies that the 
US attempted to limit the ICC jurisdiction to crimes occurring in the terri-
tory of a State party “and” were committed by a national of a State party. 
What happened was that the delegates reached a radically different consen-
sus, convinced that the disjunctive “or” (Lindberg, 2010,p 17) would rein-
force the idea the the individual was at the core of International Law and the 
paradigm of justice serving the unity of human community.
Before this achievement of international public order, the United States doubled 
their efforts to find alternatives to the Statute because in theory the American 
military abroad may be subject to ICC jurisdiction if they commit crimes in 
the territory of States party and they do not want or cannot try them9. 
The defense of sovereignty is not incompatible with international commitments 
signed by the States themselves, in a clear extension of the social contract, 
but cannot be be question when a citizen from a State that is not part of the 
Statute is reported to the ICC to be tried. Aware of this fact, the United 
States have skirted around the Court’s jurisdiction using several means. 
At UNSC, Washington has been committed in ensuring jurisdiction immunity to 
the military in peace missions abroad, despite most countries considers 
these clauses are contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Rome Statute. 
Tensions have reached a critical point when the United States informed 
they aimed to renovate the guarantees for immunity of all American 
forces in UN missions or missions authorized by the UN, as the coalition 
of forces in Iraq after July 30, 2004 (Birdsall, 2010,p 460; Johansen, 
2006, p 308-310). 
The Council was not receptive to the US proposal because they were again forcing 
the approval of a status of exception for American military at a particularly 
delicate time when the legality of the intervention in Iraq was being dis-
cussed. At that time, only the Russians, the Angolans and the Philippines 
supported the US proposal, so they were left isolated and had to withdraw 
their proposal (Johansen, idem,p 310). 
Washington reacted to this failure by withdrawing 9 American soldiers from the 
peacekeeping missions in Ethiopia and Kosovo, States that had not signed 
bilateral agreements with the United States (Johansen, idem) and were not 
part of the ICC either. 
The policy of the United States towards multilateral mechanisms is not a new fac-
tor in international relations: what concerns the United States is that the 
9 Considering that in the ICC Statute there are no exceptions.
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ICC has the capacity to enforce international rules at a global level, thus 
conditioning the design of great powers’ national policies, in this case, their 
policies (May et al, 2006,p 354). 
Another example of the policy followed is the network of bilateral agreements 
signed between the United States and a large number of countries which 
determine that the countries in the Statute should not hand in American 
nationals or nationals from other countris that are not in the Statute to the 
ICC; these include people linked to the Department of Defense and the 
CIA, even civilians. 
Another important aspect of this period is the American Servicemember’s 
Protection Act (ASPA), legislation which prohibits military assistance to 
countries that ratified the Statute unless they have bilateral agreements with 
the United States (Johansen, 2006, pp 313-314). 
There is already evidence of the counter productivity of these policies in Latin 
America. The Latin American countries refused to sign bilateral agreements 
with the United States and signed military assistance agreements with 
China. Confronted with the loss of these close contacts, Congress aproved 
a legislative amendment in September 2006 which lays down the exclusion 
of military training programs from the list of sanctions applicable to coun-
tries that refuse to sign these agreements (Birdsall, 2010,p 462), thus mak-
ing it possible to sign military cooperation agreements. 
An additional problem to the increasingly interventionist agenda of the great powers 
is the power assigned to the Prosecutor of the ICC, who can begin a process. 
Noteworthy, however, is to acknowledge that the Prosecutor has shown pru-
dence in exercising his functions. In the case of the intervention in Iraq, 
the Prosecutor received several messages requesting that Blair, Bush and 
Rumsfeld were tried (Lindberg, 2010,pp 24-25). In a letter made public, 
the Prosecutor recognized that American soldiers (belonging to a State 
that is not a State party, just like Iraq) acted in collusion with British sol-
diers (belonging to a State party) in the way they treated their prisoners 
in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor decided that the UK was internally 
investigating the facts and, from his point of view, it made no sense to 
involve the ICC10.
Besides everything that was mentioned so far, the United States created a new 
conflict with international justice regarding the prohibition to use torture, 
a principle laid down in International customary Law and in the interna-
10 OTO, Policy Paper, On the Interests of Justice, September of 2007. 
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tional treaties as jus cogens. This is banned practice by all peoples and 
criminalized in the ICC Statute as crime of war, crime against humanity 
and genocide11.
Amnesty International, among other organizations, accused the former President 
Bush, former vice-president Dick Cheney and the former secretary of 
State for the Defense Donald Rumsfeld, as well as the former CIA direc-
tor George Tenet of having ordered practices legally considered torture 
against prisoners in the context of “war against terrorism”12 in secret 
detention facilities ran by the CIA13. Former president George W. Bush’s 
statements on television acknowledging that he had authorized torture 
and official documents confirmed these practices (Guantanamo, Abu 
Grahib) (Ross, 2007). 
Torture is always carried out in the name of national security. The main feature of 
torture is its specialization as a routine tool in interrogation about activities 
by the opposition to military regimes and other non-democratic types of 
government. 
Torture in democracy is not acknowledged as official policy and it is simply a 
method of illegally obtaining information. This is why it is particularly dif-
ficult to understand why George W. Bush acknowledged he had authorized 
torture to prisoners in the custody of the United States. The Bush admin-
istration openly compromised the universal prohibition of torture, laid 
down in article 2 of the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, threatening the bases of 
political liberalism and the idea that people are the objective. To relativize 
the immorality and illegality of torture and its institutionalization in the 
democratic state represents a flaw in the information system, in particular 
of HUMINT, unacceptable because this is a country with huge international 
responsibilities and global interests. 
Obama tried to remedy the situation and approved a new National Security 
Strategy that condemns the use of torture as a means of fighting terrorism, 
suggesting that the United States are willing to abolish this practice once and 
11 Article 8. paragraph ii, article 7f), and article 6b) of the ICC Statute.
12 Amnesty International (2012). USA Human Rights Betrayed, 20 Years After the Ratification of ICCPR, Human Rights 
Principles Sidelined by “Global War” Theory. UK,  p.3
13 Many sectors are still not convinced there was an armed conflict with Al Qaeda. Anyway, as seen previously, the Rome 
Statute allows to try acts of torture within the framework of crimes against humanity. 
86
Major violence (crimes) against the international community
for all14. Yet, the truth is that the doctrinal discussion on the legitimacy of 
torture in exceptional cases cannot be dissociated from the doctrine on 
preventative war, which the 2010 National Security Strategy maintained in 
full. This has made it difficult to consolidate the principles of international 
law and justice.
To sum up, unilateralism and exceptional policies deepen the difficulties for inter-
national public order and fpr International Law regarding the protection and 
promotion of human rights and thus foster the conceptual contradictions of 
the text approved in Rome. In fact, the differences in perspectives have 
allowed countries parties (and non-parties) to the Statute to exploit the 
mentioned flaws and has made it possible for them to project their interests 
rather than the values of a global society the Statute aims to defend.
CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Crime of aggression is a crime against the main international peace promotion 
institution, the sovereign State. 
The crime of aggression is crucial in the legal construction of the ICC as it is up to 
the Court to end “abuse of power”, discourage violent competition and pro-
mote peace through preventing and trying crimes of aggression in the inter-
national legal structure.
It is relatively consensual that the Briand-Kellog Pact (1928) was the first legal 
document to introduce the idea that war is not the solution for all interna-
tional problems, a revolutionary idea at the time. Before this dates the focus 
was completely different, the use of force and armed aggression were simple 
political concepts used to describe the conduct of strong and powerful States 
(Meddi, 2008,p 658).
The atrocities committed in WWII drew the attention of the international to the 
need to judge the war of aggression. The Nuremberg Trials are the first 
attempt in codifying International Criminal Law and an important political 
compromise with the new international regime based on the general rule to 
prohibit the use of force in international relations.
14  According to the 2010 National Security Strategy, the American administration “prohibit torture without exception or 
equivocation: brutal methods of interrogation are inconsistent with our values, undermine the rule of law, and are not 
effective means of obtaining information. They alienate the United States from the world. They serve as a recruitment 
and propaganda tool for terrorists. They increase the will of our enemies to fight against us, and endanger our troops 
when they are captured. The United States will not use or support these methods”. In USA (2010). National Security 
Strategy. Washington: the White House, p. 36.  
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Yet, despite its importance, the contradictions in international politics at the end 
of WWII were evident in the Nuremberg Trials. Bass (2002,pp 173-174), 
for example, states the the preparatory negotiations to the trial show that 
the American and British national interests were more important than the 
responsibilities of the international community in punishing the crimes 
committed by the Nazi political and military elite. The preparatory work to 
the Nuremberg Trials allow us to understand the importance of the effects 
of war on American society and the need to stop the suffering inflicted on 
the American people. This national circumstance would sideline the memo-
ry of national-socialism and the suffering of the Jewish people in the holo-
caust (Bass, 2002,pp 173-174)15.
This specific feature of American home politics helps to understand the extreme 
importance of the “crimes against peace” in the post-war period:”At the 
International Conference on Military Tribunals, held in London between 
26 June and 8 August 1945, the most controversial issue was still aggres-
sive war criminality. The USA insisted on defending the idea that aggres-
sive war was an international crime that implies that those responsible 
should be criminally made accountable. The crime of aggression was 
presented at the Conference on the same day that the San Francisco 
Conference made it illegal to use force in the United Nations Charter” 
(Saraiva, 2009,p 221).
Fifty years after these events, the United States radically changed their position 
regarding criminalization of aggression within the ICC Statute negotiations, 
having influenced considerably to exclude the crime of the Court’s jurisdic-
tion. 
Yet, despite the pressure by the USA and by other UNSC permanent members, the 
crime of aggression was included in the Statute as a result of the feeling 
shred by the delegates to the Rome Conference that aggression is a major 
threat to collective peace and security. Nevertheless, due to lack of time and 
political consensus – let us not forget that the great powers accepted the 
reference to the crime near the end of the conference – its definition was 
postponed to future amendment conferences. 
The first amendment conference occurred in Kampala, in 2010. As expected, the 
discussion on the definition of crime of aggression met numerous political 
obstacles, which did not allow for fine tuning several elements in the adopt-
ed version, which reflects the strategic priorities of the great powers.
15 Perhaps this positions helps to explain the need for other trials, in Israel and in Western Germany, to try the holocaust. 
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The crime of aggression is, in fact, the crime under the ICC jurisdiction that best 
reflects the current balance of powers in the international system – an asym-
metric distribution of power among States. 
The succession of obstacles placed by the dominant power throughout this whole 
process evidences its deep suspicion of international laws in force that rule 
the use of armed force as these are like a defensive barrier to territorial 
integrity of the most fragile political units in the international system 
(Saraiva, idem). The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) has questioned the 
position of the P5 and has already stated it is not willing to effect the inter-
ventionist agenda of western powers as a specific solution for humanitarian 
emergency erupting in their territories and which the local authorities can-
not control or are the primary responsible for. In this sense, NAM always 
have favored the EU proposals in the like-minded group, advocating the 
inclusion of the crime of aggression and a wider scope of action for the 
Court against the open opinion of great powers.
Despite the initial inflexibility in their position, as negotiations continued, small 
and medium powers would have to give in and admit the role of the UNSC 
in this matter, making this the only crime in the Statute that establishes a 
pre-condition for an individual to be held accountable fro a crime of aggres-
sion that that person has planned, prepared, started or carried out an act of 
aggression that makes the State responsible (scope of action of UNCS).
In any case, the resolution adopted in Kampala on the crime of aggression is an 
amendment to the ICC Statute that finally defines the crime the conditions 
to the exercise of the jurisdiction. 
However, as I have said, the final text evidences a very fragile consensus and the 
ambivalence of great powers towards multilateralism. The final architecture 
of the crime of aggression took into account the strategic doctrines in force 
in the United States, in NATO and in other western countries deeply based 
on the Revolution of Military Affairs, the Transformation and in related 
concepts aiming to reconcile military forces and the information era we live 
in.
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) have a multiplying effect that 
‘allows the Armed Forces that have already incorporated the technological 
requirements of RMA to start considering a more pro-active strategic atti-
tude, of military prevention of “new threats” (Saraiva, 2009,p 338).
This strategic option of the United States, put in practice by the Bush administra-
tion and continued by Obama, is base on the preventative war doctrine 
because it is a long-term strategy, “by definition, a strategy that is developed 
in a framework of strategic superiority because only when in military advan-
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tage is it possible to stop the emergence of potential rivals (Saraiva, idem,p 
2029). In this sense, the idea that technological superiority would be deci-
sive in future conflicts, which would make them shorter, less intense and 
with less casualties (Espírito Santo, 2007) has won over other permanent 
UNSC members and allowed for the adoption of a common position by the 
P5 in regards to the crime of aggression.
The history of the negotiation around the crime of aggression shows that what is 
in dispute at the ICC is the right by great powers to keep their freedom in 
terms of strategic action and pursue their humanitarian agenda. 
During the negotiation of the crime, many strategies were followed to attain the 
objective. For example, in 1999, in the aftermath of NATO intervention in 
Kosovo, the German delegation advocated that the restricted concept of the 
crime sets aside categories of the crime beyond the idea of “armed attack 
whose objective or effect is the military occupation or annexation of a ter-
ritory by another State”16. This means, air bombing and sea blockade would 
not be acts of aggression (Saraiva, 2009,p 295). AS you know, the argument 
was not accepted by the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) because it dis 
not seem reasonable to thus exonerate NATO of responsibility in the air 
campaign in Kosovo2. 
The controversial issur of legality/legitimacy of “humanitarian interventions” in 
Kosovo, Aghanistan, Iraq and Georgia was back on the table in Kampala. Yet, 
a final position related to legality/illegality of armed unilateral bona fide 
humanitarian intervention (Trahan, 2011,pp 75-76) was ultimately not 
included in the final text because this was not a stable matter and is still 
under discussion by the legal community (and among scholars in interna-
tional relations), essentially under R2P.  Despite this being the decision, the 
final wording still leaves open some indirect approaches on this issue. 
In terms of the concept of exceptional illegality of armed humanitarian interven-
tions, as was the proposal by Franck, Chesterman and Byers (2003), there 
is the idea, especially among the NAM, that illegality has led to over 130 
unilateral or collective interventions of countries formally opposing to its 
being laid down (Leckerc-Gagné & Byers, 2009,p 380). 
However, in Kampala the diplomatic initiatives of the United States managed to 
win over the resistance of African and Asian countries. According to the 
wording of the final approved text, the crimes committed in States not party 
are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction. This implies that the crime of 
16 German proposal (PCNICC72000/DPPP-139 (1999), Discussion Paper PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.4 (2000)
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aggression committed by American nationals in a State party can no longer 
be tried by the Court, thus making it easier for military coalitions to be 
formed for interventions. These coalitions include the United States (State 
not party) and a State party to the Statute (UK or France, for example) in 
the territory of a State not party, because, in this case, the ICC cannot try 
the crime of aggression (Trahan, 2011,pp 91-93). 
Let us not forget that one of the aims underlying the creation of the ICC was to 
avoid trials on specific situations and geographical areas. The issue in terms 
of States party is that article 15 bis (4) previews a statement of exclusion 
that allows these States to declare that they do not accept the Court’s juris-
diction in relation to the crime of aggression by means of submitting a sim-
ple declaration to the Secretariat (Arribas, 2011). 
The situation is worsened by the fact that the solution found does not allow that s 
crime can be tried before 2012, at best17.
We may conclude that the Court and the countries supporting it were unable to 
handle the sovereignist position of States in the issue of crime of aggression, 
which reinforces the idea that the Court will only be able to try individuals 
suspected of the crime of aggression in limit cases.
As far as the definition of the crime is concerned, we consider the result rather 
more satisfactory though not particularly innovative. 
Crime of aggression was defined as planning, preparing starting or executing an act 
of aggression by an individual in a position to control or lead political or 
military action of a State. The seriousness and scale of this act of aggression 
is such that it violates the United Nations Charter (Arribas, idem).
From the point of view of the great powers, the text was not up to expectations in 
terms of the role of the UNSC on this matter, as at a time the P5 believed it 
would be possible to introduce in the text the need for Council authoriza-
tion to begin the procedure by a State party or the Prosecutor him or her-
self. The delegates to the Kampala conference opted to defend the integrity 
and independence of the Court by kept the UNSC prerogative to be able to 
suspend the inquest or the criminal procedure for one year (extendable).
The compromise formula rather reverts the initial strategy of the great powers 
which was focused on a restricted definition of the crime of aggression. This 
strategy was eventually put aside and replaced by another, focused not on 
the definition but on the conditions to exercise the Court jurisdiction. In 
practical terms, the Court will be very selective and will have greater diffi-
17 See amendment to the Rome Statute, Kampala, 11 June 2010, available at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression.
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culty in trying crimes of aggression involving the great powers, which 
emphasizes the multilateralism à la carte of the Statute. On the other hand, 
the establishing of a broader definition of the crime of aggression allows 
appropriate trying of reported cases, considering that the crime, as it was 
typified, allows to place in the Court jurisdiction most aggressive phenom-
ena that are typical of current conflicts and, thus, contribute to the rein-
forcement of international legal order. 
CONCLUSION
The creation of the ICC is a milestone in the history of International Criminal Law 
because, though its jurisdiction is not universal, as many had wanted, the 
Statute allows a citizen of a State that is not a State party to be handed in to 
the Court to be tried.
This limitation of sovereignty through a culture of responsibility is a legal revolu-
tion and, above all, it is a threat to the right of great powers to maintain their 
freedom in terms of strategic action and to pursue their ambitious humani-
tarian agenda. 
In this sense, there is a delay between this structural feature of the Rome Statute 
and the post-bipolar geopolitics, characterized by a significant increase in 
armed conflict situations and a permanent involvement of the United States 
in these armed conflicts. 
However, as we have shown throughout the text, the strategy for ICC institutional 
weakness, which involves great powers but is clearly led by the US in our 
opinion, does not only change the high innovative character of the Court but 
also provides an explanation on the nature of the international system and 
the role of the United States in that system. 
In conclusion, we may say that the international system is in rapid change and the 
great powers cannot (and in most cases, do not want) satisfactorily control 
the process. 
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The stormy waters of the International Criminal 
Court: Universal Fight against Impunity or Liberal 
Universalization?1
INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute which creates the International Criminal Court2 starts with a 
very meaningful statement by which States Parties to the Statute3 affirm that 
they are “conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cul-
tures pieced together in a shared heritage, and [are] concerned that this 
delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time”4. The preamble to the Rome 
Statute also appeals to “the conscience of humanity” and to “the peace, secu-
rity and well-being of the world”5. These lines evidence the universalistic 
perspective of an ethics common to all humanity which must be protected, 
disseminated and fostered. It is in this spirit that the President of the 
International Criminal Court, the South Korean judge Sang-Hyun Song, 
refers to the Court as a “moral imperative for humankind” (2013,p 4).
1  Paper written within the research project “International Criminal Justice: A Dialog between Two Cultures” currently 
underway in Observatório das Relações Exteriores – Observare / UAL, coordinated by Mateus Kowalski and Patrícia 
Galvão Teles. The paper represents the personal opinion of the author and cannot be understood in any way as the 
official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal.
2  Formally it is designate Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998.
3 Currently, 122 States are Parties to the Rome Statute. 
4 See paragraph 1 of the preamble of the Rome Statute. 
5 See paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble of the Rome Statute.
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The universalistic dimension of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) nature and 
function is, therefore, clear. Yet, this dimension must be thoroughly defined. 
We must ask “what universalism”? A rational approach to international social 
relations is different from an ethical one. The rational approach is based on a 
unique rational process and its prioritization – a universal process which can 
be extended to all human beings. Therefore, it would be possible to identify a 
wide range of interests and objectives common to the global community and 
usually universal and self-evident when deriving from a correct deductive 
rational process which leads to unique and universal truths. An ethical 
approach, on the other hand, resorts to a more subjective analysis based on a 
minimum common ethical ground reached through dialog: diversity, plurality 
and locality are considered more relevant. While the rational approach may 
lead to universalization of localized specific moral models (e.g. the liberal 
Western model) promoting its hegemony, the ethical approach promotes 
diversity through considering non-reducible differences and common human 
phenomena in which only a minimal common ethics is universal. This explains 
the relevance of understanding which of these approaches is that of the ICC.
This paper argues that the reply to this structural issue is crucial to understand if 
the ICC is essentially a hegemonic tool to expand the predominant Western 
liberal model or rather a mechanism to fight impunity regarding diversity 
and rooted on an axiological concern. If the former, the ICC must become 
irrelevant and we must be glad that it has been rarely successful6. If the lat-
ter, the ICC must be preserved and improved so as to make it one of the 
guardians of international criminal justice in the fight against impunity and 
in the protection and promotion of human being’s fundamental rights.
Therefore, this paper will firstly analyze the two universalistic approaches – the 
rational and the ethical. Secondly, we aim to integrate the ICC in the analy-
sis considering the Court’s nature in the international legal order as well as 
some of the institution’s features such as, possible selectivity, its relation 
with the United Nations Security Council, its legal-criminal design as well 
as its complementarity. 
The universal fight against impunity does not imply universalization of a western 
liberal model and an artificial and hegemonic blurring of what is socially and 
axiologically different. The ICC is immersed in these stormy waters.
6  In the past 12 years since the ICC was founded, it has only issued sentencing on the case Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (case ICC-01/04-01/06) e Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (case ICC-01/04-01/07). At this time, both sentences 
are still subject to appeal.
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WHICH UNIVERSALISM?
Rational Universalism and Universal Ethics
Any narrative on universalism will always include a universal ethical-legal dimen-
sion.  Therefore, we may distinguish two lines of thinking on universalism: 
that of tradition, which affirms there is universal reasoning common to all 
human beings; that of post-positivism, which rejects the concept of univer-
sal reasoning and whose concept of universality is rather based on the 
acknowledgment of non-reducible differences from which it derives7. This 
means that universality cannot question these non-reducible differences but 
is rather guided by the following joint proportions: non-reducible differ-
ences and phenomena common to all humanity that require a collective and 
potentially universal response (e.g. climate change). The issue of knowing 
whether different social communities are forced to be part of a universal 
discourse is less important than the debates on the nature of real dialog and 
its subjective scope (Linklater, 1998). 
Universalism is, therefore, ‘all that separates us and all that unites us’. The question 
is, then, ‘universalism regarding what’? Tradition answers indicating truths 
found through reason. Critical theory, introducing the subjective element, 
advocates universalism based on moral principles that can be operationalized 
through human being’s ability to communicate, including within the frame-
work of an institutional architecture that may be universal. Reason, accord-
ing to this perspective, is not the only human feature that influences human 
7  The debates on universalism – its defense, refusal or mitigation – derive from different epistemological attitudes.  
The differences are striking in positivist discourses (also defined as ‘tradition’ or ‘orthodox’) and in post-positivist ones, 
whose criticism to the predominant liberal approaches is at the bases of their narrative.  ‘Positivism’ is the name given  
to the school of thought that advocates that knowledge of the world is based on experience, observation and verification 
– a method very similar to that of natural sciences – this providing theoretical thought focused on problem resolution,  
its bases being supposedly objective and justified by repeatedly registered facts. This is the predominant scientific 
approach today and the most appealing (because it deals with power at the proclaimed end of history) – in International 
Law and in International Relations as well – that post-positivists usually designate as ‘positivism’. Positivism involves  
a cartesian separation between mind and matter, between subject and object. The positivist researchers aim that values 
and interests do not interfere in their observation, reading and analysis of empirical data – neutral objectivity – thus 
searching for the one solution – the ‘truth’ – deducted using reason supposedly universal. 
On the other hand, post-positivism searches new models that overcome the shortcomings of the positivist approach. 
Positivists advocate a research model that acknowledges the gap between subject and object; post-positivists,  
on the other hand, claim that all knowledge is contextual and that subjectivity cannot and should not be banned.  
The post-positivist approach therefore refuses dichotomies’ empiricism (true/false, good/bad, war/peace) and proposes 
a less naive and more sophisticated general approach, where there are no truths solely guided by reason. All this has led 
‘tradition’ theories being questioned by post-positivist approaches, mainly through critical theory.
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thought and action – others should be considered such as social, cultural, 
political and economic context as well as other personality-related features. 
Within the framework of post-positivist attitudes, critical theory uses 
deconstruction of hegemonic discourse, program and action. For this 
approach, reason-based universalistic perspective may kill diversity and fos-
ter hegemony. Therefore, this perspective is cautious in what concerns rules 
proclaimed as universal which may be nothing more than a means of impos-
ing interests and domination by those more powerful. Universalism could, 
then, lead to an expanding hegemony based on a national hegemony estab-
lished by those in power and that would become a pattern to be replicated 
by others. Cox, when discussing the economic aspect of production rela-
tions, defines hegemony as “an order within a world economy with a domi-
nant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into 
other subordinate modes of production” (1993,p 62). Such expansionism 
has less resistance from peripheral States as if it was a passive revolution. 
As Hoffman (1988) indicates, critical theory resists universalism as means of 
hegemony and rather tries to find a path for a more representative type of 
universalism. The issue is, therefore, not universalism itself but in how the 
concept is used by power structures, in particular the ones based on the 
liberal Western model. 
Yet, the issue can have a positive reading: that there is a true common ethical basis 
which must be acknowledged so that the limits of diversity can be identified 
and preserved. This common basis exists, therefore, in its own limits which 
cannot be hegemonically expanded beyond diversity and social plurality. 
However, plural reality does coexist with universalistic trends regarding the 
so-called minimal common ethics and cross-cutting issues to all humanity 
arising in the same historical time.  In that regard, Küng states that “for 
today’s pluralistic society, ethical consensus means the necessary agreement 
in fundamental, ethical standards which […] can serve as the smallest pos-
sible basis for humans living and acting together” (1997,p 97). 
Linklater (1998) highly contributes to understanding this, as the author refers that 
non-ethical concept is only satisfactory if based on systematic exclusion of 
any member of the human community who can potentially become univer-
sal. Universality is neither the essence of Natural Law perspectives nor the 
teleology of speculative philosophies associated to the Enlightenment. 
Universality becomes a responsibility to address others, regardless of their 
race, nationality or other features, in an open dialog on matters regarding 
their well-being. In fact, there is moral discourse that is cross-culturally 
valid. Examples of this are the discourses against slavery, genocide or the 
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prevalence of justice and environmental sustainability even in situations of 
conflict. We must also find procedures that tend to be universal and allow 
peaceful living. 
A common ethics is visible in legal principles and rights that are present in cultural 
communities where they are accepted with the possible exception of an indi-
vidual anomaly. Their denomination, their content, as well as their interpreta-
tion and application may vary. Yet these principles’ legal and philosophical 
essence is shared. As Kartashkin declares, “toutes les cultures et civilisations 
partagent, dans leurs traditions, coutumes, religions et croyances, un ensem-
ble commun de valeurs traditionnelles qui appartiennent à l’humanité dans 
son ensemble” (2011,p 7). The fact that these ethical principles are crucial to 
communities justifies the need for those principles to originate at the local 
level, in a horizontal as well as a vertical bottom-up dialog.
Justice, in its legal and philosophical dimension, is one of the principles of com-
mon ethics. International Law aims to apply justice, though it may not do 
so. Thus, justice precedes Law. Rawls enthusiastically states that “justice 
is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” 
(1999,p 3). Yet, we must not confuse liberal precedence of the fair over 
the good (system of values) mentioned by Rawls with precedence of jus-
tice over Law. Fairness is defined based on a society’s system of values in 
a given time. The dynamics of justice thus reflect the constant social and 
cultural development which is not fully reflected in Law – i.e.  in legal 
regulation. Hence, justice is a determining factor in social change via 
International Law: its dynamics is transferred to the legal international 
corpus juris, which will only be perfect when in line with the moral or 
cultural social context it is supposed to protect. From a legal-philosoph-
ical point of view, justice corresponds to the demand and to the applica-
tion of what is fair according to axiological regulatory principles of a 
specific society.  
THE INTERNATIONAL ‘MORAL COMMUNITY’
The concept of an international community linked by universal ethics (not to be 
confused with an international society diplomatically disguised as interna-
tional ‘community’) puts in practice the ethically based approach to univer-
salism,  what Linklater (1996) describes as ‘moral community’. A commu-
nity that, though subject to change, allows the individual to build his own 
history and to induce progress in the social system.
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Within the context of an international order in a process of globalization, building 
a ‘moral community’ may serve as a means to affirm the ethical element in 
a universal International Law undergoing an institutionalization, socializa-
tion and humanization process (Carrillo Salcedo, 1984)  and whose poten-
tial for change is huge. This process finds echo in the International Law 
regarding human beings and objectives referred to by Bedjaoui (1991), in 
Simma’s Law of communitarian intention (1994) or in the Humanity Law 
suggested by Abi-Saab (1991). However, this process – potentially positive 
– should be carefully conducted and assessed so as to avoid “the return to 
anarchy under the disguise of community”8 (Pureza, 2005,p 1180).
Morality is the social glue and must be historically and socially translated in an axi-
ological and legal understanding at a given moment. The issue here is how 
this can be done without there being a rupture with modernity. Critical 
theoreticians claim it can be done (Richmond, 2011); post-structuralists say 
it is not possible (Hawley, 2001). The concept of ‘moral community’ may 
help to solve the problem from a plural yet not sectarian perspective; in a 
rising (plural) perspective rather than from an imposing one (universalism 
without legitimacy). The issue lies also in determining how legitimacy is 
possible without a World State arising and simultaneously denying the par-
ticularistic perspective that legitimacy only derives from the State. Two pos-
sibilities immediately arise: either you trust reformed international organi-
zations (although deep reforms are not feasible in the near future); or 
international society is kept loose, unstructured and thus legitimacy is given 
to ethnically and culturally based communities without a State system being 
again implemented. However, from another perspective, the plural multi-
level system may provide yet other solutions.
Within this theoretical context, we must therefore understand what unites plural 
legal scenarios. Global issues cannot be contained and regulated within State 
borders. Thus, considering that issues related to shared assets are at stake, 
regional or global solution must be found. However, that solution may be 
expressed plurally or asymmetrically (for different starting points) and dis-
tributively. This suggests the need for a regulation through directives (princi-
ples and objectives). A multi-level approach could make sense here. Far from 
any World State idea, this would aim to join solidarity responses in one system, 
considering that the items in that system would meet in contexts of different 
needs, capacities and identities. Legitimacy must no longer be a prerogative 
8  Translation from the original in Spanish “el regresso a la anarquía bajo el disfraz de la comunidade” (Pureza, 2005,p 1180).
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exclusive to the sovereign State. Therefore, and using Habermas’s (2008) ideas 
on this matter, supra-state institutions may provide legitimacy without resort-
ing to the World State concept – which would otherwise be the only means of 
providing legitimacy at international level. On the other hand, this means 
accepting that plurality or opposition of legal regimes is the current legal and 
political platform. The biggest issue may be homogeneity of knowledge, per-
ception and methodology regarding this plurality (Koskenniemi, 2005), which 
is exactly what critical theory approaches aim to overcome.
Ethical and legal plurality poses several challenges to contemporary International 
Law, considering that the latter imposes values to local communities which 
they do not share. The concept of a plural world contends that there are sets 
of different and unchangeable values; these values may conflict in certain 
circumstances; the response to these conflicts cannot be assessed as good or 
bad; at individual and collective levels there are different ways to act accord-
ing to values and those actions may conflict. Thus, there is not one ideal 
means of social interaction. Thus a universal public order would become an 
imposition on the others (and would inevitably impose global values, cur-
rently mostly Western liberal values). While the liberal approach fosters 
respect for moral or religious convictions either through tolerance or by 
ignoring them, from a post-positivist perspective, respect for those convic-
tions is carried out through compromise (Sandel, 2005). This means paying 
attention to them, listening to them and challenging them. Respect based on 
communication does not ensure (and does not aim to achieve) a consensus 
regarding those convictions. Rather, in the context of a plural society, it is an 
assumption that allows differences in terms of values, thought and legal 
regimes to coexist.
Plurality, though, should not mean the denial of universalism. Shaffer says that “the 
normative vision of legal pluralism rather aims to foster transnational and 
global legal order out of the plural”9 (2012,p 673). Universalism evidences 
the relevance of mechanisms being found to provide common answers 
regarding common issues. This may even imply the foundation of a universal 
public order, but only as an exception – better, as a complement – to plural-
ity, which preserves non-reducible differences. As such, a multilevel legal 
system should be built which, within a plural framework, allows non-hier-
archical dialog and non-hegemonic relations among several social contexts 
9  Translation from the original in Portuguese “o global acontece localmente. É preciso fazer com que o local contra-hegemónico 
também aconteça globalmente” (Sousa Santos, 2001,p 79).
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– the moral community. This plural universalistic approach organized in a 
multilevel system allows for a leveled approach – the opposite of a totalizing 
approach – dependent on the level of the need for common action. Sousa 
Santos’s statement is here relevant: “global occurs locally. One must make 
local counter-hegemonic to occur globally as well” (2001,p 79). The most 
difficult level is the global level because of the risk of universal dissemination 
of hegemonic power relations. In any case, there are global legal assets, (e.g. 
the environment, justice or peace), a (universal) common ethics, a (translo-
cal) group ethics and a (local) cultural ethics, all sharing the global level 
ethics and many sharing translocal ethics. This assumption implies the need 
for communicative structures for emancipation that clear the risk of hegem-
ony. Organizing pluralism does not imply imposing a homogeneous or even 
hegemonic universal public order but to provide conditions for political 
legitimacy to create order and respect pluralism (Delmas-Marty, 2009).
THE ICC AND THE UNIVERSAL PUBLIC ORDER
A Body of Universal Sovereignty
Building and developing a public and global legal order – nowadays dominant in 
the thinking on the global system – is based on a liberal perspective of uni-
versality founded on human reason. The subjective mental process led by the 
mind of each individual becomes the shared element on which universalism 
is based. Kant’s (2009) ideals of a cosmopolitan Law and a world republic 
based on reason are at the starting point of universalistic thought regarding 
predominant public order and influence liberal thinking greatly. An element 
that characterizes modern universalistic concepts is, therefore, the existence 
of a universal reason that allows to see reality objectively and identify a sin-
gle rational perception of the same facts.
Unlike what occurs with conservative and particularistic10 views of International 
Law, schools focused on universalism claim that universal public order is 
possible and advisable, even if not built on reason (Dellavalle, 2010). These 
10  Particularistic concepts advocate that politics is nothing more than a struggle for power, a phenomenon different from 
and not subject to Law. Considering the need to link internal political process with globalization, particularistic 
concepts arose to refocus the State as a predominant actor in international space, thus denying the existence of true 
international order and preserving its sovereign self-sufficiency. On this matter, see, among others, Rabkin (2004), 
Kagan (2004) or Goldsmith and Posner (2005).
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schools share a universal concept of public order with a legal core common 
to international actors and institutions towards collective actions for univer-
sal goals. According to Tomuschat, International Law is a “comprehensive 
blueprint for social life” (1999,p 42). 
The mechanisms used to organize global reality go far beyond State in its individ-
ual perspective. For universalism, International Law must, therefore, com-
prehensively regulate international society in terms of human actions within 
the jurisdiction of the State and regarding its actors, namely, the individual. 
The development of International Law and consequently the reinforcement 
of universal public order are viewed as boosters of civilizations because it 
allows regulation of global phenomena depending on universal principles 
and values defined by reason.
Incorporating in global public order natural and inalienable rights of the indi-
vidual is an example of this: an individual’s situation is no longer viewed 
as limited to State jurisdiction but becomes relevant to the global com-
munity. The development of a human rights system represents the applica-
tion of a classic principle in State constitution at global level – promotion 
and protection of fundamental rights of individuals within a community. 
Therefore, it is not a mere constitutionalization process of an interna-
tional human rights system – and subsequent laying down of international 
constitutional rights – but this process also promotes global constitution-
alism  (Gardbaum, 2008), an apologetic version of rational objective uni-
versalism (Kowalski, 2012). This conclusion derives from the predomi-
nant liberal perspective on human rights focus on the universal individual. 
However, we must stress that other perspectives on human rights may not 
lead to the same conclusion, namely those who believe the individual can 
only be seen within his or her social and cultural context. Therefore, the 
approach that focuses on collective rights and peoples’ rights questions the 
liberal assumption of human universal rights claiming that certain groups 
(among others, religious, social and ethnic groups) may invoke specific 
rights or specific interpretations of those rights, which then do not apply 
universally but to that group alone (Jones, 1999). On the other hand, 
other approaches question the validity of ‘Western’ universalized human 
rights in other social and cultural contexts (Freeman, 2011).
International judicialization is a feature of liberal approaches to universal legal 
order (Kingsbury, 2012).  The ICC is evidently part of this universalistic 
liberal concept (Kowalski, 2011). In the context of universal public order, 
from an institutional point of view, ‘sovereign bodies’ tend to be created. 
The ICC criminal action illustrates it assuming typically State functions at 
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the level of global governance. Criminal prosecution is a power typical of 
a State’s sovereignty. The creation of the ICC represents a break: criminal 
prosecution can now be exercised in an order beyond the State when seri-
ous crimes that affect the international community as a whole are 
involved. This international criminal power does not require State author-
ization. The investigation, the arrest warrant or the trial may be initiated 
by a Court decision and they may even be against the will of those States 
that have primary jurisdiction on the case at hand. This occurs in situations 
where the ICC Prosecutor or the United Nations Security Council, pursu-
ant to article 13 of the Rome Statute, have established jurisdiction; this 
may even imply taking on jurisdiction regarding States that are not Parties 
to the Statute. 
The rational universalistic approach to universal public order is not without 
concerns or challenges. Zolo (1997) identifies in his thesis on ‘legal cos-
mopolitanism’ a set of assumptions that, according to the author, pose a 
series of difficulties and have several shortcomings: firstly, the definition 
of the primacy of International Law and of formal equality of States is only 
apparent because, in practical terms, the differences between rich and 
poor countries necessarily imply a hierarchy in international public order 
and inequality among individuals; secondly, trusting a centralized interna-
tional jurisdictional system is not compatible with the fact that jurisdic-
tional decisions are highly dependent on a small number of powerful 
States which have excluded themselves from international jurisdiction as 
in an absolutist system; thirdly, it rejects contemporary International Law 
ability to eradicate war; finally, the individual is a subject of International 
Law with limited capacity because there are no jurisdictional mechanisms 
at the international level that ensure them acknowledged human rights. 
These difficulties and shortcomings evidence the weaknesses of the liberal 
universalistic approach.
In fact, in the current framework of international social relations, the project of 
universal public order, present also in ‘sovereignty bodies’ such as the 
ICC, runs the risk of fostering power dynamics which already influence 
more or less institutionalized, more or less informal mechanisms in inter-
national social relations. In this case, the idea to limit power and create an 
international dynamics based on Law may be – more or less naively – 
coopted by other predominant power interactions unduly pursued in the 
name of justice. It would become a Leviathan under a veil of apparent 
legitimacy provided by International Law.
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A UNIVERSALIZING LIBERAL DISCOURSE
Currently, hard criticism has been made against the ICC regarding its fundaments 
which to a certain extent reflects a concern regarding the imposition of 
‘Western’ liberal ethical-normative solutions (Kowalski, 2011). Two major 
types of criticism are possible here: one regarding the selectivity of situa-
tions for assessment by the ICC, in which the ‘liberal West’ is always the 
prosecutor and never the defendant; another regarding the relation between 
the (prevailing) political and the legal domains.
In terms of the first type of criticism, a serious accusation heard mostly at political 
and diplomatic levels has given origin to some hostility by the African States 
towards the ICC, in what regards a factual aspect: up to the present all eight 
situations submitted for ICC assessment are related to Africa11. This evi-
dences selectivity in the Court’s action. The conclusion, based on undeniable 
facts, has fostered the accusation that the ICC is biased in establishing its 
jurisdiction, and has given rise to at least implicit accusations of neo-coloni-
alism12 13. The argument is that the accusation and the issuing of arrest war-
rants regarding African leaders poses greater threat to international peace 
and security, thus implicitly claiming this is a conflict between peace and 
justice.
The reasons behind this criticism are essentially political. Discourse based on lib-
eral universalism responds through strict observance of the ICC Statute, 
which includes thirty-four African States, making this the most represented 
group. Thus, if the Court opened criminal procedures on the situations in 
those Africans States, that is due to either the States reporting the situation 
– which is the most common reason14 – or because there was strong evi-
dence of serious crimes of relevance to the international community as a 
whole and the States with primary jurisdiction did not want or could not 
11  Situations in Uganda, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Central African Republic, in Sudan (Darfur),  
in Kenya, in Libya, in the Ivory Coast and in Mali.
12  These accusations have been heard from several African States that, more or less united in a common claim, mostly 
through the African Union. For example, after an arrest warrant by the ICC against Omar Al Bashir there was harsh 
reaction against the Court’s attempt to try African leaders, namely by States that are not Parties of the ICC Statute. 
Another example is the reaction by the African Union in 2011 after an arrest warrant was issued by the ICC against 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, which asked its Member-States to ignore the referred warrant.
13  As if summarizing the concerns of several African States, the then President of the African Union Commission, Jean 
Ping, referred that the ICC discriminates because it is only concerned with crimes committed in Africa and ignores 
those committed by the “Western powers” in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan – see Associated Press “African Union  
calls on Member States to Disregard ICC Arrest Warrant Against Libya’s Gadhafi”, 2 July 2011.                    
14 The situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, the Ivory Coast and Mali.
110
The stormy waters of the International Criminal Court: Universal Fight against Impunity or Liberal Universalization?
able try the case. Thus, more than the relevance of the cases under assess-
ment being related to situations in Africa, what is at stake here is rather the 
injustice regarding the fact that some situations remaining unpunished15. 
The second type of criticism focuses on the relation between jurisdictional action 
and politics, as a perversion of the function and independence of the ICC. 
Several non-governmental human rights organizations have denounced 
‘promiscuity’ between jurisdictional action and politics with negative effects 
in international criminal justice (Bourdon, 2000). Criticism is evident on 
the fact that ICC action is excessively dependent on the Security Council 
and therefore that the attribution of jurisdiction it is largely determined by 
political criteria rather than legal criteria. This is a concern related to the 
Statute. In fact, the power of the Security Council on ICC action is laid 
down in the Court’s Statute, namely in articles 13 and 16.
Article 13 b) lays down that the Security Council may submit a situation to the 
Prosecutor in which there is evidence of serious crimes having been com-
mitted and which are under the ICC competence. Therefore, of the eight 
situations under analysis, two were submitted by the Security Council16. 
This power awarded to the Security Council has received much criticism 
since the preparatory work on the ICC Statute: this includes criticism on the 
fact that the Court thus loses independence and credibility to those claiming 
that the Security Council has no competence in international criminal law 
under the Charter of the United Nations or even others stating that this 
leads to selectivity in establishing jurisdiction (Yee, 1999). 
This criticism is based on the fact that submission of cases to the ICC is dependent 
on political decision criteria different than admission criteria typical of a 
jurisdictional body as the ICC. Moreover, of the five permanent members of 
the United Nations Security Council three are not Parties in the Rome 
Statute: China, the United States of America, and Russia. Considering that 
15  The existence of armed conflict is a good indicator that serious internationally relevant crimes may occur. Therefore,  
in 2012 there were 32 armed conflicts, most of which in Africa, Asia and the Middle East; six of these 32 were war-like 
(over 1000 casualties a year). Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan, Syria, Somalia and Sudan (Themnér e Wallensteen, 2013). 
Noteworthy is also the fact the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC is preliminarily analyzing the following situations: 
Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, North Korea and Nigeria. These situations under preliminary assessment 
include facts allegedly committed by official and pro-governmental forces, opposition forces and foreign forces (OTP, 
2013). Moreover, of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council three are not Parties to the 
Rome Statute: China, the United States of America, and Russia. According to 2012 data, these three States are exactly 
those which have the highest annual expenditure on the military (Perlo-Freeman et al., 2012).  
16 The situations in Sudan (Darfur) and in Libya.
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they have veto power17, any situation that takes place within their territory 
or involves their nationals would certainly never be submitted to the Court 
via the Security Council. This reinforces the idea that the Court jurisdiction 
may be selective, and in accordance with the dynamics of the Security 
Council.
The power of the Security Council laid down in article 16 of the Statute is, however, 
the one that has been pointed out as representing the most serious political 
interference. According to that article, the Security Council may decide to 
suspend an ongoing ICC criminal inquiry or procedure for a renewable period 
of twelve months. The Security Council has even approved resolutions award-
ing immunity to people involved in peace operations at the service of a State 
that is not a Party to the ICC Statute18. We may even argue that this is an 
amendment to the Rome Statue by the Security Council (Jain, 2005). This, on 
the one hand, clashes with the objective of the fight against impunity on seri-
ous international crimes and, on the other hand, it evidences the degree of 
interference that the Security Council is willing to undertake19. 
In the case of the crime of aggression, the role of the Security Council is even more 
relevant. The conference to revise the ICC Statute, which was held in 
Kampala in 2010, introduced the crime of aggression – not initially defined 
in the Statute – laying down that the Court’s jurisdiction would depend on 
previous establishment by the Security Council that an act of aggression has 
been committed20.        
Underlying this criticism of the role of the Security Council towards the ICC is a 
concern with the performance of functions by an executive body that is 
focused on the restricted circle of its permanent members and which has no 
real political or jurisdictional control mechanisms (Kowalski, 2010). The 
liberal discourse does not provide any other argument for this concern 
except that the intervention of the Security Council in the ICC was the 
result of a necessary consensus to create the Court.
17 See articles 27, n. º 3 of the Charter of the United Nations Charter and 13 b) of the ICC Statute. 
18 See, for example, Resolutions S/RES/1422, of 12 July 2002, and S/RES/1487, of 12 June 2003. 
19  The ICC is analyzing the post-electoral violence in Kenya in 2007-2008 in which several crimes against humanity were 
allegedly committed. Among those accused are Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, President and Vice-President of 
Kenya, respectively. Kenya, upon a decision by the African Union, requested that the Security Council delayed any 
procedure by the ICC regarding the situation in Kenya for 12 months, under article 16 of the ICC Statute. In a meeting 
on 15 November 2013, the Security Council decided not to delay by one vote.
20  See UN Depository Notification C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8, 29 November 2010. The Court may exercise jurisdiction 
if the Security Council does not pronounce any decision within six months after being informed by the Prosecutor  
of intention to open inquiry regarding an act of aggression.
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ELEMENTS OF PLURALISM
The Rome Statute reflects an understanding that, at least from a formalistic point 
of view, is one that puts at center the protection and promotion of a minimal 
common ethics for humanity. The mission to fight impunity and promote 
justice is awarded to the ICC by the Statute from an ultima ratio perspective 
and aiming to ensure diversity of legal systems and of participating social 
actors.
Firstly, there is a universal ethical and legal consensus on the crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, considered unacceptable according to any commu-
nity’s ethical code, genocide21, crimes against humanity22 and crimes of 
war23 24. These are the crimes under ICC jurisdiction that the Rome Statute 
describes as “the most serious crimes of concern to the international com-
munity as a whole”25. This is also why the Rome Statute rejects any immu-
nity regime that prevents the ICC from exercising jurisdiction regarding 
these crimes26. This is an exception (that is not unanimous) when compared 
to other international criminal immunity regimes27.   
The last legitimizing source of the legal criminal order must be searched in the 
social system, in its axiological order(s) (Figueiredo Dias, 1996). As Saraiva 
refers on the crimes typified in the Rome Statute, “violence and cruelty are 
universal and timeless” (2013: 48). The list of crimes under the ICC jurisdic-
tion does, therefore, derive from consensus on minimal common ethics, 
allowing for identification of ‘interests of the global community’ which 
legitimize universal action to protect them28 – dignity, fundamental rights 
and justice for the individual and his or her community.  
21 This corresponds to the actions aimed at destroying, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group 
(article 6 of the Rome Statute).
22  This corresponds to the crimes committed within a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population, 
which results in a violation of International Law on Human Rights (article 7 of the Rome Statute).
23  This corresponds to violations of Humanitarian International Law, in particular when committed as part of a plan 
or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such acts (article 8 of the Rome Statute).  
24  Although the crime of aggression is included in article 5 of the Rome Statute, its definition and inclusion in the ICC 
jurisdiction has not been concluded. A definition and the jurisdiction criteria for the crime of aggression were reached 
in the 2010 Kampala conference to revise the Statute. Those amendments are not yet in force.  
25 See paragraph 9 of the preamble to the Rome Statute.  
26 Article 27 of the Rome Statute.
27 For example, the regime laid down in the Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in Vienna, on 18 April 1961.
28  For example, the International Court of Justice, in its decision on the Reserves towards the Convention on Genocide, 
stated that the Convention on Genocide expressed community’s common interest rather than States’ individual 
interests (ICJ, 1951). 
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Secondly, the Rome Statute claims the precedence of all States to exercise their 
criminal jurisdiction on those responsible for international crimes. This 
means that the ICC is a last resort court that only exercises jurisdiction 
subsidiarily. 
Complementarity is thus a relevant principle of the ICC jurisdiction, which means 
that, pursuant to article 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC complements nation-
al criminal jurisdictions – which have the main competence – and exercises 
its jurisdiction only when these choose not to or have no ability to try29 30. 
This subsidiary position regarding national jurisdictions aims also to foster 
States to open criminal procedures in case of extremely serious crimes 
(Kleffner, 2008). Complementariness of the ICC ensures its subsidiarity to 
local jurisdictional systems and, therefore, its non-hegemonic position.
Thirdly, we must not neglect the fact that there is a concern regarding representa-
tion of different legal and judicial systems in the ICC. In fact, one of the 
criteria for electing the 18 Court judges is the need to ensure that the main 
legal systems in the world are represented there31. However, it is also true 
that this is a criminal jurisdictional system essentially accusatory, closer to 
the Anglo-Saxon judicial system. Other criteria, such as equitable geograph-
ic representation32 and equitable representation of female and male judges33 
evidence the diversity in terms of perspectives within the Court.  
Organizations and individuals have made a mark in the Court and contributed to 
the ICC more independent functioning concerning simplistic power consid-
erations and State political interests. Referring to the creation of the ICC, it 
is noteworthy that in the diplomatic conference which adopted in 1998 the 
Rome Statute, two hundred and thirty-seven non-governmental organiza-
tions from all over the world were accredited34. Those organizations had a 
direct influence in the writing of some of the Statute preamble through their 
participation in the conference (Struett, 2008). Moreover, non-governmen-
tal organizations were always in close contact with serious human rights’ 
violations, documenting and denouncing those situations. Their contribution 
may be decisive for reporting and investigating some cases (HRF, 2004).  
29  The principle of complementarity is opposed to the primacy that ad hoc courts for the former Yugoslavia and for 
Rwanda have towards national criminal jurisdictions.
30  We must also stress that “not being able to try” which can determine complementary intervention by the ICC includes 
cases in which the suspects have been covered by amnesty (Cassese, 2008). 
31 Article 36, paragraph 8 i) of the Rome Statute.
32 Article 36, paragraph 8 ii) of the Rome Statute.
33 Article 36, paragraph 8 iii) of the Rome Statute.
34 See UN Document A/CONF.183/INF/3, 5 June 1998. 
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CONCLUSION 
Focusing on the organization ethics of international society necessarily implies 
criticizing and overcoming rational universalism. Building the universal 
based on a purely rational process is an epistemological error – it neglects 
the subjective dimension that is typical of any human phenomenon. This 
error easily leads to a dispute on who has the competence to define true 
axioms. A dispute that, in turn, is inevitably won by those (States, organiza-
tions, universities, individuals, companies, networks, etc.) with power to 
export their vision and impose their interests, more or less coercively. The 
term is ‘hegemony’. Hegemony not only in ethical terms, but also as a moral 
divide which sees peripheries as the only pariahs and the developed center 
as the moral beacon which behaves in the correct manner.  
Thus, basing concerted international action on minimal common ethics – a rather 
more complex and indeterminate process, not very immediate-solution-
friendly (these being potentially simplistic solutions) frequently required in 
everyday life – is a counter-hegemonic antidote. The concept is based on 
two assumptions: non-reducible differences; common phenomena that 
require collective potentially universal response dependent on the scope of 
that phenomenon. Universalism respects a common ethics that may be 
operationalized through human communication ability, including within the 
framework of a multilevel architecture that includes a universal level. At its 
core it is an ethical pluralist system with pluralist traits regarding a common 
ethics – socially identified and not hegemonically imposed or disseminated 
– and phenomena common to all humanity at a given time: human being’s 
spirit of cooperation and solidarity may imply, in certain circumstances, a 
universal common action. The fight against impunity when serious interna-
tionally relevant crimes are at stake, such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity or crimes of war, effectively requires criminal action at universal 
level. An action that is based on the acknowledgment that human dignity and 
justice are part of the minimal common ethics.
The ICC is immersed in stormy waters where it is not always possible to separate 
a universalizing liberal approach from an ethical universal approach. On the 
one hand, its quality as a quasi constitutional body that easily becomes part 
of the ‘universal legal order’, as well as its excessive dependency regarding 
the United Nations Security Council and other powers (whose cooperation 
it depends on) integrate the Court in a rational universal liberal approach. 
The still few successful cases have contributed to the distrust regarding the 
Court ever fulfilling its role or even to the idea that this was created as a 
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means of soothing consciences but allowing gaps that ensure impunity of the 
most powerful. On the other hand,  the order of fundamental and (appar-
ently) universally shared values visible in the typified crimes, the fact that it 
is a last resort court or even the search for guaranteeing that diversification 
of legal traditions and actors is maintained, all include the ICC in an 
approach closer to ethical universalism.
Now, going back to our initial question, whether we can claim that the ICC – even 
if partially and at times serving as a tool for hegemony – is essentially 
defined by the universalization of the fight against impunity by reference to 
a minimal common ethics. Universal application of certain values and prin-
ciples can be positive. However, for it to have legitimacy beyond a political 
and economic hegemony apparently ethical, it must be based on other para-
digms. The ICC must be seen as a (good) path towards the defense and 
promotion of human dignity and justice, which will always require caution 
against its instrumentalization.
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an assessment 15 years after the Rome Conference
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)1 took place 
in Rome on 17 July 1998 and it entered into force on 1 July 2002. There are 
now 122 States part of this Statute, which corresponds to approximately 
two-thirds of the members of the international community. Specifically, 
there are 34 States from Africa, 27 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
25 from Western Europe and Others Group, 18 from Eastern Europe and 
18 from Asia. 
The International Criminal Court is currently adjudicating approximately twenty 
cases in eight different countries: Uganda, Democratic Republic of  Congo, 
Sudan/Darfur, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Ivory Coast and 
Mali. The Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic 
and Mali situations were submitted by the respective States. The UN 
Security Council has submitted two: Darfur and Libya. The final two were 
the result of the powers of the Prosecutor to investigate proprio motu: Kenya 
and the Ivory Coast.
The ICC is the first permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction to try 
those responsible for the most serious principal international crimes: 
1 For detailed information on the ICC, its cases, organs, etc., see: www.icc-cpi.int
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aggression2, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Today, it is 
the main forum for international criminal justice, although ad hoc tribunals 
and the universal jurisdiction remain in existence.
The Statute of the ICC is, without a doubt, one of the principal treaties of the post-
cold war period. International law received popular support at the time of 
the Statute, which was at the center of the political discourse, particularly 
in response to the most serious atrocities since World War II, such as Rwanda 
and the Former Yugoslavia, celebrating now the 20th anniversary since these 
cases justified the creation of ad hoc tribunals.
During the genesis and early years of the ICC, fighting impunity was a constant 
challenge, regarding the prevention of atrocities and their repression. Yet, 
how has the idea of fighting impunity evolved over the last 15 years and what 
are the main challenges facing the ICC today?
If the creation of the ICC was an enormous (and for some an unexpected) success, 
international criminal justice is currently under pressure. Expectations were 
high and thus generating  high expectations which may explain the frustra-
tion with the fact that the Court, disposing of a substantial budget3, has 
taken ten years for the first conviction4, especially at a time of global eco-
nomic crisis and austerity measures.
Nevertheless, the major challenges, besides the delay of justice or the financial 
burden of the institution, are political in nature. The fact that the ICC 
focuses mainly on cases involving African states arouses criticism of selectiv-
ity. Moreover, in the absence of full international ratification there are 
always “double standards” in the struggle against impunity,even though this can 
be remedied – but only in part – by the UN Security Council  since the “P5” 
will always be “safe”, given their power of veto).
Likewise, the lack of adoption of national legislation criminalizing international 
crimes undermines the ICC system, which is based on the principle of com-
plementarity. Non-cooperation and lack of Court custody of many of the 
defendants, particularly from Uganda and Sudan, weaken the reputation and 
credibility of the Court.
2  Despite the amendments adopted at the Review Conference in Kampala in 2010, the definition of the crime  
of aggression and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction have not yet entered into force.
3 Approximately 120 million Euros per year.
4  Conviction, in 2012, of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, sentenced to 14 yrs. of prison for recruitment of child soldiers during 
the Democratic Republic of Congo conflict. The second sentence of the ICC relates to the same crime, in the case  
of Germain Katanga. The conviction of March of 2014 is still subject of appeal.
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On the other hand, the fact that the Court is called to exercise its jurisdiction in some 
cases pending conflict resolution, and that Heads of State in office are the 
subject to criminal proceedings, invigorates the debate on “peace” and “jus-
tice”, and which of these objectives should be promoted and achieved first. 
Therefore, we can group two main challenges around the following themes: a) 
Universality, Complementarity and Cooperation; and b) Peace vs. Justice or 
Peace and Justice.
The Kenyan case and recent issues raised by the African Union, climaxing during 
the last Assembly of States Parties in the autumn of 2013, also calls for 
reflection. Still unresolved, these tensions may leave a mark in the fight 
against impunity.
CURRENT CHALLENGES FACING THE ICC 
a)  Universality, Complementarity and Cooperation 
Universality5
Although based on classical international law, an international treaty like the Rome 
Statute, whose ratification or accession is a sovereign and voluntary decision 
of states, is not akin to other multilateral agreements. Like the Charter of 
the United Nations or major treaties on human rights and international 
humanitarian law, the Statute aspires to universality. To this end, a campaign 
for universal ratification is consistently promoted (on the part of some 
member States, the European Union and NGOs). This is likewise echoed in 
resolutions adopted annually by the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) of the 
ICC6, the political body where the State Parties convene, as well as observ-
er States. The ASP meets at least once annually and is responsible for ICC 
management and legislation.
Ideally, the ICC would have jurisdiction to try the most serious crimes committed 
in each country, but during the first decade, attention was directed toward 
conflicts in African countries. This is explained by three facts: atrocities were 
committed in several States that are not party to the Statute (still approxi-
5  See, e.g., X. Philippe, “The principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How do the two principles 
intermesh?
6 See the most recent Resolution ICC /12/Res. 8, November 27, 2013.
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mately a third of the international community), referral according to the 
action of the Security Council (which refereed only the cases of Sudan7 and 
Libya8), and that half of the cases were submitted by States themselves, by 
coincidence African States. 
However, preliminary investigations have started in several other cases, such as 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Equatorial Guinea, Honduras, North 
Korea, and Nigeria. Nevertheless, for the moment, such investigations have 
not yielded results.
On the other hand, Commissions of Inquiry, mandated by the UN Human Rights 
Council on atrocities committed in Syria and North Korea, recommended 
the submission of such cases to the ICC in 2013 and 2014.9 In the first case, 
Syria is not a State Party to the ICC and there was a decision against sending 
the case to the ICC10, despite the favorable position of some of the UN 
Security Council members. In the case of North Korea, which is not part of 
the ICC either, the outcome is pending.
As Navi Navanethem Pillay, the Un High Commissioner for Human Rights stated, 
“broadening the reach of the ICC is necessary so as to turn the ICC into a universal 
court and close the loopholes of accountability at the international level”11.
While the ICC is not a truly universal court – and one wonders if some day it may 
be – its “partial” or “incomplete” jurisdiction will always be a challenge, as 
long as “loopholes of accountability” remain open.
Complementarity 
The ICC was designed as a Court of last resort, as each State has the primary duty to 
protect its population from the most serious international crimes and to 
prevent and repress the offences definted in the Rome Statutein accordance 
with national criminal systems.
The Statute states clearly, in the preamble, that the ICC is intended to judge the 
crimes of greater severity and, in particular, Article 17 establishes the prin-
ciple of complementarity, whereby the ICC only has jurisdiction to try 
7 Resolution 1593 (2008). 
8 Resolution 1970 (2011).
9  It was also the case in relation to Darfur and to Libya, whose reports of the UN Commissions of Inquiry led the Security 
Council to refer these cases to the ICC in 2005 and 2011.
10 Cf. Resolution 2118 (2013).
11  Opening Remarks at the Side-Event at the 24th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, “The International Criminal 
Court 15 years after the Rome Statute: Prospects for the Future”, September 10, 2012.
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crimes when the State having jurisdiction over the same crime is “unwilling” 
or “unable” to exercise that jurisdiction.
To this extent, the appropriate legislation and the capacity for effective investiga-
tion and judicial procedures are necessary at the national level. This is 
encouraged and supported by the ICC and the ASP (cf. Resolution ICC-
ASP/12/Res. 4) in order to avoid the so-called “impunity gap”, i.e. criminal 
cases that are not judged at the national or international level12.
However, not all of the 122 States Parties to the Rome Statute have the appropriate 
legislation or competent judiciary to prosecute crimes within their jurisdic-
tion. A thorough analysis of national legislation, to ensure its appropriate-
ness, remains to be done and technical assistance can be provided to help 
these State Parties improve and adopt the necessary domestic legislation.
On the other hand, it is not always evident how to determine the situations in 
which a member State, in accordance with Article 17 (1) of the Statute, 
refuses or lacks the capacity to carry out the national jurisdiction over 
crimes. Only in the case of a negative assessment, can the Court declare the 
case inadmissible. As of yet, consolidated case law determining with cer-
tainty if the State “does not want” or “does not have the capacity” is lacking. 
Nor is it the practice of States on when to invoke such an objection of inad-
missibility or of the Prosecutor for not pursuing investigations.
Are there other ways to avoid the “impunity gap”?
Cooperation 
Non-cooperation with the Court is a phenomenon that strongly affects the credi-
bility of the ICC. The States Parties are under an obligation to cooperate in 
accordance with Part IX of the Statute, specifically, in the implementation 
of the decisions of the Court and execution of the arrest warrants. In the 
event of cases referred by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, it would be fair to say that even the States not party shall be obliged 
to cooperate with the Court, in accordance with, at least, the aspects 
referred to in the resolution.
The most serious case of non-cooperation is, of course, the non-compliance with 
arrest warrants or requests for delivery. Arrest warrants or requests for 
delivery of more than half of the defendants have gone unheeded, as is out-
12  Cf. Informal Summary by the Focal Points, “Stocktaking of international criminal justice – Taking stock of the principle of 
complementarity: bridging the impunity gap”, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010.
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lined in the Resolution ICC-ASP /12/Res.3. Considering that all the mem-
bers of the international community are under obligation to cooperate, 
arrest, or surrender those under warrant to the Court, it is striking that the 
the accused in situations submitted by the Security Council under Chapter 
VII (Darfur, President Bashir13, and Libya) or in the first case, initiated in 
2005 by Uganda, none of the suspects are in Court custody.
Pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute, the accused shall be present during the trial. 
Since there is no provision for trials in absentia, the Court’s role diminishes, 
as a case cannot proceed to trial by reason of non-presence of the accused.
b) Peace vs. Justice or Peace and Justice14
The idea of peace and justice, whether conflicting or complementary, is a rela-
tively new issue, coming to light by the creation of the ICC. Previously, 
instances of establishment of international criminal tribunals took place at 
the end of the conflict as a consequence of crimes committed. The cases of 
the military court in Nuremberg or the ad hoc tribunals for the Former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrate this point.
In the ICC´s case, jurisdiction can be triggered during any stage of the conflict, 
provided that there is suspicion that crimes, in accordance with the Statute, 
have been committed and that the situation will be referred by the State in 
whose territory the crimes are committed, by the Security Council, or in 
accordance with the powers proprio motu by the Prosecutor of the Court.
Likewise, being that the majority of current conflicts are intrastate or civil wars, 
their resolution will depend on a process of negotiated internal peace, where 
it is often necessary to gather all the conflicting parties to the negotiating 
table. It is frequently the case that some of these parties – government or 
rebels – have committed crimes, i.e., war crimes or crimes against humanity.
In the case of such peace negotiations, some argue that it is necessary to carry out 
the peace process first and, subsequently, commence the fight against impu-
13  See G. P. Barnes, “The International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: the Indictment of President 
Omar Al Bashir”.
14  For a brief interesting summary of this debate, its history and different positions, see Draft Moderator Summary, 
“Stocktaking of international criminal justice – Peace and Justice”, Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Kampala, 
31 May-11 June 2010. See also the “Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice”, Annex to the letter dated 13 June 
2008 from the Permanent Representatives of Finland, Germany and Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General (A /62/885). 
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nity and for justice15 through a process called “sequencing”. This is illustrated 
by the example of Uganda, where the case was brought to the Court by the 
government in an attempt to weaken the rebels of the “Lord’s Resistance Army”. 
However, the warring parties would only accept negotiations if the peace 
agreement gave them immunity from ICC indictments16.
The Rome Statute and general international law seem incompatible with granting 
amnesty for the most serious international crimes. Yet, the Rome Statute rec-
ognizes the importance of suspending investigations or trials in cases of the 
maintenance of international peace and security (Article 16), when the crimes 
are subject to processes at the national level (Article 17), or when the 
Prosecutor believes that suspension best serves the interests of justice (Article 53). 
For the ICC and the ASP, these concepts are complementary: “There can be no lasting 
peace without justice and (...) peace and justice are thus complementary require-
ments” (Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res. 8)17 Moreover, it is the only way to 
enhance the effect of deterrence18 regarding the commission of the most 
serious international crimes, which was the initial rationale for the creation 
of the first permanent international criminal court.
THE ICC, THE CASE OF KENYA, THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND THE 
FUTURE OF THE IDEA OF COMBATING IMPUNITY 
In the autumn of 2013, the African Union raised concerns19 directed toward the 
ICC, especially concerning the case of Kenya, hitting its climax in the 
Assembly of State Parties. Still ongoing, these tensions continue to challenge 
the idea of combating impunity.
15  See the opinion of the African political figure, Thabo Mbeki, co-author of an article in the New York Times, published 
in February 5, 2014, with the provocative title of “Courts can’t end civil wars.”
16  Cf. L. M. Keller, “Achieving peace without justice: the International Criminal Court and Ugandan alternative justice 
mechanisms”, and L. M. Keller, “The false dichotomy of Peace versus Justice and the International Criminal Court”.
17  See also the article of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, the New York Times, 19 March 2013, entitled 
“International Justice and Diplomacy.”
18  K. Cronin-Furman, “Managing expectations: International criminal trials and the prospects for deterrence of mass 
atrocity”.
19  For an evolution of the relations between the ICC and Africa see N. Waddell and P. Clark, Courting Conflict? Justice, 
Peace and the ICC in Africa; A. Arieff et al, International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and policy issues;  
E. Keppler, “Managing setbacks is the International Criminal Court in Africa”; A. Warrior, The resistance of the African 
States to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court; F. M. Benvenuto, “La Cour Penale Internationale en 
juge”; and C. C. Jalloh, “Reflections on the indictment of Child Heads of State and Government and its consequences 
for peace and stability and reconciliation in Africa”-
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The African Union has taken several tough positions on the question of universal 
jurisdiction, the fight against impunity,20 and the International Criminal 
Court, specifically with the cases of Sudan and Kenya.
Regarding Kenya, the case was not referred to the ICC by the State directly, 
although it is a party to the Rome Statute, but triggered by a Prosecutor 
investigation proprio motu. The referral occurred after the discovery that 
crimes against humanity were committed in the wake of the 2007 national 
elections. Specifically, murder, rape, forms of sexual violence, deportation, 
forced transfer of populations, and other inhumane acts were reported. The 
Prosecutor´s findings led to the 2010 indictment for crimes against human-
ity of three suspects, two of whom were elected in 2013, President Uhuru 
Kenyatta (trial postponed) and Vice President William Ruto (trial started in 
2013) of the Kenyan Republic.
During the 21st Session of the Assembly of the African Union in May 2013, the 
African Union, by resolution (Assembly /AU/13 (XXI), reiterated its, 
“strong conviction that the search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not 
impede or jeopardize efforts at promoting lasting peace” and the “AU’s concern with 
the misuse of indictments against African leaders.”
As a result of this decision, a letter21 was addressed on 10 September, coinciding 
with the start of the trial of Vice-President Ruto, to the President of the ICC 
referring to the need of the creation of a national mechanism to investigate 
and prosecute crimes committed in the context of the post-electoral violence 
in Kenya in 2007. The same letter stated that the Court proceedings affect the 
ability of Kenyan leaders to lead, who – despite possible liability for the crisis 
of 2007 -, are democratically elected and must remain in the country to fulfill 
their constitutional responsibilities. Furthermore, the trial period requiring 
the physical presence of the President and the Vice-President at The Hague 
would not be feasible, since the Constitution of Kenya states that when the 
President is abroad, the Vice-President cannot be also, and vice versa.
20  On this theme see “The AU-EU Expert Report on the Principal of Universal (AHJ) (Council of the European Union 
8672 1/09, 16 April 2009). The theme of universal jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court has caused wide 
friction between the African Union and the European Union, which gave rise to the above-mentioned report.  
The Declaration of the most recent EU-Africa Summit, which took place in Brussels on 2 and April 3, 2014,  with total 
absence of reference to the ICC, states in paragraph 10: “We confirm our rejection of, and reiterate our commitment 
to, fight impunity at the national and international level. We undertake to enhance political dialogue on international 
criminal justice, including the issue of universal jurisdiction, in the agreed fora between the parties.”
21 Cf. Doc. BC/U/1657.10.13.
131
Patrícia Galvão Teles
In response, the ICC denied any procedural statute to that letter or the May deci-
sion since it fell outside the scope of the process and was not sent the request 
of the parties or the Security Council, and responded negatively to the pre-
tense of suspending the process22.
In October 2013, a Special Session of the Assembly of the AU adopted a new reso-
lution, this time entitled: “Decision on Africa’s relationship with the International 
Criminal Court” (cf. Ext /Assembly/AU/Dec .1 (Oct. 2013)). This resolu-
tion reiterated the concern with the politicization and misuse of accusations 
against African leaders by the ICC. Regarding the question of Kenya, the 
resolution stated that the indictment prompts a serious and unprecedented 
situation in which both the President and Vice President in Office of a coun-
try are the target of a international criminal process, affecting the sover-
eignty, stability and peace in that country, as well as the national reconcilia-
tion and the normal functioning of constitutional institutions. The resolution 
decided, inter alia, the following:
 –  For the safeguarding of constitutional order, stability, and integrity of the 
Member States, no prosecution can be initiated or continued by any inter-
national tribunal against any head of State or Government in Office or 
someone who acts or with the right to act in that capacity during his ten-
ure;
 –  That the trials of the Chairman Uhuru Kenyatta and the Vice-president 
William Samoei Ruto, who are the current leaders in Office of the 
Republic of Kenya, must be suspended until theirterms are completed;
 –  Creation of a Contact Group of the Executive Board, to be headed by the 
President of the Council, which shall consist of five members (one per 
region) to conduct consultations with the members of the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), specifically, the five Permanent Members, with a view 
to collaborate with the UNSC in all concerns of the AU on their relation-
ship with the ICC, including the postponement of the cases against Kenya 
and the Sudan, in order to obtain the answer before the beginning of the 
trial, the 12 November 2013;
 –  Accelerate the extension process of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (TADHP) mandate to judge international crimes, such as 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes;
 –  The African States Parties to the Rome Statute to propose relevant amend-
ments to the Rome Statute, in accordance with Article 121 of the Statute;
22 Cf. 2013/PRES/00295-4/VPT/MH, Letter from September 13, 2013.
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 –  Ask the African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC, in particu-
lar the members of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties, to include 
in the Agenda of the next session of the ASP the question of the prosecu-
tion of a Head of State and of Government in Africa in Office by the ICC, 
and its consequences for the peace, stability, and reconciliation in the 
Member States of the African Union;
 –   That any member State of the AU wishing to refer a case to the ICC should 
inform and obtain the approval from the African Union;
 –  That Kenya should send a letter to the Security Council of the United 
Nations, requesting postponement of the case against the President and 
the Vice President of Kenya, in accordance with Article 16 of the Rome 
Statute, which is supported by all African States Parties;
 –  In accordance with this Decision, ask the Court to postpone the trial of 
President Uhuru Kenyatta, marked for November 12, 2013 and to sus-
pend the procedure against the Vice-president William Samoei Ruto up to 
the moment in which the UN Security Council considers the request of 
Kenya for deferral, supported by the AU;
 –  That the President Uhuru Kenyatta not be required to appear before the 
ICC until the moment that the concerns raised by the AU and its Member 
States have been duly considered by the Security Council of the United 
Nations and the ICC.
On November 15, 2013 the Security Council rejected, though extremely divided 
(7 votes in favor and 8 abstentions) a draft Resolution (doc. S/2013/660) 
which sought, pursuant to Article 16 of the Rome Statute and Chapter VII 
of the Charter, to defer the investigation and trial of the President and Vice-
President of Kenyan, for a period of one year. Voted in favor Azerbaijan, 
China, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Rwanda and Togo. Abstained Argentina, 
Australia, France, Guatemala, Luxembourg, the Republic of Korea, United 
Kingdom and USA (for individual explanations of vote see S/PV. 7060).
Nevertheless, the 12th session of the ASP included, at the request of the African 
Union, a special segment entitled, “Indictment of Sitting Heads of State and 
Government and its consequences on peace and stability and reconciliation.” 
During the November 2013 intervention on behalf of the AU in the ASP, it was 
stated; “… I would like to turn now to the situation in Kenya and to highlight the 
inescapable link between peace and justice. We at the AU would like to see an intelligent 
interaction between justice and peace because it is only in this way that we can succeed 
in promoting democratic governance with strong institutions, the rule of law and consti-
tutionalism. The African Union believes that if Kenya does not qualify for use of Article 
16 of the Rome Statute and subsequently the principle of complementarity then no other 
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State Party will. If this turns out to be the case, then not only Article 16 would be deemed 
to be redundant for the United Nations Security Council to legitimately and construc-
tively resort to it, but the irresistible conclusion will also be that the ICC, whose establish-
ment Africa and the Organization of African Unity strongly supported and advocated 
for is no longer a Court for all but only to deal with Africans in the most rigid way”23.
According to the proposal submitted by the African States – adopted by consensus 
– substantial amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC 
– namely Rule 134 – were drafted, specifically allowing the justification of 
absence or that of physical presence in the trial to be replaced by participation 
via video technology. In accordance with the Resolution ICC-ASP/12/Res. 
7, the following was inserted after Rule 134 of the Rules of Procedure: 
Rule 134bis
Presence through the use of video technology 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request to the 
Trial Chamber to be allowed to be present through the use of video technology 
during part or parts of his or her trial. 
2. The Trial Chamber shall rule on the request on a case-by-case basis, with due 
regard to the subject matter of the specific hearings in question. 
Rule 134ter
Excusal from presence at trial 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear may submit a written request to the 
Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by counsel only during 
part or parts of his or her trial. 
2. The Trial Chamber shall only grant the request if it is satisfied that: 
(a) exceptional circumstances exist to justify such an absence; 
(b) alternative measures, including changes to the trial schedule or a short 
adjournment of the trial, would be inadequate; 
(c) the accused has explicitly waived his or her right to be present at the trial; and 
(d) the rights of the accused will be fully ensured in his or her absence. 
3. The Trial Chamber shall rule on the request on a case-by-case basis, with due 
regard to the subject matter of the specific hearings in question. Any absence 
must be limited to what is strictly necessary and must not become the rule. 
23 http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/GenDeba/ICC-ASP12-GenDeba-AU-Uganda-ENG.pdf.
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Rule 134
Quarter Excusal from presence at trial due to extraordinary public 
duties 
1. An accused subject to a summons to appear who is mandated to fulfill extraor-
dinary public duties at the highest national level may submit a written 
request to the Trial Chamber to be excused and to be represented by coun-
sel only; the request must specify that the accused explicitly waives the right 
to be present at the trial. 
2. The Trial Chamber shall consider the request expeditiously and, if alternative 
measures are inadequate, shall grant the request where it determines that it 
is in the interests of justice and provided that the rights of the accused are 
fully ensured. The decision shall be taken with due regard to the subject mat-
ter of the specific hearings in question and is subject to review at any time.”
There will be those who question the compatibility of these amendments with 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute and the principle of equal treatment. The 
Court, in a decision from November 26 2013 on the Kenyan process, con-
tended that the absence of the accused should only occur in exceptional 
circumstances and be limited to what is strictly necessary. Although the tri-
als in absentia were allowed in the Nuremberg trials, they were excluded, as 
a general rule, in the Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and by the 
Statute of the ICC.
Article 27 of the ICC Statute confirms, in addition, that the official capacity of a 
defendant is irrelevant for the purposes of a trial before this Court, providing 
that immunities or special procedural rules that may be inherent to the official 
duties of a person, according to  national or international law, does not prevent 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person. In addition, 
Article 98 of the Statute does not refer to the personal immunities of Heads 
of State, Government, or Ministers of Foreign Affairs in absolute terms, but 
rather to the diplomatic immunities between Member States and the possible 
need to obtain consent prior to the delivery of a suspect to Court.
The proposals made during the ASP for amendment to the Rules of Procedure, its 
acceptance policy and strategy of containement, did not prevent, however, 
the Government of Kenya from notifying, on November 22, 2013, the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations,24 as depositary of the Rome 
Statute, the following proposed changes to the Statute in accordance with 
Article 121 (1), in particular with regard to Articles 63 (Trial in the 
24 Officially circulated on March 14, 2014 (C.N.1026.2013.TREATIES-XVIII.10 – Depositary Notification).
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Presence of the accused), 27 (Irrelevance of official capacity) and to the 
paragraph of the Preamble on complementarity:
Article 63 (2) – the Presence of the accused at trial 
“Notwithstanding article 63(1), an accused may be excused from continuous pres-
ence in the Court after the Chamber satisfies itself that exceptional circum-
stances exists, alternative measures have been put in place and considered, 
including but not limited to changes to the trial schedule or temporary 
adjournment or attendance through the use of communications technology 
or through representation of Counsel. 
(2)  Any such absence shall be considered on a case-by-case basis and be 
limited to that which is strictly necessary. 
(3)  The Trial Chamber shall only grant the request if it determines that such 
exceptional circumstances exist and if the rights of the accused are fully 
ensured in his or her absence, in particular through representation by counsel 
and that the accused has explicitly waived his right to be present at the trial.” 
Article 27 (3) – Irrelevance of official capacity 
“Notwithstanding paragraph 1 and 2 above, serving Heads of State, their deputies 
and anybody acting or is entitled to act as such may be exempt from pros-
ecution during their current term of office. Such an exemption may be 
renewed by the Court under the same conditions” 
Introductory Paragraph on Complementarity 
“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute 
shall be complementary to national and regional criminal jurisdictions.”
If the proposed amendment to Article 63 – the new rules introduced in ASP 2013 
are to some extent already accepted – represents a 60 year step backwards 
to the trials in absentia of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the proposed amendment 
to Article 27 goes against a fundamental “sacrosanct” principle upheld since 
Nuremberg and incorporated in the Statute of all criminal courts: interna-
tional criminal law applies to everyone, regardless of official capacity. Article 
7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal stated “the official 
position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government 
Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment.” 
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The proposal for the amendment of Article 27, supported by the African States and 
proposed for discussion in an extraordinary ASP, would alter a fundamental 
principle of the Statute and customary international criminal law, recog-
nized by ICJ in the Case Arrest Warrant of 2000. It would be “a shameful 
retreat in the global fight against immunity”.25 Additionally, according to the 
same author, this Amendment to Art. 27 could even be a stronger incentive 
for taking power (by democratic means or not) in order to avoid a trial in 
The Hague. The proposal, likewise, contradicts the principle of speedy jus-
tice for the victims, because the Court would be prevented from exercising 
jurisdiction with regard to persons that occupy high political positions.
In our view, and as mentioned above, the appropriate safeguards for complex cases, 
such as the case of Kenya are already incorporated in the Rome Statute, there-
fore, no change to the aforementioned articles is required. However, the safe-
guards in Articles 17 (Complementarity and Admissibility), 53 (Powers of the 
Prosecutor) and 61 and 63r (Presence of the accused at trial), could be read-
dressed to improved consistent and continuity. In any case, in extreme circum-
stances, the power to appeal will remain, and in cases in which peace is seri-
ously threatened, the Security Council, pursuant to Article 16 of the Statute, 
may suspend, for periods of 12 months, the proceedings before the ICC. The 
fact that that body  has not accepted the use of this prerogative in Sudan´s case, 
where it did not formally take a decision, or Kenya, where the request was 
denied by a narrow margin, does not mean that this safeguard is ineffectual.26
CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the challenges of the current cases, some perceive the idea of combating 
impunity and international criminal justice as declining. Others view this as 
a process of stabilization developing in the ICC; which after a revolutionary 
achievement, despite maturing over many decades, materialized in a rela-
tively short period. 
However, the African attempt to introduce immunity from criminal jurisdiction 
25  C. C. Jalloh, “Reflections on the indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its consequences for peace 
and stability and reconciliation in Africa”, p.15.
26  On the relationship between the ICC and the UN Security Council see H. Mistry and D. Ruiz Verduzco (Rapporteurs), 
“The UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court, International Law Meeting Summary”; D. Kaye et al, 
“The Council and the Court: Improving Security Council Support for the International Criminal Court”; e J. Trahan. “The 
relationship between the International Criminal Court and the UN Security Council: Parameters and best practices”.
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for current Heads of State for the most serious international crimes – even 
if temporarily – is a severe setback to the idea of fighting impunity.
The future credibility of the ICC´s role, pursuant on how and when these chal-
lenges and ideas are approached, awaits judgment. The proposal for a sepa-
rate International Criminal Court for Africa (suggested by the African 
Union and the proposed amendment to the Statute of Rome from Kenya) 
and the possible withdrawal from the ICC Statute (authorized but with lim-
ited effects on current cases) by Article 127 (2) by some African states has 
yet to materialize.
Kofi Annan succinctly clarified the issue when he stated, “it is the culture of impunity 
and individuals who are on trial at the ICC, not Africa”27. 
It is our hope that the entire international community will understand these words 
of wisdom and that the struggle against “impunity” will not lose its “p” and 
become, in fact, for some, ”immunity” from crimes against humanity.
27 Speech of K. Annan in “ 3rd Annual Desmond Tutu International Peace Lecture”, October 7, 2013.
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The ICC will not be a panacea for all the ills of humankind. It will not eliminate conflicts, 
nor return victims to life, nor restore survivors to their prior conditions of well-being and it 
will not bring all perpetrators of major crimes to justice. But it can help avoid some conflicts, 
prevent some victimisation and bring to justice some of the perpetrators of these crimes. In 
doing so, the ICC will strengthen world order and contribute to world peace and security.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Ceremony for the Opening for Signature of the Convention 
on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 18 July 1998
… justice is a fundamental building block of sustainable peace
Kampala Declaration, 11 June 2010.
INTRODUCTION
Envisioning an international public order means envisioning an order sustained by 
a legal and institutional framework that ensures effective collective action 
with a view to defending fundamental values of the international commu-
nity and to solving common global problems, in line with the universalist 
vision of international law. Such an international order implies institutions, 
procedures and international instruments that enable the achievement of 
common objectives (Bogdandy & Delavalle, 2008,p 1-2).
The International Criminal Court and  
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Envisioning the construction of an international public order means considering 
that this framework which embraces and promotes the respect for human 
rights focused particularly on human dignity, aiming to safeguard peace, secu-
rity and well-being of the world, is consolidating and evolving based on a 
permanent and independent court, the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The preludes of an international criminal court as a protector and as a driving force of 
a public order date back to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 under the auspices of the United Nations 
(UN)1. Indeed, the General Assembly, taking into account the question raised 
during the discussion on the punishment of crimes of genocide and the increas-
ing need for a competent body for the trial of certain crimes under interna-
tional law in a developing international community invited the International 
Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of its establishment2. 
The positive response of the Commission3 resulted in a draft statute, elaborated 
over several decades and submitted to the General Assembly in 1994 that advo-
cated the importance of the creation of an international criminal court4. In this 
sense, the Assembly established a preparatory committee in 1996 with the aim 
of producing a draft text, which served as the basis for negotiations at the Rome 
Conference in 1998, culminating in the signature of the Statute.
Armin von Bogdandy and Sergio Dellavalle stress that the progress of an interna-
tional public order and effective international law largely depends on the 
fate of international criminal law and on the success of the Statute’s regula-
tory project (2008,p 2). However, how is this dependence manifested? How 
could the regulatory project and, more specifically, the ICC be more suc-
cessful and influence this construction in a more effective manner?
1  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Official Gazette, 1st Series A, No. 160, 
07.14.1998.
2  U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/260 B (III), Study by the International Law Commission of the Question of an International 
Criminal Court, 09.12.1948.
3  U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34, Report of the International Law Commission on its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth session, Supplement No.12 (A/1316), Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, vol. II, 1950, (140) p. 379. Ricardo J. Alfaro, Special Rapporteur pointed out in his report submitted to 
the Commission that “The community of States is entitled to prevent crimes against the peace and security of mankind  
and crimes against the dictates of the human conscience, including therein the hideous crime of genocide. If the rule of law is to govern 
the community of States and protect it against violations of the international public order, it can only be satisfactorily established  
by the promulgation of an international penal code and by the permanent functioning of an international criminal jurisdiction”,  
UN. Doc. A/CN.4/15 and Corr.1, Report on the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Question  
of international criminal jurisdiction, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol. II, 1950, §136, p. 17.
4  U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of International Law Commission  
on the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth 
session, Supplement No.10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II(2), pp. 26 ff.
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This article examines the merits of the Rome Statute and ICC’s practice and then 
explicates its limitations. Lastly, it argues for the indispensability of a process 
of acquiring new dimensions and of deepening existing facets, formulating 
some proposals.
THE ROME STATUTE AND THE RECENT PRAXIS OF THE ICC:  
KEY CONSIDERATIONS
The Rome Statute of 1998 reaffirmed the relevance of the UN Charter objectives 
and principles5 and recognized the existence of common values  such as 
peace, security and well-being of the world which should be safeguarded by 
the court.
The Statute established the notion of “most serious crimes” of concern to the inter-
national community as whole and which are enumerated in Article 5: crime 
of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggres-
sion. In this context, the statute added a punitive facet to international 
human rights law and to international humanitarian law, since until then the 
punishment of its violation depended solely on national criminal jurisdic-
tions. 
Specifically, regarding International Human Rights Law, the Statute incorporated, 
in Article 6, the definition of the crime of genocide as stated in Article II of 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide. Hence, genocide means any act committed with intent to destroy, 
in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group: homicide, 
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members, deliberately inflicting 
conditions of life designed to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births, and the forced 
transfer of children to another group.
The punitive facet of international humanitarian law was embodied in Article 8 
related to the war crimes prescribed in the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
The Court has jurisdiction over these crimes “when committed as part of a 
plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes”. This 
article covers grave breaches of these conventions, i.e., acts against persons 
or property and serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict under international law. In the case of non-
5 See Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter.
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international armed conflicts, war crimes refer to violations contained in 
Article 3, common to the Geneva Conventions. That is, acts committed 
against individuals taking no active part in the hostilities, including members 
of armed forces who have laid down their arms or were placed hors of com-
bat: acts of violence to life and person, outrages upon personal dignity, 
hostage-taking, the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions, 
without previous trial by a regularly constituted court, which affords all 
indispensable judicial guarantees as well as other serious violations of the 
laws and customs applicable to such conflicts under the international law 
framework.
Under the Statute, crimes against humanity are any act committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population with knowl-
edge of the attack, such as murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation 
or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law, torture, rape, sexual slavery, persecution against 
an identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 
cultural, religious, gender grounds or on other universally accepted criteria, 
crimes against humanity, forced disappearance of persons, the crime of 
apartheid, and other inhumane acts of a similar nature intentionally causing 
considerable suffering, serious injury or affect mental or physical health 
(Article 7).
In contrast to the crimes of genocide and war crimes, the crimes against human-
ity are not codified in an international convention and the analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the international ad hoc criminal tribunals reveals differ-
ent understandings. The systematization contained in the Statute encom-
passes acts that had not been specified previously as crimes against human-
ity, being therefore the most comprehensive listing on this matter.
The merits of the Statute are not solely limited to codifying the most serious 
crimes, except the crime of aggression whose definition and conditions for 
the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction were procrastinated to a review 
Conference (Article 5, paragraph 2). By prescribing the application of the 
general principles of criminal law (Part III), the principles of the presump-
tion of innocence (Article 66) and of the prohibition of double jeopardy – ne 
bis in idem (Article 20) by the Court, the Statute contributes significantly to 
the consolidation and development of international criminal law (Stein & 
von Buttlar 2012,p 438).
This punitive system is based on the complementarity principle (Article 1), that 
even though constraining the ICC’s power, enables the Court to exercise 
influence over the states’ sphere of authority. It forms part of a gradual ero-
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sion process of the Westphalian view of the sacrosanctity of state sovereignty 
and internal affairs. As Miguel de Serpa Soares argues: ”any form of interna-
tional justice always represents a means of limiting national sovereignty. In the case of 
International Criminal Law this limitation is even more evident by compromising ele-
ments essential to the classic paradigm of International Law, as for example the punitive 
monopoly of States or the concept of a quasi-absolute State sovereignty” (Soares, 
2014,p 9).
In effect, the Court is competent to determine a state’s unwillingness to carry out 
the investigation or prosecution: situations where the proceedings were or 
are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of 
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility within the 
Court’s jurisdiction, existence of an unjustified delay in the proceedings or 
the proceedings were or are not being conducted independently or impar-
tially, and they are or were being carried out in a manner that is inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice (Article 17, para-
graph 2).
In addition, the Statute imposes upon the States Parties the obligation to cooperate 
with the Court in the investigation and prosecution of crimes within its 
jurisdiction (Article 86) and to adopt procedures under national law for all 
of the forms of international cooperation and judicial assistance specified 
under Part IX (Article 88).
The praxis evidences an increasing activity of the Court, demonstrating its commit-
ment to ending impunity.
In 2012, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was sentenced to 14 years in prison for war 
crimes.  He was found guilty of enlisting and conscripting of children under 
15 years of age to actively participate in a non-international armed conflict 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1 September 2002 to 13 
August 20036. In 2014, Germain Katanga was found guilty and sentenced to 
12 years in prison for one count of crime against humanity (murder) and 
four counts of war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian population, destruc-
tion of property and pillaging) committed on 24 February 2003 during the 
attack on the village of Bogoro in the Democratic Republic of the Congo7.
6  See ICC-01/04-01/06-2901, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, 10.07.2012.
7  See ICC-01/04-01/07-3484, the Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Prosecutor 
v. Germain Katanga, Decision on the sentence (Article 76 of the Statute), 23.05.2014.
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Presently, the Office of the Prosecutor is investigating several situations by state 
party referral − Uganda (2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), 
Mali (2012), The Union of the Comoros (2013) and Central African 
Republic (2005 and 2014) − by proprio motu action of the Prosecutor: Kenya 
(request submitted in 2009, authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber in 
2010), Ivory Coast (request submitted and authorization of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in 2011) − and conducting preliminary examinations concerning 
several states, namely Ukraine, a non-state party which accepted the juris-
diction of the Court (2014). Even more important is the referral of the 
situations in the Darfur region, in Sudan (2005) and in Libya (2011) by the 
UN Security Council due to the existence of evidence of international 
crimes8. It can be considered that these referrals are in line with the argu-
ment of universalism that this competence of the Council allows the exten-
sion of the Court’s jurisdiction to non-States Parties and thus constitutes an 
“evolution in shaping the international order” (Kowalski, 201,p 124).
LIMITATIONS OF THE ICC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE APPLICABILITY 
OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
The limitations of the ICC result, firstly, from legal and political tensions arising from 
its relationship with the Security Council and the complementary character of 
its jurisdiction and, secondly, from the ambiguity of certain formulations con-
tained in the provisions concerning the “crime of aggression” and “crimes 
against humanity”, raising interpretive problems which the law applicable by 
the Court under Article 21 of the Statute9 does not clarify categorically.
8  Resolution 1593 (2005) which refers the situation in Darfur (since July 1, 2002) to the ICC does not specify possible 
international crimes committed in the region. However, the Security Council took note of the report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur – this Commission was established by former UN Secretary General, 
Kofi Annan, on the basis of resolution 1564 (2004) with a mandate to investigate reports of violations of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law in the region – which considered that the crimes committed may 
amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity (UN Doc. S/2005/60). Resolution 1970 (2011) which refers the 
situation in Libya to the Court mentions that the widespread and systematic attacks taking place against the Libyan 
civilian population could constitute crimes against humanity.
9 According to Article 21, paragraphs 1 and 2, the Court must in the first place, apply the Statute, the Elements of Crimes 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and in the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict. 
Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from different national legal systems and principles and rules 
of law as interpreted by the Court in previous decisions.
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LEGAL-POLITICAL TENSIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF DECISION 
IMPLEMENTATION
Article 13, paragraph b) of the Statute provides for the possibility of the Security 
Council to refer a situation to the Prosecutor under Chapter VII. This means 
that the consent from the state in which the acts were committed or of the 
nationality of the person alleged to have committed international crimes is 
not required. The Security Council’s referrals of the situations in Darfur, 
Sudan, in 2005 and in Libya in 2011 were considered historic. However, in 
the first case, the Security Council has not actively supported the ICC with 
respect to detention and to the states’ duty to cooperate with the Court. In 
the second case, despite the swift reaction of the Council, the resolution, as 
the Darfur referral decision, was flawed, as it, for instance, excluded the 
Court’s jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties (Stahn, 2012,p 328).
But it is mainly Article 16, according to which an investigation or a prosecution 
may not be initiated or proceeded with for a period of 12 months if the 
Council has requested the Court to that effect in a resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII, with the possibility of renewal, that raises sharper criticism 
based on the argument that this action undermines the independence of the 
Court10. Jorge Bacelar Gouveia qualifies this mechanism as “whimsy” and 
underlines that “It is very difficult to accept the interference of a political organ in 
the heart of the exercise of public power of a body that should be jurisdictional, whose 
intervention, above all, can not only happen at any time in the proceedings, but also 
repeat itself, though it has in its favor the temporality and the astringent context of 
Chapter VII of the UNC” (2013,p 792-793).
The Court’s complementary nature to national criminal jurisdictions means that, 
as Judge Philippe Kirsch noted, the Statute is a two-pillar system: a judicial 
pillar represented by the Court and an enforcement pillar represented by 
the States11. Yet, the absence of a permanent mechanism that ensures com-
10  The definition of the crime of aggression involved the establishment of procedures that emphasize this dependence in 
the case of a state party referral or proprio motu action by the Prosecutor, although paragraph 9 of Article 15 bis 
underlines that such determination by an external body is not binding on the Court. According to paragraphs 6 and 8 of 
this Article respectively, when the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the 
investigation, he/she must first ascertain whether the Security Council made a determination of such an act committed 
by the State concerned and notify the United Nations Secretary-General of the situation before the Court; if no 
determination is made within six months after the date of notification, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation as 
long as the Pre-Trial Chamber has authorized the initiation of the investigation and the Security Council has not decided 
otherwise under Article 16.
11 ICC, Philippe Kirsch, Opening remarks at the fifth session of the Assembly of State Parties, 23.11.2006.
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pliance with the court’s decisions hampers the implementation of this pillar 
and, therefore, the fight against impunity.
In fact, the execution process of the warrants of arrest has been to a certain extent 
troubled. Therefore, it cannot be considered a coincidence that the first words 
of the declaration of the first Review Conference of the Statute – the 
Declaration of Kampala of 2010 – focus on a renewed spirit of cooperation and 
solidarity, emphasizing the States Parties’ commitment to fight impunity and 
ensure lasting respect for the enforcement of international criminal justice.
The case of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is representative of this problem. The 
origins of this case date back to 2005 when the Security Council referred the 
Darfur situation to the Court in resolution 1593. The former ICC Prosecutor, 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, initiated an investigation later that year and in 2008 
requested the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue a warrant of arrest against the 
Sudanese President (first warrant issued on 4th March 2009 and the second 
warrant issued 12th July 2010, accused of indirect responsibility for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide)12. This was the first case in 
which an arrest warrant was issued against a head of state in office. 
Subsequently, the African Union (AU) submitted a request, pursuant to Article 
16 of the Statute, to the Council to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII to 
defer the decision, which was declined by the Security Council. As a result, 
the AU appealed repeatedly to Member States not to cooperate with the ICC 
in the arrest of Omar al-Bashir13. As David Luban stated, the Court’s weak-
ness, namely, the gap between the aspiration for criminal justice and its accom-
plishment, became evident when most African and Arab states gathered to 
support the Sudanese President against the ICC’s decision (2013,p 508).
On several occasions, the ICC urged, unsuccessfully, the States Parties and non-
States Parties to execute the arrest warrants issued against al-Bashir during 
his presence on their territory. In April 2014, the Pre-Trial Chamber deter-
mined that the Democratic Republic of the Congo failed to comply with its 
obligations to arrest and surrender Omar al-Bashir during his visit to the 
country. Consequently, in accordance with Article 87, paragraph 7, the Pre-
12  ICC-02/05-01/09-1, Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Omar al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan 
Ahmad al-Bashir, 04.03.2009 and ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Omar al-Bashir, 
Second arrest warrant for Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir,12.07.2010.
13  See Reinold, T. (2012) “Constitutionalization? Whose constitutionalization? Africa’s ambivalent engagement with  
the International Criminal Court”. International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10(4), p1076-1105, Obura, K. (2011)  
“The Security Council’s Power to Defer ICC Cases under Article 16 of the Rome Statute,” Journal of African  
and International Law, 4(3),p 581-583 and Stella Nyana (2011) “The ICC at a Crossroads: Between Prosecution  
and Peace in Africa”.Journal of African and International Law. 4 (1),p 1-74.
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Trial Chamber informed the Assembly of State Parties and the Security 
Council14. The fact that the latter may take the necessary measures on this 
matter demonstrates that the power to enforce the decisions of the Court 
lies also on this organ.
Another relevant case regards the current President of Kenya, Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, accused of being criminally responsible as an indirect co-perpetra-
tor for crimes against humanity. This case concerns the violence that 
occurred in Kenya following the 2007 presidential elections that caused 
numerous victims. In 2009, Luis Moreno-Ocampo submitted a request to 
the Pre-Trial Chamber for authorization of an investigation, which culmi-
nated, at request of the Prosecutor, with the issuance of an arrest warrant 
against six Kenyan officials, the so-called “Ocampo six”, by the Pre-Trial 
Chamber in 2011. That year, the AU endorsed the Kenyan government’s 
request to the Security Council to adopt a resolution, requesting the ICC to 
defer the proceedings against the Kenyan president and the vice president, 
William Ruto, pursuant to Article 16. The AU renewed the request in 2013, 
which was once again declined by the Security Council15.
In June 2014, the AU adopted an amendment to the protocol of the Statute of the 
future African Court of Justice and Human Rights, with jurisdiction over 
international crimes, that grants immunity from prosecution to heads of 
state and senior government officials, in opposition to Article 2716 of the 
Rome Statute, which allows for the prospect of the persistence of legal and 
political tensions between the AU and the ICC. 
WEAKNESSES IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THE ROME STATUTE 
“CRIME OF AGGRESSION” AND “ACT OF AGGRESSION”
14  ICC-02/05-01/09-195, Pre-Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Omar al-Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation  
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 09.04.2014.
15  See Reinold, T. (2012), “Constitutionalization? Whose constitutionalization? Africa’s ambivalent engagement with the 
International Criminal Court” International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10(4),p 1076-1105, Obura, K. (2011) “The 
Security Council’s Power to Defer ICC Cases under Article 16 of the Rome Statute”. Journal of African and International 
Law. 4(3), p 581-583 and Nyana, S. (2011) “The ICC at a Crossroads: Between Prosecution and Peace in Africa”. Journal 
of African and International Law. 4(1),p 1-74.
16  Article 27, paragraph 1 determines that “this Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on 
official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or 
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence”. Article 27, 
paragraph 2 states that “immunities or special procedural rules may attach to the official capacity of a person under 
national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person”.
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The failure to reach an agreement on a definition of “crime of aggression” and 
respective elements at the Rome Conference resulted in the inclusion in the 
Statute of an additional clause to the incorporation of this crime as a “core 
crime”. This clause provided for the exercise of jurisdiction once a provision 
was adopted in a Review Conference, in accordance with Articles 121 and 
123, defining this crime and setting out the conditions for that purpose 
(Article 5, paragraph 2). In this sense, resolution F in Annex I of the Final 
Act of the Rome Conference established a preparatory commission with 
various tasks including the preparation of proposals for a provision on this 
crime17; this task was subsequently attributed to the Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression.
The definition of the crime of aggression adopted at the Kampala Conference rep-
resents a significant development in international criminal law18. It is unde-
niable that the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will 
constitute an evolution, since it will be the first time that a permanent 
criminal justice system imposes criminal liability for the illegal use of force. 
However, it is subjected to formal and material constraints, the latter giving 
rise to interpretive issues that may hinder the determination of the existence 
of such a crime.
Regarding the formal constraints, the Court will only have jurisdiction over crimes 
committed one year after acceptance or ratification by a minimum of thirty 
states19 and after a decision to be taken only after 1 January 2017 in the 
Assembly of States Parties to activate the Court’s jurisdiction (Articles 15 
bis and 15 ter, paragraphs 2 and 3). These limitations garner criticism by 
some authors as Mary Ellen O’Connell and Mirakmal Niyazmatov, who 
qualify this process as “byzantine” (2012,p 191).
As for the material constraints, the new Article 8 bis, paragraph 1, defines the 
crime of aggression as “Planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person 
in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations”.
17  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment  
of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United Nations, 2002, 7, pp. 72 and f.
18  See, among others, Blokker,N. & Kress, C. (2010). A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: Impressions 
from Kampala, Leiden Journal of International Law. 23(4),p 889-895. 
19  Currently, 15 states accepted the amendments concerning the crime of aggression: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
Botswana, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Germany, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Samoa, Slovakia, Slovenia, Trinidad  
and Tobago and Uruguay.
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Criminal liability is solely applicable to individuals in a position effectively to exer-
cise control over or to direct a state’s political or military action. In other 
words, the leadership position is a determining factor.
Paragraph 2 refines the notion of “act of aggression”. It means the use of armed 
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political inde-
pendence of another State or in other manner inconsistent with the princi-
ples of the UN Charter. This provision absorbed Article 1 of the Definition 
of Aggression of the UN General Assembly – resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 
1974. Simultaneously, it listed several acts that may qualify as an act of 
aggression, as mentioned in Article 3 of the Definition of Aggression, such 
as invasion, military occupation and bombardment by the armed forces of a 
State against another State’s territory. It is also important to note that the 
act of aggression must be considered in the context of its “character”, 
“scale”, and “gravity”. This means that a determination of the existence of a 
crime of aggression presupposes an act of aggression constituting a manifest 
violation of the Charter. Thus, although the act of aggression can only be 
perpetrated by a State, the responsibility for such unlawful acts lies on the 
individual who is responsible for the state’s action.
Articles 15 bis and 15 ter establish the procedures under which the Court may 
exercise jurisdiction. The first article concerns the possibility to open an 
investigation pursuant to a state referral or a proprio motu action by the 
Prosecutor. Article 15 ter prescribes the possibility of a Security Council 
referral, which means that in this case the Court will also be competent for 
the investigation and prosecution of crimes of aggression regardless of the 
acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction by the concerned States.
The Kampala Conference defined the crime of aggression and its elements which 
serve the purpose of clarifying and assisting the Court in the interpretation 
and application of the amendments to the Statute. However, the enunciated 
provisions and clarifications contain some ambiguities.
As far as “act of aggression” is concerned, while the criteria of “gravity” and “scale” 
were included to avoid overloading the Court with minor cases, the crite-
rion of “character”  aimed to exclude controversial cases involving the use of 
force (Mancini, 2012, 236). However, the criteria of “character,” “gravity” 
and “scale” used to assess whether an act constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter lack definition. The latter two undefined criteria are also used 
in the determination of an armed attack in Article 51 of the UN Charter and 
this lack of clarity could be problematic, particularly given the existing 
divergences regarding the lawful use of force in self-defence or in the case 
of humanitarian intervention (Santos, 2012). The elements of crimes refer 
154
The International Criminal Court and the construction of international public order
that the determination of a “manifest” violation of the Charter is objective, 
but this process within the UN is not peaceful.
At the same time, the remission of paragraph 2 of Article 8 to resolution 3314 of 
the General Assembly with the purpose of clarifying the term “act of aggres-
sion” raises some questions. Firstly, some formulations in the resolution are 
vague and the enunciated list is not exhaustive, which may lead to contro-
versial situations. Secondly, the article does not provide clarification wheth-
er and to what extent other articles of the resolution were applicable or 
relevant to the Court (Surendran Koran,p 252).
In addition to the political character of the Definition of Aggression − the General 
Assembly can only make recommendations, devoid of any binding effect −, 
paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of Article 15 bis confirm the power of the Security 
Council. In fact, Article 39 of the Charter stipulates the exclusive power of 
the Council to determine the existence of an act of aggression and it may 
refer to cases which are not mentioned in the Definition of Aggression. The 
practice, however, is not uniform, and, repeatedly, in its Chapter VII deci-
sions the Security Council uses different wording.
Other aspects have been criticized such as the complete exclusion of acts committed 
by nationals of non-states parties – unlike the procedures relating to the “most 
serious crimes” − and the “retrograde opt-out clause” (Alam, 2010,p 179-180) 
that provides for the possibility of voluntary exclusion from the Court’s juris-
diction (Article 15 bis, paragraph 4). Other critics consider the resolution as a 
political guidance in determinations of state responsibility and, therefore, it 
did not contemplate its application to individual liability (Alam, 2010,p 170).
But, an essential criticism can be pointed to the fact that the definition of aggres-
sion adopted in Kampala did not contemplate a possible aggression by non-
state actors. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated the 
likelihood of such an act being committed by non-state actors as well as the 
magnitude, comparable to an action perpetrated by a State.
In fact, this solution reveals problems that cannot be underestimated otherwise it 
could hamper the proper functioning of the ICC. However, the pessimistic 
view of some more critical authors like Mary Ellen O’Connell and Mirakmal 
Niyazmatov who argue that “the substantive provision leaves experts unclear 
to what the prosecutable crime even is” cannot be corroborated. These 
authors doubt the feasibility of criminal proceedings and regret that the 
solution presented is different from the definition of crime of aggression 
under international law, affirming that this prohibition of aggression must 
not be undermined by the political compromise reached at Kampala 
(O’Connell & Niyazmatov 2012,p 191, 207).
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“CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY”
Some formulations of Article 7 reveal a certain ambiguity. Several authors high-
light interpretive difficulties and their consequences. 
Jordan J. Paust considers the formulations too restrictive and unclear: “Article 7 
contains a limiting definition of ‘attack’ that is lacking in common sense. 
Instead of recognizing that one attack can constitute an ‘attack’, Article 7 (2)
(a) requires that an ‘attack’ involves ‘a course of conduct involving the mul-
tiple commission of acts’” (2010,p 691). The author also argues that the use 
of the word “attack” instead of, for example, act(s) committed (against) is 
problematic, since this may result in the impossibility to include certain 
situations linked to crimes of this type and that are included in the listing. 
Moreover, according to the author, the phrases “course of conduct” and 
“multiple commission of acts” are debatable, since they do not include acts 
of torture, rape, persecution among others (ibid., 692-693).
Further criticism can be pointed to the expression “when committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, 
with knowledge of the attack”, since it leaves open the following question: 
Which is the threshold of “widespread or systematic”?
Another interpretive problem relates to the understanding of the formulation “other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or 
serious injury to body or to mental and physical health” (paragraph 1, subpara-
graph k). This interpretation became relevant for the first time in the joint 
indictment of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui in 2008. The 
Office of the Prosecutor accused both of perpetrating such acts and in its deci-
sion confirming the charges, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that the wording 
should be interpreted strictly. However, several authors like Bernhard Kuschnik 
support a broad interpretation (2010, p 524-530).
According to Cameron Russell, one of the interpretive problems relates to the notion 
of “civilian”. The author advocates that the parameters are not clear, which is 
partly a result of the decoupling of these crimes from the requirement of the 
existence of an armed conflict. This concept was employed to differentiate 
civilians from “combatants”, but the fact that these crimes can be committed 
in times of peace generates interpretive problems (2011,p 60-61). In addition, 
an "attack directed against any civilian population" implies a conduct “pursu-
ant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such 
attack” (Paragraph 2, subparagraph a), since the term “organizational” is 
imprecise, which also results from the dissociation with the existence of an 
armed conflict. Thus, it becomes necessary to define “organization” to distin-
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guish it from the entity of the state (Ibid.,p 63). In the author’s opinion, the 
requirement of “policy” seems to create some inconsistency within the Statute 
(ibid., p 70). Leila Nadya Sadat notes that the Pre-Trial Chambers have been 
demonstrating different positions on the interpretation of Article 7, especially, 
regarding the phrase "State or organizational policy" (2013,p 335). This ele-
ment for the prosecution for these crimes remains controversial (ibid.,p 352) 
and should be interpreted broadly otherwise it could result in the fragmenta-
tion of international criminal law (ibid.,p 375). The dissenting opinion of 
Hans-Peter Kaul, following the request of the Prosecutor to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber to open an investigation into the post-election violence in Kenya, 
showed an opposite understanding. According to the judge, only states or 
organizations with similar characteristics to a State following criminal policies 
may perpetrate crimes against humanity. This position has gathered support in 
the doctrine and within the Court (Sadat, 2013,p 336).
It is also important to refer the minority opinion of Christine Van den Wyngaert of 
March 2014 concerning the case of Germain Katanga, since it illustrates this 
problematic and it can have repercussions in future trials. The judge disagreed 
with Germain Katanga’s conviction for lack of evidence of his criminal respon-
sibility to intentionally contribute to the perpetration of crimes by a group of 
persons with knowledge that this group had such purpose (Article 25, para-
graph 3, subparagraph d, vii) and the interpretation of the evidence could have 
been made in a different and more convincing manner. As for the accusation 
of crimes against humanity, the judge argued numerous points. Firstly, the 
number of victims was insufficient to qualify the acts as crimes against human-
ity and, therefore, there was no multiple commission of acts; secondly, the 
intent of targeting the civilian population was not proved in an incontestable 
manner; thirdly, the existence of a policy and of an organization was not 
proved incontestably and, finally, the attack could not be considered system-
atic20.
In this context, the decision of the International Law Commission to add the topic 
“crimes against humanity” to its program in June 2013 – following the 
recommendation of the Working Group on the Long-term Programme of Work 
based on the proposal prepared by a working group member, Sean Murphy 
– is to be welcomed. As the author of the proposal notes “For example, the 
mass murder of civilians perpetrated as part of an international armed conflict 
would fall within the grave breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but 
20 ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-Anxl, Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 07.03.2014.
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the same conduct arising as part of an internal armed conflict (as well as internal 
action below the threshold of armed conflict) would not (…). A global convention 
on crimes against humanity appears to be a key missing piece in the current frame-
work of international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and interna-
tional human rights law.”21
Sean Murphy stressed the importance of the elaboration of an international con-
vention on the prevention and punishment of such acts. The author men-
tioned aspects that should be taken into account by the Commission for the 
purposes of the Convention such as defining the offense of “crimes against 
humanity” as expressed in Article 7.
As for the articulation between the Convention and the ICC, Sean Murphy claims 
that the Convention would benefit substantially from the language of the 
Statute and related instruments as well as jurisprudence. In turn, the adop-
tion of the Convention could address aspects that were not covered by the 
Statute and it could support the ICC’s mission22. In particular because, 
among other aspects mentioned by the author, the Statute regulates relations 
between States Parties and the Court, but not among States Parties them-
selves and between State Parties and non-States Parties. Part IX, headed 
“International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance" implicitly recognizes 
that inter-state cooperation on crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court 
may occur outside the Rome Statute. The Convention could help to pro-
mote inter-state cooperation in relation to the investigation, detention, 
prosecution and punishment of individuals who commit such crimes, which 
would be consistent with the object and purpose of the Statute. The 
Convention would require the enactment of national legislation prohibiting 
and punishing these crimes, which in the author’s opinion has not been 
made by several Member States yet, helping to fill a gap and, thus, encourag-
ing all States to ratify or accede to the Statute. In the case of States that have 
adopted legislation in this regard, frequently it only authorizes the prosecu-
tion of crimes committed by nationals of that State or in its territory. The 
Convention would require the State Party to broaden its legislation to cover 
other individuals who are in their territory – nationals of other States who 
commit an offense in the territory of another State Party to the Convention. 
In the event that a State Party receives a surrender request from the Court 
21  U.N. Doc. A/68/10, Sean D. Murphy, Annex B, Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-fifth session, 
General Assembly, Official Records, Sixty-eighth session, 2013, §2 and §3, pp. 140-141.
22 Ibid., §8, §9, pp. 142 and f.
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and at the same time, an extradition request from another State in accord-
ance with the Convention, Sean Murphy proposes that the Convention 
should be designed to ensure that States which are party to the Statute and 
to the Convention can continue to follow the procedure outlined in Article 
90 of the Statute on competing requests.23
MULTIFACETING THE ICC
Certain challenges such as terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, the profu-
sion of intrastate conflicts with different nuances and complexities and the 
phenomenon of fragile states, failed or collapsed demonstrate the increasing 
number of distinct and intricate situations in which a state is unwilling or 
unable to conduct an investigation or prosecution or is incapable of protect-
ing its population from international crimes.
Thus, these challenges justify the indispensability of rethinking the ICC through a 
process of adding new facets and deepening facets foreseen in the Statute. 
More specifically, rethinking the competence of this body to expand its 
jurisdiction to the crime of international terrorism − i.e. large-scale terror-
ist acts, which “threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world”, acts of 
atrocities “that deeply shock the conscience of humanity” and of concern “to the 
international community as a whole”, paraphrasing the preamble, similarly to 
what occurs with the most serious crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Court – and rethinking the action of the ICC with a view of protecting 
populations from those crimes which should be implemented in articulation 
with the “responsibility to protect” concept.
CATEGORIZATION OF TERRORISM AS AN “INTERNATIONAL CRIME”
Terrorist acts, methods and practices can take many forms and manifestations and 
aim the destruction of human rights and fundamental freedoms24. The dis-
semination of a new type of terrorism of transnational nature and the pro-
liferation of terrorist groups in different parts of the globe, including the 
territories of States Parties to the Statute, groups that could include nation-
23 Ibid., §10 and §12. See Article 90 of the Rome Statute.
24 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20.09.2006, p. 2. 
159
Sofia Santos
als of those States, imply to revisit the question of the possibility of ICC 
jurisdiction over this matter.
The idea of  including terrorism as one of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community dates back to the Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court of the International Law Commission of 1994. The 
Commission’s proposal contained an article – Article 20 – which contem-
plated – along with the crimes of genocide, aggression, serious violations of 
the laws and customs applicable to armed conflict and crimes against human-
ity – a specific subparagraph, subparagraph e), regarding the “treaty crimes” 
which included terrorism: “Crimes, established under or pursuant to the 
treaty provisions listed in the Annex, which, having regard to the conduct 
alleged, constitute exceptionally serious crimes of international concern.”25
Similarly, the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court created by the UN General Assembly in 1996 – with the 
purpose of preparing a widely accepted consolidated text, serving as a basis 
for negotiation for the establishment of an international criminal court – 
suggested the inclusion of the crimes of terrorism among others (Article 5, 
subparagraph e))26 as an offense covered by the conventions mentioned in 
the Commission’s draft statute (paragraph 2), but it went further by specify-
ing these crimes as follows: “Undertaking, organizing, sponsoring, ordering, 
facilitating, financing, encouraging or tolerating acts of violence against another 
State directed at persons or property and of such a nature as to create terror, fear or 
insecurity in the minds of public figures, groups of persons, the general public or 
populations, for whatever considerations and purposes of a political, philosophical, 
ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or such other nature that may be invoked to jus-
tify them” (paragraph 1).“An offense involving use of firearms, weapons, explosives 
and dangerous substances when used as a means to perpetrate indiscriminate violence 
involving death or serious bodily injury to persons or groups of persons or populations 
or serious damage to property” (paragraph 3).
25  U.N. Doc. A/49/10, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Report of International Law Commission on 
the work of its forty-sixth session, 2 May-22 July 1994, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-ninth session, 
Supplement No.10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, vol. II (2), p. 38. The Annex refers, for 
example, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970, the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 1971, the International Convention against the Taking 
of Hostages, 1979 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety  
of Maritime Navigation, 1988, pp. 67 ff.
26  U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13(Vol. III), Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment  
of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United Nations, 2002, p. 5 and p. 21.
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The dissent among States at the Rome Conference prevented the incorporation of 
the crime of terrorism in the Statute, but States in resolution E of Annex I 
to the Conference Final Act recognized that “terrorist acts, by whomever and 
wherever perpetrated and whatever their forms, methods or motives, are serious crimes 
of concern to the international community”. At the same time, the States, deeply 
apprehensive about the persistence of this serious threat to international 
peace and security, recommended that a Review Conference pursuant to 
Article 123 of the Statute27 should consider the crimes of terrorism to 
achieve a consensual definition and their inclusion in the list of the most 
serious crimes28. However, this topic was not discussed at the Kampala 
Review Conference of 2010. Undoubtedly, the main difficulty lies in the 
absence of an universal legal and political definition enshrined in a compre-
hensive convention on international terrorism, prescribing that large-scale 
terrorist acts constitute an international crime.
Several authors stress that acts of international terrorism as the 11 September 
2001 attacks could qualify as crimes against humanity under Article 7 of 
the Statute and be tried by the ICC. Mireille Delmas-Marty argues that 
paragraph 2 of this article which establishes the notion of an attack 
directed against a civilian population as an element of crimes against 
humanity could have been applied to these terrorist acts (2013,p 561). In 
this regard, Vincent-Joël Proux adds: “other acts of international terrorism, 
which do not compare in magnitude to the events of September 11th, yet still con-
stitute an affront to the principles of humanity, should be prosecuted under this 
mechanism” (2004,p 1085). Lucy Martinez contemplates the possibility of 
individual acts of international terrorism falling under crimes against 
humanity or war crimes, under the condition of the existence of an 
armed conflict (2002,p 50). In turn, Surendra Kumar although arguing 
that crimes with the magnitude of 11 September attacks could be consid-
ered crimes against humanity, minor terrorist acts may not reach the 
27  Article 123, paragraph 1 provides that “seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review may 
include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes contained in Article 5.”
28  UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. I), United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
of an International Criminal Court, Official Records, Rome 15 June-17 July 1998, United Nations, 2002, pp. 71 and f. 
At the Rome Conference, several States supported the court’s jurisdiction over the crimes of terrorism, ibid., Vol. II 
(for example, Algeria, §18, p. 73, Kyrgyzstan, §71, p. 77, Costa Rica, §74, p. 77, Armenia, §83, p. 78, Albania, 
“institutionalized State terrorism” §12, p. 82, India, §52, p. 86 and f., Tajikistan, §17, p. 92, Russian Federation, “most 
serious terrorist crimes”, §20, p. 115, Congo, §49, p. 117, Sri Lanka, §35, p. 123, Turkey, “Terrorism shouldn’t have 
been included among crimes against humanity, since it was often the root causes of such crimes”, §41, p. 124).
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threshold and, therefore, not fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Moreover, the author sustains that while some terrorist acts, to some 
extent, can be perceived as a crime of genocide – the conviction for such 
acts will always depend on whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the 
elements of the crime of genocide – or as a war crime – when committed 
in armed conflicts, terrorist acts may not always hold these characteris-
tics (2008,p 200-202). In this sense, Surendra Kumar proposes an 
amendment to the Statute, “the need of the hour is that crimes of terrorism, 
inducing suicide terrorism should be incorporated as a separate category and 
deserves separate contemplation and prosecution” (2008,p 202).
The arguments put forward in favor of including the crime of terrorism within the 
jurisdiction of the Court relate to the limitations of national judiciary sys-
tems and to the fact that such acts possess features which are common to the 
most serious crimes under the Statute.
The Netherlands proposed an amendment to the list of such crimes in 2009 and 
explained the problematic as follows: “We have all committed ourselves to 
cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism, in accordance with our obligations 
under international law, in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on 
the basis of the principle of extradite or prosecute, any person who supports, facili-
tates, participates or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, prepara-
tion or perpetration of terrorist acts or provides safe haven. Yet, at the same time, 
there is all too often impunity for acts of terrorism in cases where states appear 
unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute such crimes. (…) In the light of 
the absence of a generally acceptable definition of terrorism, the Netherlands pro-
poses to use the same approach as has been accepted for the crime of aggression, i.e. 
the inclusion of the crime of terrorism in the list of crimes laid down in article 5, 
paragraph 1, of the Statute (…)”29.
According to this proposal, the crime of terrorism would be integrated in a new 
subparagraph (subparagraph e) of Article 5, paragraph 1. Furthermore, this 
article would include a third paragraph that would reproduce ipsis verbis the 
content of the second paragraph concerning the crime of aggression in the 
Statute:“The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism once a pro-
vision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and 
setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 5, paragraph 3).
29 ICC-ASP/8/43/Add. 1, Report of the Bureau on the Review Conference, Annex IV, 10.11.2009, pp. 12 and f.
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The proposal also provided for the establishment of an informal working group on 
the crime of terrorism at the Kampala Conference tasked to assess to what 
extent the Statute would require changes as a consequence of the introduc-
tion of the crime of terrorism within the jurisdiction of the Court as well as 
other relevant questions linked to the extension of its jurisdiction.
If the attacks of 11 September 2001 relaunched the question on whether large-
scale terrorist acts could constitute “international crimes” and fall within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, presently several arguments can be enunciated that 
support the inclusion of terrorism as a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.
The Security Council referred to these attacks as a threat to international peace 
and security (resolution 1368 (2001)). In several resolutions, this organ 
reaffirmed that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one 
of the most serious threats to international peace and security. The UN 
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 referred to this phenomenon in 
the same terms30. 
The seriousness of this threat is accentuated by its different and multiple forms and 
manifestations, being also perpetrated by non-state actors, groups resorting 
to different methods and with different motivations.
It is important to underline that terrorism can not and should not be associated 
with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group – as mentioned by 
the Security Council in Chapter VII decisions and by the General Assembly 
in the above-mentioned Strategy31 – currently, the actions of several 
extremist groups, most of them considered terrorist groups, in which 
nationals of States Parties may be participating and whose acts may occur in 
the territories of these states is an argument in this sense.
It is undoubtedly significant that the ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, has initiated an 
investigation (January 2013) due to the existence of evidence indicating that 
war crimes had been committed since January 2012. These acts are mainly 
attributed to the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), 
the Defenders of the Faith group (Ansar Dine), the Organization of Al-Qaida in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West 
30 U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288, The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 20.09.2006, p. 1.
31 Ibid., p. 2.
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Africa (MUJAO)32, the last three terrorist groups are ideologically inspired and 
linked to al-Qaida33. Likewise, it is significant that the Prosecutor conducts a 
preliminary examination concerning the activities of the jihadist group Boko 
Haram, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaida34, which according to the report 
could have committed crimes against humanity since July 200935. Nevertheless, 
if the Prosecutor decides to prosecute, formulating an accusation, it is for the 
Pre-Trial Chamber and, eventually, the Trial Chamber to corroborate these 
assessments.
The acts committed by the jihadist group “Islamic State”36, a splinter group of al-
Qaida, against Iraqi security forces and civilians were condemned by the 
Security Council. This organ, and several State Parties, qualified these acts as 
terrorist attacks/acts37. The proclamation of a transnational caliphate by this 
group – comprising northern Syria and eastern Iraq, with expansionist ten-
dencies, threatening neighbouring countries including Jordan, a State Party to 
the Statute – could increase the perpetration and the magnitude of terrorist 
acts and diversify the characteristics of such acts.
In this regard, it is important to mention resolution 2170 (2014), in which the Security 
Council: “Deplores and condemns in the strongest terms the terrorist acts of ISIL and its 
violent extremist ideology, and its continued gross, systematic and widespread abuses of 
human rights and violations of international humanitarian law”.
“Recalls that widespread or systematic attacks directed against any civilian popula-
tions because of their ethnic or political background, religion or belief may 
constitute a crime against humanity, emphasizes the need to ensure that 
ISIL, ANF [Al Nusra Front] and all other individuals, groups, undertakings 
and entities associated with Al-Qaida are held accountable for abuses of 
human rights and violations of international humanitarian law (…)”.
32  ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Mali, Article 53 (1) Report, 16.01.2013, pp. 13-28. This investigation 
follows a preliminary examination based on the Mali government’s referral dated of 13 July 2012  
in accordance with Article 14 given the impossibility of pursuing or prosecuting those responsible for crimes against 
humanity and war crimes especially in the northern part of the territory. See Referral Letter,  
Republique du Mali, Ministère de la Justice, 13.07.2012.
33  The Security Council linked the Ansar Dine group on 20 March 2013 and the MUJAO on 5 December 2012  
to al-Qaida. The AQIM had originally been associated with the name Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat  
on 6 October 2001.
34 On 22 May 2014, the Security Council placed Boko Haram in the list of entities associated with Al-Qaida.
35 ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities, 2013, §206 and §209-§219. 
36  Since June, the designation replaced the previous self-designation of the group of “Islamic State of Iraq  
and the Levant”, also known by the acronym ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State  
of Iraq and the Levant).
37  U.N. Doc. SC/11437, Security Council Press Statement on Iraq, 11.06.2014. On 30 May 2013, the Security Council 
included this group and the al-Nusra Front in the list of terrorist organizations linked to al-Qaida.
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It is also relevant that the Security Council alludes to the possibility of certain acts 
constitute crimes against humanity and, at the same time, to the existence 
of other types of international crimes, while reaffirming, however, that the 
acts of ISIL can not and should not be associated with any religion, national-
ity or civilization. 
However, not all terrorist acts can be covered by the provisions and respective ele-
ments relating to the most serious crimes of international concern.
Whilst the qualification as a war crime implies the existence of an armed con-
flict, the crime of genocide – although alluding to the “intent to destroy”, 
which is also a characteristic of terrorist acts – requires that this intent 
aims to destroy in part or in whole a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group as stated in Article 6, which might not be the purpose of certain 
terrorist acts or it might not be unequivocally proven. With regard to 
crimes against humanity, the Statute’s definition states that the attack must 
be widespread or systematic and this prevents a large-scale attack that 
does not possess these characteristics from being subsumed under this 
article. In addition, the definition states that an attack against any civilian 
population means a course of conduct pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy. But it may be difficult to establish a link 
between the conduct and a policy of a State or an organization, since ter-
rorist acts can be perpetrated by isolated individuals. The crime of aggres-
sion can only be committed by a person in a leadership position of an act 
of aggression; as it requires an act of aggression by a State it would not 
apply to non-state entities.
Besides, the principle nullum crimen sine lege provides that a person shall not be 
criminally responsible for a conduct unless it constitutes, at the moment it 
takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court (Article 22), this 
could mean that the perpetrators of terrorist acts, shielded by this principle, 
would go unpunished.
The underlying ideas of terrorism are the creation of feelings of terror, fear and 
insecurity in individuals and the perpetration of indiscriminate violence 
involving the use of different types of weapons. Hence, the proposal of the 
Preparatory Committee appears the most appropriate solution, but the 
definition enshrined in paragraph 1 should be further broadened to include 
non-state entities. Terrorist acts such as the use of a conventional explosive 
combined with radioactive material in order to disperse it over a wide area, 
exposing victims to radiation (the so-called “dirty bomb”) or the intentional 
release of pathogenic microorganisms could be covered by paragraph 3 of 
the Committee’s proposal. At the same time, in line with the Commission 
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and the Committee, the insertion of the reference to treaties on terrorism 
could circumvent the existing gap concerning a comprehensive interna-
tional convention on terrorism and a binding and consensual definition. Also 
a procedure that would enable the inclusion of future conventions, which is 
justified by the increase in the number of conventions on this matter in 
recent years, should be incorporated.
Alternatively, although the amendment proposal submitted by the Netherlands 
did not gather sufficient support for its consideration at the Kampala 
Conference and it was withdrawn in June 2013, within the Working Group 
on Amendments established by the Assembly of States Parties as a mechanism 
for discussing amendment proposals38, the proposal could be an interme-
diate solution to resolve this impasse, similarly to what happened with the 
crime of aggression.  
THE ICC AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
The rethinking of ICC’s action with a view of protecting populations from inter-
national crimes should be implemented in articulation with a “responsibility 
to protect” of the international community.
Similarly to the ICC, this responsibility focuses on the crimes of genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This concept was devel-
oped by the “International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” 
(ICISS) and presented in the report “The Responsibility to Protect” of 2001. Its 
relevance was acknowledged by the UN Member States in the final docu-
ment of the 2005 World Summit, which incorporated its general features: 
the responsibility to protect resides primarily at the State level and encom-
passes the prevention of such crimes, including its incitement through 
appropriate and necessary means. When appropriate, the international com-
munity should encourage and assist a State so that it can exercise this 
responsibility; if national authorities are unwilling or are unable to protect 
its population, the international community should take appropriate collec-
tive measures to protect it from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity in a timely and decisive manner under Chapters VI, 
VII and VIII of the UN Charter39.
38 ICC-ASP/12/44, Report of the Working Group on Amendments, 24.10.2013, §4.
39 U.N. Doc. A/Res/60/1, World Summit Outcome, 24.10.2005, §138 and §139.
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The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has clarified the responsibility to 
protect concept and, as the Prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, has 
defended this articulation. The Secretary-General affirmed, in the 
report “Implementing the Responsibility to Protect” of 2009, that an impor-
tant measure under the pillar on the protection responsibilities of a State 
– which include the prevention of such crimes and their incitement – 
concerns first of all the accession to the Statute as well as to relevant 
international instruments and the incorporation of international stand-
ards in national legislation to ensure that the crimes and their incite-
ment are criminalized under national law and practice40. Ban Ki-moon 
stressed that the threat of referrals to ICC may have a preventive 
effect41. 
The deepening of the foreseen preventive facet by the Court is essential, mak-
ing the most of its permanent character – unlike the international ad hoc 
criminal tribunals, implementing, thus, a preventive justice system, also 
through the encouragement and provision of assistance to States Parties 
in order to build capacity to protect their populations, when such need 
exists.
In other words, “prevention” should be regarded as a dissuasive and as a deter-
rent measure. As Ban Ki-moon underlines: “by seeking to end impunity, the 
International Criminal Court and the United Nations-assisted tribunal have 
added an essential tool for implementing the responsibility to protect, one that is 
already reinforcing efforts at dissuasion and deterrence”42.
In the same vein, Phakiso Mochochoko, Director of the Jurisdiction, 
Complementarity and Cooperation Division of the ICC, affirms 
“Prevention is key to all our efforts. For the Office, this preventive role is foreseen 
in the Rome Statute Preamble and reinforced in the Office’s prosecutorial strate-
gies. In fact, the Preamble makes clear that prevention is a shared responsibility 
in writing that State Parties are `determined to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such 
crimes`. The Office of the Prosecutor will make public statements referring to its 
mandate when violence escalates in situations under its jurisdiction; it will visit 
situation countries to remind leaders of the Court’s jurisdiction; it will also use 
its preliminary examinations activities to encourage genuine national proceed-
40 U.N. Doc. A/63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 12.01.2009, §17.
41  U.N. Doc. A/66/874, Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response, Report of the Secretary- General, 
25.07.2012, §29.
42 U.N. Doc. A/63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect, Report of the Secretary-General, 12.01.2009, §18.
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ings and thereby attempt to prevent the recurrence of violence. Given that the 
commission of massive crimes can threaten international peace and security, the 
Security Council can complement the OTP’s [Office of the Prosecutor’s] preven-
tive efforts”43.
In this context, the Prosecutor could play a significant role in the preventive 
efforts since he/she may initiate an investigation proprio motu based on 
information on crimes (Article 15). The Office of the Prosecutor, as a 
separate and independent organ, is “responsible for receiving referrals 
and any substantiated information (...), for examining them and for 
conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court” (Article 
42, paragraph 1). It is important to note, however, that a greater celer-
ity and agility on the part of these entities is needed in order to prevent 
violence, i.e., in the pre-violence stage or when it is unfolding, to pre-
vent further occurrence of crimes, restraining it within a short period 
of time.
The establishment of the Scientific Advisory Board on June 25, 2014 by the Office 
of the Prosecutor represents a major change. This board will meet annu-
ally and make recommendations to the Prosecutor about the most recent 
technological developments as well as new scientific methods and proce-
dures that can reinforce the Office’s capabilities in the collection, manage-
ment and examination of scientific evidence relating to an investigation 
and prosecution44. But the creation of an early warning and situation 
evaluation capability that could materialize in the establishment of a spe-
cific organ by the Prosecutor or by the Assembly of States Parties, with 
competence to establish subsidiary bodies, would be indispensable. This 
organ would pay particular attention, but not exclusive, to the phenome-
non of fragile, failed or collapsed states that are unable to meet their 
international commitments. This organ could assist in the detection, 
bringing to the attention of the Prosecutor and of the Office relevant situ-
ations and support and assist the Court in the determination whether the 
State, due to a total or substantial collapse of the national judicial system 
or its unavailability, is unable to conduct an investigation or prosecution 
(Article 17, paragraph 3).
43  ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor, Phakiso Mochochoko, Address on behalf of the Prosecutor, Open Debate of the 
United Nations Security Council on “Peace and Justice, with a special focus on the role of the International Criminal 
Court”, 17.10.2012.
44  ICC, Press Release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Establishes a Scientific Advisory 
Board, 27.06.2014.
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A joint study conducted by experts from Oxford University and the Australian 
Government suggests that the Court’s preventive dimension should be 
implemented through encouraging the Statute’s ratification, namely among 
non-signatories, strengthening capacities at the national level, raising aware-
ness activities to inform populations on crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Court, developing clear and more objective criteria for Security Council 
referrals and guaranteeing a more consolidated alignment between preven-
tive instruments as non-military coercive measures and mediation and 
criminal justice mechanisms45. These measures could be implemented in the 
articulation process of the ICC with the responsibility to protect.
As for the materialization of this interconnection, the Security Council referral46 
of the situation in Libya in 2011 took on a paradigmatic significance for two 
reasons. Firstly, resolution 1970 linked the Court’s role to the responsibility 
to protect and, secondly, the resolution was unanimously adopted, despite 
the reluctance of the United States, the Russian Federation and China 
regarding the ICC’s mission, permanent members of the Council, which 
seems to indicate a change in the perception of the Court.
Although the resolution does not explicitly allude to a responsibility to protect by 
the international community, it refers in the Preamble “recalling the Libyan 
authorities’ responsibility to protect its population”. This decision imposed an 
obligation on the Libyan authorities to cooperate and provide the necessary 
support to the Court and the Prosecutor. In resolution 1973 (2011), the 
Council reiterated the authorities’ responsibility to protect the Libyan 
population. In addition, it authorized coercive military measures and 
recalled the decision to refer the situation to the ICC, emphasizing that 
those responsible for or complicit in attacks against the civilian population, 
including aerial and naval attacks, must be held accountable.
Carsten Stahn (2011) affirmed regarding resolution 1970 that “This resolution 
marked the first incident in which the ICC was expressly recognized in Council prac-
tice as a core element of preventing and adjudicating atrocities in line with the ‘R2P’ 
[responsibility to protect] concept (…) With the Security Council referral, interna-
tional justice has become one of the primary means of constraining violence and 
securing accountability, not only in the context of hostilities, but also in ensuring 
justice after conflict”.
45  “Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, Australian Government, Australian Civil-Military Centre,  
The Prevention Toolbox: Systematising Policy Tools for the Prevention of Mass Atrocities, The International Criminal 
Court”(Sep. 2013). Policy Brief Series .5, p. 3.
46 The importance of the “responsibility to protect” was highlighted for the first time in resolution 1674 (2006).
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Nevertheless, the author warned that the Libyan case became a test for the man-
agement of the idea of “shared responsibility”, after the detention of Saif 
Al-Islam Gaddafi by the Libyan authorities (Stahn, 2012), who is still not 
under the custody of the Court, despite several unsuccessful attempts to 
challenge its jurisdiction.
The articulation between the ICC and the responsibility to protect, more specifi-
cally, the role of this jurisdictional organ will inevitably be conditioned by the 
Security Council, i.e., by its decision to refer situations relating to non-states 
parties under Chapter VII if one or more crimes under ICC jurisdiction 
appear to have been committed, after its determination of the existence of a 
threat to peace under Article 39 of the Charter. The lack of a Security Council 
decision with respect to failed states and the divergences among permanent 
members on the interpretation of “threat to peace” will certainly hinder the 
referral of certain situations to the ICC.
In fact, the Security Council lacks objective binding criteria to determine a threat 
to peace and is held hostage to political discretion. The establishment of 
criteria in this regard and the introduction of changes concerning the right 
of veto (Santos, 2012, p 560-561) would avoid situations in which the 
Council is unable to refer the case to the ICC due to the threat or use of the 
veto, as in the case of Syria. Even recently, in May 2014, the Russian and 
Chinese vetoes prevented the adoption of a resolution in this regard.
The process should, therefore, be allied to an uniform application to similar situa-
tions by permanent members and to previous changes to the veto system to 
avoid such situations. It is important to note that the ICISS in its report “The 
Responsibility to Protect” declared “(…) the Commission supports the proposal put 
to us in an exploratory way by a senior representative of one of the Permanent Five 
countries, that there be agreed by the Permanent Five a “code of conduct” for the use of 
the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or avert a significant human-
itarian crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member, in matters where its 
vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, would not use its veto to 
obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution. The expression 
“constructive abstention” has been used in this context in the past (…)”47.
47 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), The Responsibility to Protect, §6.21, p. 51.
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Among the Security Council reform proposals it should be referred the introduc-
tion of a voluntary conduct limiting the exercise of the veto right in situa-
tions of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or ethnic cleansing 
or the elimination of this right, which appears infeasible, or the need of 
current and eventual new permanent members to justify this action. 
This articulation is justified by the observation of common denominators, at the 
beginning of a timid practice – which should be explored and deepened – 
and by the possibility of contributing to the consolidation and enabling a 
broader exploration of the Court’s role and to increased human rights pro-
tection.
This jurisdictional organ could be relevant in the prevention prior to the occurrence 
of violence or when it is unfolding as a reaction mechanism – which could 
occur alongside an intervention with use of force by the international com-
munity. The objective is to end violence through its intervention by putting 
those responsible under its custody. This action is justified by the fact that a 
State’s judicial system may be unable to function in times of conflict or even 
in the reconstruction phase, after the international intervention with use of 
force, i.e., in the reconciliation and criminal retribution process. Regarding 
justice and reconciliation, the ICISS warned of the possibility that in many 
situations the state in whose territory a military intervention took place may 
have never had a non-corrupt or properly functioning judicial system48.
The effects of the “responsibility to protect” and the mission of the ICC will have 
a greater impact if this concept acquires the status of an international norm 
(Santos 2012,p 562). Although the relationship between the ICC and the 
Security Council is viewed with scepticism and concern, which is to some 
extent justifiable due to the Security Council’s political nature, a tripartite 
cooperation in this context may be beneficial.
CONCLUSIONS
An effective international public order is desirable. The sustainability of an order 
with such features, however, requires a permanent construction process in 
order to meet adequately the increasing and different challenges and to 
overcome emerging vulnerabilities. International criminal law embodied in 
the ICC will be crucial to achieve this aspiration.
48 Ibid., §5.13, p. 41.
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By resorting to “a graphical representation” it can be concluded “that the substan-
tive law that the ICC applies is a smaller concentric circle within a larger 
circle, which represents the total international criminal law” (Gouveia, 
2013,p 784) and important limitations can be pointed out to the ICC such 
as the possibility of its activity be constrained by the Security Council, ten-
sions deriving from the complementary nature of its jurisdiction and inter-
pretive questions raised by certain provisions of the Statute, but focusing 
only on those facts entails the risk of obtaining a reductive assessment of the 
merits and potential of the ICC.
The Statute’s regulatory project and, specifically, the Court may be more success-
ful and influence the construction of an international public order in a more 
effective manner if the process of permanent construction of this body takes 
into account the need to fill gaps and the challenges of the contemporary 
world.
In this sense, there should be clarification of ambiguous aspects by the Court relating 
to the crime of aggression and crimes against humanity, as underestimating 
these aspects could hamper the efficient and expeditious delivery of justice. In 
the case of the crime of aggression the evolutive process cannot be oblivious 
to the Security Council’s determinations. In the case of crimes against human-
ity, the Court shall specify the content of Article 7, a task that would be 
facilitated by the entry into force of a future international convention on the 
prevention and punishment of such crimes.
The Court should also explore new facets and deepen those foreseen in the Statute, 
making the most of its independent and permanent character, which allowed 
its detachment from a “victor’s justice” connotation attributed to the inter-
national ad hoc criminal tribunals.
The distinct and intricate situations of passivity, inaction or impunity on the 
part of States that require the protection of the human dignity, which 
result from new challenges, imply a greater involvement of the ICC. 
Thus, a rethinking of its jurisdiction, extending its scope to the crime of 
terrorism, subjecting the perpetrators of terrorist acts to international 
justice is necessary. This inclusion is justified by the increasing dissemina-
tion of terrorism at the global level and by the fact that its different forms 
and manifestations may not be covered by the provisions and elements of 
crimes prescribed in the Statute. Simultaneously, this article proposes an 
articulation of the ICC’s mission with the “responsibility to protect” of 
the international community which should be expressed in the different 
dimensions of this responsibility: prevention, reaction and rebuilding a 
lasting peace.
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Although the jurisprudence is still scarce, namely concerning convictions, it cannot 
be ignored that the threshold of the first decade of the 21st century marks a 
turning point in the activity of the ICC. The gradual confluence around the 
Court by States Parties, by non-party States and by the Security Council 
demonstrates the growing recognition of the Court’s relevance by the inter-
national community as well as the application of the system envisioned in the 
Statute.
These reasons and the potential of the ICC allow for the prospect of a passage from 
the present adolescence (Soares, 2014,p 10) to adulthood characterized by 
increasingly confident steps, a maturing process leading to a consolidated 
and more effective criminal justice system.
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Justice is an indispensable ingredient in the process of national reconciliation. 
It is essential for the restoration of peaceful and normal relations among people 
who have had to live under a reign of terror. It also breaks cycles of violence, 
hatred and extra-judicial retribution. Thus, peace and justice go hand in hand. 
Antonio Cassese, former President of the ICTY
The duties and powers of the Prosecutor in international criminal justice to some 
extent can be nominally equated to the Prosecutor at a domestic level. 
However, there are substantial and methodological difference. The chal-
lenges posed in the investigation and prosecution of large-scale crimes and 
massive criminal violations committed years ago in a sovereign foreign 
country are unique. Thus, it is both remarkable and surprising that the legal 
tools of investigation available to the international Prosecutor have pro-
duced results that one can observe and quantify. Although challenges still 
remain, the work of the Prosecutor in international criminal justice is a 
considerable achievement in the fight against impunity for serious violations 
of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.
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INTRODUCTION 
The theme “the Prosecutor in international criminal justice” is part of the “interna-
tional criminal justice” project that aims to bring together researchers, 
experiences and methodologies that can be found in International Relations 
and International Law.
Some people know the duties, powers and functions of the Ministério Público 
(MP)1 at a national level, though few have a good understanding of what the 
Prosecutor in international criminal justice entails. The very name of the 
position causes some confusion due to its similarities with near national 
equivalents (the attorney of justice, the justice promoter, the public prose-
cutor, the deputy prosecutor, the prosecutor of the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, General Prosecutor). In today’s world, the magistrate usually refers 
to the exercise of judicial power, and has the ability and prerogative to judge 
according to the constitutional rules and laws created by the legislature. The 
notion of magistracy, which in some places includes judges and prosecutors, 
is unknown as such in countries that have adopted common law, which 
extend these constitutional guarantees only to their judges, and where the 
word magistrate has a different meaning. The Portuguese magistrates (judges 
and prosecutors) enjoy the constitutional guarantees of life tenure.   
THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Knowing the duties, powers and functions of the MP in the national framework can 
help to better understand the institutional identity of the Prosecutor in 
international criminal justice. 
All organisation and jurisdiction of the MP is the remit of the Assembly of the 
Republic. Article 163 of the Constitution states the “Assembly of the Republic, 
with regard to other entities, is responsible for... electing in accordance with the pro-
portional representation system... members of the High Prosecutorial Council”. 
Article 165 establishes that: “1. It is the sole responsibility of the Assembly of the Republic 
to legislate on the following matters, unless it authorises the Government to do so: ... 
p) organisation and jurisdiction of the courts and Ministério Público as well as the 
1  The Ministério Público is the constitutional organ empowered to start investigations on criminal violations and institutes 
criminal proceedings before criminal courts. The term equates, more or less, to the French Ministere Public and the 
English State Prosecutor’s Office, Chief Prosecutor’s Office or Attorney General.
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status of the corresponding judges and prosecutors and non-judicial bodies for alter-
native dispute resolution.” 
In the terms of Article 219 (1):The Ministério Público represents the State and safeguards 
the interests prescribed by law, takes part in the enforcement of the criminal policy as 
defined by the sovereign bodies, carries out the prosecution according to the principle 
of legality, and defends democratic legality.
Article 219 (2) also confers that the MP’s has its “own statute” and “autonomy”.
Article 219 (4) states that “officials of the Ministério Público shall be accountable judicial 
officers, shall form part of and be subject to a hierarchy and shall not be transferred, 
suspended, retired or removed from office except in cases provided for by law”. 
Article 219 (5) establishes that “[t]he appointment, assignment, transfer and promotion 
of officials of the Ministério Público and the exercise of discipline over them shall be 
the responsibility of the State General Prosecutor’s Office”. 
On the other hand, Article 220 of the Constitution states that “[T]he State General 
Prosecutor’s Office shall be the highest authority of the Ministério Público” and that: 
“State General Prosecutor’s Office shall be presided over by the State Public Prosecutor 
and shall contain the High Prosecutorial Council, which shall include members 
elected by the Assembly of the Republic and members whom the public prosecutors shall 
elect from among their number”. 
These constitutional provisions derive some fundamental rules and principles that 
sustain the operation of the MP. They are the principles of autonomy, inde-
pendence and legality of prosecution. 
Article 2 (2) of the MP’s Statute2 provides that “the autonomy of the Ministério Público 
is characterised by it being bound by legality and objectivity criteria and by the exclu-
sive submission of agents of the Ministério Público to the directives, orders and instruc-
tions laid down by the [Statute]”.
In fact, the MP enjoys autonomy not only in relation to central, regional and local 
authorities, but also in relation to the judiciary. Firstly, the autonomy of the 
MP means that it takes no orders or instruction from central, regional and 
local authorities, nor can they influence its governance or administration. 
Secondly, the autonomy of the MP means that officials are organic and func-
tionally separated from the judiciary, giving the MP a prerogative of stabil-
ity identical to that of judges. 
2  Approved by Law no. 47/86 of 15 October, republished in Law no. 60/98 of 27 August, and changed by Laws 42/2005 
of 29 August, 67/2007 of 31 December, 52/2008 of 28 August, 37/2009 of 20 July, 55-A/2010 of 31 December and 
9/2011 of 12 April.
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Thus, the MP is a constitutional body of justice organised as an independent pro-
cedural body in two ways: in terms of independence from political power in 
the exercise of prosecution and in terms of being separated from, and paral-
lel to, the judiciary.3  
Consequently, the MP is autonomous in the exercise of its duties, powers4 and 
functions. This principle is based on the idea that no crime should go unpun-
ished and, therefore, that the MP is legally obliged to act. 
The principle of legality of criminal prosecution is reflected in the obligation of the 
MP to prosecute, provided that it has been informed of the crime and there are 
no obstacles preventing it from acting. This principle has a democratic character 
and meets the requirements of social defence in that it subjects the public 
body’s actions to law. Thus, the action is imposed on the State not as a mere 
power, but as an obligation to carry out one of its essential purposes, which is 
to maintain and reintegrate the legal system. Therefore, the MP has the duty to 
prosecute without being led by political criteria of opportunity or social utility. 
Prosecution is thus the most important function of the MP.5 Moreover, the gradu-
al democratisation of criminal proceedings has imposed the accusatorial 
principle that places the MP in a position of near monopoly in the exercise 
of prosecution. 
As mentioned earlier, the State General Prosecutor’s Office is the highest author-
ity of the Ministério Público, which is organically and functionally independ-
ent. The independence of the MP lies in an organisational-institutional 
framework through which interference, dependences or limitations regard-
ing other state powers such as the President, the Assembly of the Republic 
and the Government are neutralised. 
Moreover, Article 219 (4) of the Constitution states that “Ministério Público agents 
are accountable and. subject to hierarchy”.
Hierarchical subordination means that MP6 agents receive orders and instruction 
from the State General Prosecutor’s Office, which seems to contradict the 
3  This view is reaffirmed in several parts of Criminal Procedure Law when stating the principle of objectivity (Article 53), 
by applying to magistrates of the MP the provisions concerning impediments, refusals and excuses of judges (Article 54), 
when making it compulsory for the MP to investigate à charge and à décharge (Article 262), by exempting the MP from 
the rules on the conduct of lawyers and defenders (Article 326), and recognising the right to appeal in the sole interest 
of the accused (Article 401).
4  Article 3 of the MP Statute specifies its duties and Paragraph 3 states that “in the exercise of its duties, the Ministério 
Público is aided by justice officers and criminal police bodies, and has access to advisory services”. 
5  The magistrate is a speaking law, and the law is a silent magistrate (Cicero).
6  Article 8 (Agents) of the MP Statute states: 1 — The agents of the MP are: a) The General Prosecutor; b) The Deputy 
General Prosecutor; c) The Assistant General Prosecutors; d) The Prosecutors; e) The Assistant Prosecutors.
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MP’s principle of independence. It is necessary to note that the independ-
ence that characterises the structure and functioning of the MP, which every 
MP agent benefits from, is a functional independence that has to be seen in 
light of the MP’s unity and indivisibility. 
Indeed, the agents that comprise the MP are under the aegis of a single higher body, 
the State General Prosecutor’s Office,7 to the extent that the MP appears as 
a single institution, with the division being essentially functional. Thus, the 
principle of unity has an administrative character. The organisation of the 
MP into various sectors only intends to establish a rational division of 
labour; however, all agents in the different sectors are guided by the same 
principles and goals, thus constituting a single institutional body. 
The indivisibility of the MP is a direct consequence of its unity. Thus, a MP agent 
can be replaced by another without any practical implications, since acts are 
regarded as practised by the MP and not by a single individual. The entity 
that is present in all cases is the MP, albeit through a given agent. The term 
“representative of the Ministério Público”,8 therefore, is not technically cor-
rect when referring to MP agents. 
This principle allows MP agents to be replaced by another during cases. However, 
the replacement cannot be made arbitrarily: it has to be done in line with 
terms provided by law (in case of promotion, transfer, suspension, dismissal, 
retirement, death, etc.), without constituting or implying any procedural 
change. Incidentally, Article 4 of the Statute envisages that “agents of the 
Ministério Público can be replaced according to the provisions of this law”. 
Thus, the principle of functional independence means that MP agents act indepen-
dently in the exercise of their duties. They base their conduct on law and 
personal conviction, and may refuse to comply with illegal directives, orders 
and instructions on the grounds of them being a serious violation of their 
legal conscience. Accordingly, the hierarchical subordination of MP agents 
exists only at an administrative level, not functionally. 
In short, the autonomy of the MP is characterised by its links to legality and objec-
tivity criteria and by the exclusive subjection of agents of the MP to direc-
tives, orders and instructions provided by law. 
7  Article 7 (Organs) of the MP Statute. The bodies of the MP are: a) The State General Prosecutor’s Office; b) The District 
General Prosecutor’s Offices; c) The State Prosecutor’s Offices.
8  Article 4 (Representation) of the MP Statute: 1 — The MP is represented before the courts: a) In the Supreme Court 
of Justice, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Supreme Military Court and in the Court 
of Auditors, by the State General Prosecutor; b) In High Courts and the Central Administrative Court, by Assistant 
General Prosecutors; c) In Courts of First Instance, by prosecutors and Assistant Prosecutors.
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THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
Introducing and reviewing the national constitutional framework of the MP and its 
agents can help understand the role of the Prosecutor in international 
criminal justice as perceptions are usually preceded and influenced by per-
ceptions of the national justice. Identity and the institutional framework in 
which the Prosecutor stands internationally will be examined below in 
order to understand the evolutionary process and historical circumstances 
behind the positon’s existence, as well as its importance today. 
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia
In 1993, the UN Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).9 The sheer scale of human rights violations in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina – think of the images of destroyed cities and people 
looking like cadavers in the death camps of Omarska, Keraterm and 
Trnopolje10 – generated huge international outcry and prompted the inter-
national community to embark on its first course of international criminal 
justice since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. 
Article 16 of the ICTY Statute states that: The Prosecutor shall be responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of persons [allegedly] responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law... The Prosecutor shall act independently as a 
separate organ of the International Tribunal. He or she shall not seek or receive 
instructions from any Government or from any other source.
A similar decision was made with regard to the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), according to Article 15 of the ICTR 
Statute. Paragraph 3 of the Article states that “the Prosecutor of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia shall also serve as the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”.11
9  On 25 May 1993, the UN Security Council formally adopted Resolution 827, establishing the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, known as the ICTY. This resolution contained the ICTY Statute, which determined 
the Court’s jurisdiction and organisational structure as well as criminal proceedings in general terms. This was the first 
war crimes tribunal established by the UN and the first international court of war crimes since the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials. This date marked the beginning of the end of impunity for war crimes in former Yugoslavia.
10  This situation was tried at the ICTY, Kvočka et al. (IT-98-30/1) “Omarska, Keraterm & Trnopolje Camps”;  
in the BiH Court, Mejakić et al. (IT-02-65) “Omarska and Keraterm Camps”.  
11 For this reason, only the Prosecutor of the ICTY is mentioned here.
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As shown in Articles 16 and 15 of the Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR respectively, 
the Prosecutor is independent and does not seek or take instruction from 
any government or international organisation, or from any of the other two 
organs of the Court. The ICTY Prosecutor’s Office is mandated to investi-
gate and prosecute those presumed responsible for serious violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) committed in the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.12 
“[In early 1994] the Office of the Prosecutor has had to invent itself. Starting from nothing... 
a staffing plan was first formulated and qualified and experienced staff were recruit-
ed. Then an information management and litigation support system was developed... 
Following the work of the investigators, the final stage of the Prosecutor’s task begins 
with the framing of indictments and the ensuing trial process”.13 
Indeed, the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office investigated many of the worst atrocities that 
have taken place in Europe since World War II – such as the 1995 Srebrenica 
massacre – and has prosecuted civilian, military and paramilitary leaders for 
crimes and atrocities. In 2011, the last two accused by the ICTY Prosecutor, 
Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić, were arrested and transferred to a UN 
detention centre in The Hague after many years on the run, thus ensuring 
that none of the 161 individuals accused went unpunished.14 
The Prosecutor’s Office is headed by a Prosecutor appointed by the UN Security 
Council for a renewable term of four years. A Deputy Prosecutor is appoint-
ed by the UN Secretary General. 
In accordance with the Resolutions of the Security Council and the Statute of the 
Tribunal – notably pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter – UN Member 
States are obliged to cooperate with the Prosecutor’s Office in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious IHL violations. 
The Prosecutor’s Office was organised into an investigation division and a prosecu-
tion division. The latter had three sections: trial, appeal, and information 
and evidence. The Prosecutor’s Office employed staff (such as police offic-
ers, investigators, forensic experts, analysts, lawyers, trial lawyers and legal 
advisers) from approximately 80 countries, whose experiences with nation-
al systems were combined into a single system of international criminal 
procedures. 
12 Since 1 January 1991.
13 ICTY Annual Report, A/49/342, S/1994/1007, of 29 August 1994.
14  In accordance with the Tribunal’s completion strategy, the final charges were issued in late 2004.
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When the ICTY began its pioneering work of investigating and prosecuting perpe-
trators of serious IHL violations, the statute only gave the Prosecutor the 
power to “initiate investigations” and “to question suspects, victims and wit-
nesses, collect evidence and conduct investigations on the ground”.15 Unlike 
the criminal codes of national legal systems, the ICTY Statute contains a 
rather limited set of legal tools to investigate and prosecute crimes in the 
jurisdiction of the International Tribunal. 
The situation that the ICTY Prosecutor faced in carrying out the mission was com-
pletely different from the one Prosecutor Robert Jackson met in the 
Nuremberg Tribunal. In the latter case, the accused were within reach, the 
archives were open and the witnesses were available; in the former 
Yugoslavia, everything took place at a distance (between The Hague and 
Belgrade, Sarajevo and Zagreb) and within sovereign countries that were 
unwilling to detain suspects or cooperate with the Prosecutor. 
At the beginning in 1994, even those who encouraged and supported the establish-
ment of the ICTY doubted that it would have any impact or success. Almost 
twenty years later, its jurisprudential legacy and its effect on peace and 
reconciliation remain a topic of vibrant academic debate. For the ICTY, it is 
generally accepted that there is a before and after, with new precedents 
being set for international law, international criminal justice and interna-
tional humanitarian law.
Indeed, with the establishment of the ICTY, the UN Security Council hoped to 
deter civilian and military officials of the former Yugoslavia from committing 
further atrocities, sending a clear message that those responsible for atroci-
ties would be brought to justice. Unfortunately, the establishment of the 
ICTY had little or no deterrent effect, with the Srebrenica massacre in July 
1995 – the greatest crime of all in the armed conflict – occurring after the 
tribunal had been established. Following Srebrenica, the Prosecutor filed 
charges and arrest warrants were issued against the Bosnian Serb leader 
Radovan Karadžić and his Chief of General Staff, General Ratko Mladić. 
Again, many doubted that they would ever face justice; however, they were 
arrested and transferred to The Hague’s detention centre in 2008 and 2011 
respectively. 
15  The statute is silent as to how to accomplish these tasks and by what means. In fact, there are more paragraphs in the 
Statute on the appointment and qualification of the judges than on skills and research tools.
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The ICTY was created in May 1993. The conflict began in 1991 and ended in 
December 1995 with the Dayton Accord. Even before that date, and during 
the conflict, the Prosecutor sent several investigation teams to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH).
In 1996, the Bosnian Serb Duško Tadić became the first to be tried for war crimes 
and crimes against humanity at the ICTY. This case was an important sign 
that the Tribunal would prosecute the perpetrators of serious international 
crimes. The evidence and testimonies collected for the trial of Duško Tadić 
proved to be very useful in the Prosecutor’s guidance for other cases, a 
bottom-up approach that culminated on 28 June 2001 with the arrest of 
former President Slobodan Milošević. 
The ICTY created a large and rich body of jurisprudence that decisively influenced 
international criminal justice and which, to a large extent, has been adopted 
by the International Criminal Court (ICC). For approximately two years 
(1996-1997), the Prosecutor investigated the July 1995 Srebrenica massa-
cre. On 2 November 1998, the Prosecutor filed an indictment. The trail 
started on 13 March 2000 and ended on 2 August 2001. The trial took place 
over 98 days, with hearings lasting five hours a day. Being a first for European 
history, the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre was judged by the Tribunal as 
genocide. 
The most immediate goal of the ICTY was to end impunity and prosecute those 
presumed responsible for the most serious crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 
Another more ambitious and long-term goal was to contribute to peace and 
reconciliation in the region and provide resolution for victims and their 
families.
The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
On 17 July 1998, the international community reached a historic landmark when 
120 States adopted the Rome Statute, through which the ICC Statute was 
approved. The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002 after ratifica-
tion by 60 countries, including Portugal. 
One of the ICC organs is the Prosecutor’s Office, which is responsible for receiv-
ing reports of the crimes that fall within its jurisdiction, examine them and 
eventually institute criminal proceedings. 
The roots of the ICC Statute are close to those of the ICTY and the ICTR, although 
there are differences regarding several legal and structural characteristics. In 
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fact, the ICC is a permanent judicial body with universal reach16 and its activ-
ity complements that of national courts.17 The ICTY and the ICTR are sub-
sidiary bodies of the UN Security Council; the ICC was established and is 
maintained by the Assembly of States Parties, who acceded to the Treaty of 
Rome. The UN Security Council appoints the Prosecutors of the ICTY and 
the ICTR; in the case of the ICC, the Prosecutor is elected by States party to 
the Treaty of Rome. One of the major differences in the two ad hoc tribunals 
is the possibility for victims to appear before the ICC to express their opin-
ions and to claim reparation for the injustices they have suffered.18 
The Court’s exercise of jurisdiction is dependent on referrals being made to the 
Prosecutor by a State Party or by the UN Security Council, whenever one 
or more crimes have been committed within its jurisdiction (Article 13 of 
the ICC Statute). Information received by the Prosecutor about crimes 
committed within the Court’s jurisdiction may lead to the initiation of an 
investigation by itself if it is believed that there are sufficient grounds to do 
so and if the Pre-Trial Chamber’s permission to start the investigation has 
been obtained (Article 15 of the ICC Statute). When conducting investiga-
tions, the Prosecutor has to trigger some preliminary decision on admissibil-
ity to ensure the functioning of the complementarity principle of interven-
tion (Article 18 of the ICC Statute). That is, “it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” 
(Preamble of the ICC Statute); the Prosecutor may start criminal proceedings 
only if the State is genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute. 
The Prosecutor may, as a rule – only once and before the trial or at its commence-
ment – ask the ICC to rule on issues related to jurisdiction and admissibil-
ity. If it is decided that an inquiry is to be transferred to a State, the 
Prosecutor may request the State in question to pass on information about 
the progress of the proceedings. This information should be kept confiden-
16  The ICTY and ICTR are ad hoc tribunals with limited territorial and temporal jurisdiction. It can be said that the ICC  
is forever and for all. The difference between ad hoc and permanent justice was and still is a major obstacle to the 
ratification of the Rome Statue by some countries, which, having supported ad hoc justice solutions (in the case of some 
countries and if deemed convenient), are reluctant to support a permanent justice solution (for all and on every occasion).
17  The jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR is concurrent with that of national courts and has primacy over national courts. 
The ICC operates on the principle of complementarity, i.e. exercising jurisdiction only when national courts are 
unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute.
18  In the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, victims stood before the courts as witnesses. However, in the ICC 
Statute, victims were elevated to the category of procedural participants in their own right. Indeed, several provisions 
in the ICC Statute stipulate the involvement of victims at all stages of the proceedings. Most importantly, victims  
of international crimes can claim redress for violation of their rights. 
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tial if the State so requests. If the Prosecutor thereafter decides to open an 
investigation, the decision must be shared with the State in question (Article 
19 of the ICC Statute). 
Article 42 of the ICC Statute, in its nine paragraphs, presents the ICC Prosecutor’s 
Office as acting autonomously from the Court. It is chaired by the 
Prosecutor and assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who must be 
highly competent individuals of high moral character with extensive practi-
cal experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases. The Prosecutor 
is elected by the members of the Assembly of States Parties through a secret 
ballot and must gain an absolute majority. The Prosecutor and the Deputy 
Prosecutors are subject to the exclusivity rule and they may be subject to 
disqualification if their impartiality is in question. 
A Victims and Witnesses Unit, established within the ICC Registry, takes protective 
measures and prepares security arrangements. It also provides counsel and 
other assistance to witnesses and victims who appear before the Court, or 
others at risk (Article 43 of the ICC Statute). 
The Prosecutor appoints “such qualified staff as may be required to [its] respective 
[office]”, namely, investigators. In the employment of staff, the Prosecutor ensures the 
“highest standards of efficiency, competency and integrity”. 
In exceptional circumstances expertise of seconded personnel offered by States 
Parties, intergovernmental organisations or non-governmental organisa-
tions may be employed (Article 44 of the ICC Statute). 
The Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutors and staff from the Prosecutor’s Office, when 
engaged in the business of the Court, enjoy privileges and immunities that 
are necessary to the fulfilment of their duties (Article 48 of the ICC Statute). 
The primary function of the Prosecutor is to investigate and prosecute the 
perpetrators of massive violations of human rights and IHL. 
It is possible to discern some similarities between the prosecution of massive crime 
violations internationally and the prosecution of organised crime at a nation-
al level. There are also important differences that make the types of proce-
dure dissimilar. At least two in international prosecution stand out. The first 
has to do with a lack of external administrative structure able to carry out 
investigations in the territory of a State without its help – as well the 
absence of an international police force to make arrests, giving paramount 
importance to the State’s cooperation.19  The second is that the procedural 
19  Section 9 of the ICC Statute provides for international cooperation and judicial assistance of the States Parties. Article 86 
(General Obligation to Cooperate) establishes that “States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, 
cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”.
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model of international criminal tribunals is a combination of elements of the 
accusatory system (common law) and the inquisitorial system (civil law). 
Several concepts and procedures from both legal traditions can be found in the 
Statutes of the Courts and the Procedure and Evidence Rules; in the 
approach of the Prosecutor, judges and defence lawyers; in the introduction 
of evidence; and the manner in which the case is conducted in general. 
As a result of that combination of elements of the different legal systems, some 
general principles are acquired in relation to the international rules of evi-
dence: national rules of evidence not binding, application of the rules of 
evidence which best favor a fair determination of the matter, admissibility of 
any relevant evidence with probative value, exclusion of evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial, 
possibility of verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of 
court and reception of the evidence of a witness orally or, where the inter-
ests of justice allow, in written form20. Further examples of that combina-
tion in the production of evidence are the testimony of the accused21 and a 
statement of the accused22 (common law), and the possibility for the Court 
proprio motu to summon witnesses and order their attendance23 (civil law).
Still, some methods commonly used in national criminal proceedings may be of use 
internationally, such as resorting to “insiders” as witnesses. Although nation-
al systems are aware of this practice, it may have a particular meaning in the 
context of the prosecution of international crimes, especially when the 
accused enjoy top hierarchical positions. It may also be relevant in certain 
forms of criminal participation (such as joint criminal enterprise). The tes-
timony of an insider in a case of joint criminal enterprise is one of the best 
ways to prove the purpose of the criminal enterprise and its members. 
Insiders can and should be used in complex criminal cases, because finding 
evidence of a complex criminal organisation and its leaders can be difficult 
and consuming in terms of time and resources. 
Although similar investigating tools or legal concepts can be used nationally, unique 
challenges arise when investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Some 
are obvious, such as a lack of police or enforcement officers; others are less 
obvious, such as the impact of the combined common law/civil law process. 
20 Rule 89 of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See also Article 69 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
21 Rule 85 C of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
22 Rule 84 bis of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
23 Rule 98 of ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence
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Such challenges have an impact on the type of investigation methods, the recruit-
ment of personnel as well as the legal tools used and their effectiveness. 
Only a mix of traditional and innovative criminal investigation tools and a 
balance of the different national legal cultures can ensure effective investiga-
tion and prosecution of international crimes. 
Similar to what had happened with the ICTY, the ICC adopted the accusatory 
model, which is one of the fundamental pillars on which all functions and 
activities of the Prosecutor stand. Thus, it is up to the Prosecutor to investi-
gate à charge et à dècharge suspicions of the existence of crimes and, where 
appropriate, indict suspects. However, there are at least three important 
exceptions in the accusatory model. 
Firstly, as at Nuremberg and Tokyo, there are no technical rules for the admissibil-
ity of evidence. Consequently, all relevant evidence may be included in the 
process unless their probative value is substantially offset by the need to 
ensure a fair trial or if the evidence was obtained through serious violations 
of human rights. 
Secondly, while in the accusatory system courts must normally be satisfied with the 
evidence submitted by the parties, the Court may proprio motu order the pro-
duction of additional evidence. This allows the Court to be fully satisfied with 
the evidence on which it bases its final decisions. It was considered that, in 
the international sphere, the interests of justice are best served by this provi-
sion and that the decrease, if any, of the rights of the parties is minimal by 
comparison. 
Thirdly, the granting of immunity and plea-bargains have no place in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. It remains entirely a matter for the Prosecutor to 
determine whom to investigate and to prosecute. Cooperation of an accused 
person will also be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance, as well 
as for the purpose of granting pardon or commutation of the sentence. The 
Prosecutor’s Office operates independently from the Court’s judges. There 
is, however, a close and cooperative relationship between the Prosecutor’s 
Office and the rest of the Court in administrative, personnel and other 
issues related to the functioning of the Court as a whole. 
The selection of personnel is a demanding and time-consuming exercise. It is no 
exaggeration to note that the success of the Court as a whole depends 
largely on the quality of the Prosecutor’s Office investigation staff. Having 
experienced and qualified prosecutors is important: If the prosecution evi-
dence is not exhaustive, relevant and complete – or is insufficiently pre-
pared – the risk of failure of the charge is high, given the principle of in dubio 
pro reo and the requirement of evidence beyond reasonable doubt.  
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The ICC Prosecutor, as in other cases, governs actions through the principle of 
mandatory prosecution whenever there are elements of criminal conduct 
and action must be taken, and when not acting is not an option. There is no 
police force at an international level. Thus, the Prosecutor must rely on the 
support of State police in carrying out investigation, accusation and prosecu-
tion functions. There is no international enforcement body, but the 
Prosecutor can count on numerous other investigation mechanisms, be 
them governmental or not. 
The Prosecutor’s Office is one of the organs that make up the Court (Article 34 of 
the ICC Statute). Article 42 of the ICC Statute guarantees its functional 
autonomy, stating that the Prosecutor “shall act independently as a separate 
organ of the Court”. The Prosecutor is responsible for receiving, through 
any suitable form, notitia criminis about crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC and then investigates and institutes criminal proceedings. 
The Prosecutor may also propose amendments to the Elements of Crimes (Article 
9 (2) of the ICC Statute) and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Article 
51 (2) c) of the ICC Statute). For an independent and impartial ICC, the 
Prosecutor enjoys privileges and immunities in carrying out duties in the 
territory of each State party (Article 48 of the ICC Statute). 
The Prosecutor’s Office is headed by a Prosecutor (who holds full directive and 
administrative powers) and assisted by dedicated Deputy Prosecutors of dif-
ferent nationalities, working on a full-time basis. 
THE PROSECUTOR AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
The international criminal procedure is different from the national in several ways. 
One of the most striking differences is the symbolic function of interna-
tional criminal procedures, which are deemed essential to the peace and 
reconciliation process in post-armed conflict societies; in other words, there 
can be no peace without justice and reconciliation. “Thus, Peace and Justice 
go hand in hand”. (Antonio Cassese).
However, this is only possible when the communities involved give legitimacy to 
these procedures, and when the messages of the procedures are received and 
accepted by their communities. Thus, if courts are to contribute to peace 
and reconciliation in affected communities, there is a need to communicate 
with the people involved. Although much progress has been made over the 
past decade, outreach programmes remained a significant challenge for ad 
hoc tribunals and still remain for the ICC. 
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In addition to these external communication obstacles, there are also internal 
barriers. On the one hand, there are those who repeatedly ask for more 
resources to enable the court to achieve their ambitious goals. On the other 
hand, others question whether it is appropriate for prosecutors and judges 
to be involved in dissemination activities. After all, the international crimi-
nal courts are modelled on national courts, which, as a rule, do not have 
such a role.
Domestic prosecutors and judges focus mainly on the technical elements of 
crimes and procedural aspects of the case. In addition to the application of 
the law, any activity is considered to be “political” (a taboo term). 
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the rhetorical functions of 
international criminal law are fundamentally different from nation legisla-
tion. There are important reasons for international courts to carefully 
manage public evaluation and their image, which incidentally should also 
be done at a national level. 
International criminal justice is still in its infancy. The ICTY, as the first ad hoc tri-
bunal in recent history, was established only two decades ago. Unlike 
domestic criminal law that could be centuries old in terms of history and 
jurisprudence, there is still a lack of understanding about what purpose the 
international criminal tribunals serve. The ICC also remains either unknown 
or unaccepted in many parts of the world. 
Besides this alienation and ignorance, international criminal justice is normally 
intended for communities with little previous experience of an impartial 
and independent judiciary – otherwise they would be willing and able to 
investigate and prosecute the crimes by themselves. It is therefore impor-
tant for international criminal law to establish a new beginning for these 
communities and to be an example to the national courts. This is only pos-
sible if the public has a positive and fair view of international criminal 
courts.  
International criminal justice essentially covers genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. Of course, communities devastated by these crimes are trau-
matised, fearful, eager to find a culprit, and take revenge. In turn, in most 
cases, local politicians and media agitate these feelings, jeopardising the peace 
and reconciliation process, with no other help being available, except the 
intervention of international courts. National criminal law seeks mainly to 
punish and prevent crimes; international criminal law is intended to also con-
tribute to peace, reconciliation, security and the wellbeing of the interna-
tional community. 
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Being a case of massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law, the Srebrenica massacre presented exceptional legal and logistical chal-
lenges due to the large number of victims, witnesses, forensic investigations, 
incidents and supporting documents involved,24 as well as the original legal 
complexities of the various crimes in question.25 
The ICTY and the ICTR were created as auxiliary bodies to the UN, which until 
then had never practised international criminal justice. Therefore, the need 
to strike a balance between the priorities of criminal operations, the deten-
tion of suspects and compliance with other UN principles posed legal, insti-
tutional and operational challenges specific to the Prosecutor in terms of 
fulfilling mandates to investigate crimes and initiate criminal proceedings 
before the Court. These challenges increase with the complexity of crimes, 
their size, the safety concerns of potential witnesses, and the fact that in the 
early years arrests of suspects often preceded the investigation26.
SOME QUESTIONS
Genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes are, by definition, massive. 
International crimes can be widespread and systematic, with multiple 
offenders and victims. Thus, perpetrators are often coordinated and organ-
ised by senior military and/or civilian officers. Their nature requires nation-
al jurisdictions to have a different approach in terms of “selecting”, investi-
gating, indicting, proving, adjudicating, defining responsibilities, punishing, 
repairing, and enforcing penalties. 
24  In the first instance, and after much filtering in the preparation for trial, the case had 103 witnesses called by the 
Prosecutor; 13 witnesses called by the Defence (including the very General Radislav Krstić). The Prosecutor filed 910 
documents (some of which extensive dossiers) and the Defence presented 183 documents.
25  See ICTY,KRSTIĆ (IT-98-33) “SREBRENICA DRINA CORPS” and other related cases:  BLAGOJEVIĆ & JOKIĆ (IT-
02-60) “SREBRENICA; ERDEMOVIĆ (IT-96-22) “PILICA FARM”; KARADŽIĆ (IT-95-5/18) “BOSNIA AND 
HERZEGOVINA” & “SREBRENICA”; MILOŠEVIĆ (IT-02-54) “KOSOVO, CROATIA AND BOSNIA”; MLADIĆ (IT-
09-92) “BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA” & “SREBRENICA”; NIKOLIĆ MOMIR (IT-02-60/1) “SREBRENICA”; 
OBRENOVIĆ (IT-02-60/2) “SREBRENICA”; ORIĆ (IT-03-68); PERIŠIĆ (IT-04-81); POPOVIĆ et al. (IT-05-88) 
“SREBRENICA”; STANIŠIĆ & SIMATOVIĆ (IT-03-69); TOLIMIR (IT-05-88/2) “SREBRENICA”; TRBIĆ (IT-05-88/1) 
“SREBRENICA”. 
26  When investigating and prosecuting massive violation of human rights or international humanitarian law, it is extremely 
important to first investigate suspected violations, then jointly indict the suspects who participated in the same criminal 
action, and arrest the accused in an organised manner. Those suspected of having committed war crimes are heroes to 
the other side of the conflict and keep communication lines and networks of relationships that can disrupt investigations, 
destroy evidence, intimidate witnesses, and organise escape from detention.
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In short, this means that criminal theory built on common cases of individual 
criminal offense is unsuitable in cases of massive criminal violations. In all, 
prosecuting war crimes is not the same as dealing with common individual 
criminal cases. 
In addition, a national court with jurisdiction to try war crimes must regard the 
cases as urgent and recognise their international impact, considering the 
circumstances and nature of violations of IHL. In fact, war crime trials 
must be timely, given the requirements of peace and reconciliation pro-
cesses, and conducted by independent and impartial judges. National 
judges, even if they have not taken up arms in conflict,27 in a sense have 
always taken the side of a party in the conflict. In principle, those who 
took part in a conflict cannot be completely independent and impartial or, 
at least, cannot be publicly perceived as such. Justice must be done and 
must be seen to be done. 
Is there a need for strategy in the prosecution and trial of war crimes? The answer 
is clearly yes. The Prosecutor must act with a view of closure and comple-
tion considering that: war crimes  are usually committed in the past; most 
criminal operations have been investigated and documented by different 
public and private entities; the majority of suspects have been identified; 
there is a risk of losing evidence; fatigue and a lack of witnesses motivation 
increases over time; new generations are more focused on the future; expe-
ditious and fair trials are the only way to close the door to the past and open 
the door to the future28; and justice is about the past and reconciliation is 
about the future. 
After considering these points, the Prosecutor is asked how many cases to investi-
gate and prosecute and what strategy (selecting and mapping cases, establish 
interactive and centralised databases, and deduce accusations) 29 is being 
considered. The Prosecutor also needs to take into account available 
resources (human, financial and material) and organise interaction in order 
achieve the common goal of closing the door to the past. 
27  Most armed conflicts that took place after World War II were not international conflicts, but civil wars. Thus,  
the public perception of independence and impartiality of the Court becomes even more important and decisive. 
Without this dimension, trials, regardless of how fair and fast they may be, will have no effect and impact  
on the peace and reconciliation process of communities. 
28  In Sarajevo (2008) diplomats said that the issue of “war crimes” in Bosnia was poisoning the political, social  
and economic environment, as well as personal relationships. It was necessary to clean up this type of poison  
and close the issue of war crimes as quickly as possible.
29  See the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law tools for post-conflict States, 
Prosecution initiatives, UN, New York and Geneva, 2006.
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The joint criminal enterprise is particularly applicable in circumstances when sen-
ior leaders share the intent of committing a crime and each contributes to 
fulfilling the criminal purpose. The relationship among perpetrators may or 
may not be hierarchical, although this is not decisive.30
It is the practice of joint murder with shared intention that defines relationships. 
Even if perpetrated by others, enterprise members, and not necessarily 
those individuals who physically carried out the crimes, are culpable. The 
concept reflects a reality where large-scale atrocities are committed by the 
combined action of various forces or agents, and criminal purpose can only 
be shared by leaders who take action to achieve their ends. 
In August 2003, the Security Council issued Resolution 1503, urging the ICTY to 
“focus on the prosecution and trial of senior leaders suspected of being 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY” and transfer 
other cases to competent national courts in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia 
and Serbia. 
The transfer of a case from an international to a national court proved to be a 
complex subject and raised a series of new legal and organisational issues 
that were difficult to foresee and solve. However, the efficient and effective 
manner in which the War Crimes Section of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina – in cooperation with the ICTY – handled the situation should 
be stressed.31 
Other legal principles that were also developed as a result of the transfer process 
also deserve analysis. They include the development of the ICTY and Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina Prosecutors’ cooperation mechanisms, the 
notion of “proven facts” and “documental evidence” from the ICTY proceed-
ings. These developments contribute to the heritage of the ICTY, leaving a 
lasting legacy for future national courts dealing with international crimes. 
Despite the different legal natures of the ICTY and the ICC, this experience 
30  On the contrary, the hierarchical relationship is crucial for assessing and establishing the responsibility of the superior, 
be it civil or military, i.e. de jure or de facto responsibility. 
31  The case of Radovan Stanković was the first to be transferred from the ICTY to the War Crimes Section of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 July 2002, he was placed in custody in the ICTY detention unit. On 1 September 2005, 
the ICTY decided to transfer the case to the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on 29 September 2005, the accused 
was transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 7 December 2005, the indictment was confirmed/accepted. This was also 
the first “11bis case” finalised in the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, on 14 November 2006, the first trial 
sentenced Radovan Stanković to crimes against humanity and imposed a prison sentence of 16 years. On 28 March 2007, 
the Board of Appeal modified the sentence to 20 years. Other cases transferred from the ICTY to the Court of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina were Ljubičić (IT-00-41) ‘’Lašva Valley’’; Mejakić et al. (IT-02-65) “Omarska and Keraterm Camps”; 
Stanković & Janković (IT-96-23/2) “Foča”; Todovic & Rasevic (IT-97-25 /1) “Foča”; Trbic (IT-05-88/1) “Srebrenica”; 
Stanković & Janković (IT-96-23/2) “Foča” ; Todović & Rašević (IT-97-25/1) “Foča” ; Trbić (IT-05-88/1) “Srebrenica”
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can be seen as supplementing the principle of complementarity and consti-
tutes critical learning for the future relationship between international and 
national criminal jurisdictions. 
One of the pre-project objectives of investigation in “International Criminal 
Justice” is “to bring about new proposals for some of the problems that cur-
rently arise in the context of international criminal justice”.
Given the above, and particularly due to the nature of war crimes, some relevant 
questions regarding the work of the Prosecutor in international criminal 
justice will need to be asked in the hope that they will translate into new 
proposals for some of the problems that currently arise from international 
criminal justice. 
Accordingly, what will be the impact on court independence and impartiality, at 
least in terms of public perception, especially in cases of non-international 
armed conflict?
What criminals and crimes should be tried? How should charges of large-scale 
international crimes be addressed? How should cases that are investigated 
and submitted to trial be selected when it is impossible to try all those 
presumed as responsible for the crimes committed in armed conflicts? 
What form of criminal responsibility (individual, command or joint criminal 
enterprise) does the Prosecutor choose to accuse suspects of having com-
mitted massive violations? 
How should evidence be collected and taken to trail in order to build a case, given 
that under certain circumstances it is not possible to gather modern evi-
dence (i.e. wiretapping, pictures, video and audio records). What if the 
investigation depends on the cooperation of States that are not always will-
ing to collaborate? 
What about victims and witnesses? How should reparations for victims be deter-
mined? What contribution, if any, does national law make to the process? 
Which concept of reparation should be used, given that not all people dis-
placed by conflict return home? Should reparation mean collective repara-
tion or a reconstruction of life? 
How investigation and prosecution at an international and national level should be 
combined, given that international crimes contain general (chapeau ele-
ments, e.g. widespread or systematic attacks) and more specific elements 
(underlying criminal offences, e.g. murder)?
How should the proven facts be transferred from the international tribunal to the 
national court and how should technical and human resources and criminal 
investigation materials be shared? 
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What kind of evidence has proved to be useful in rendering serious IHL violations? 
What are the challenges affecting the collection of relevant evidence? How 
should the presentation of evidence, including collecting and stabilising wit-
ness testimony in order to be used in different processes be optimised? For 
example, why subject a victim of rape to different testimonies in different 
cases in different places on different dates? Is it necessary and permissible to 
traumatise victims on behalf of justice and reconciliation? 
What are the most effective means of dealing with the external factors that influ-
ence the investigation and prosecution of suspected IHL violations?
CONCLUSION 
The Prosecutor in international criminal justice is an organ that is part of the 
International Criminal Court. To some extent, duties and power nominally 
equate to those at a national level; however, such powers and tasks differ 
substantially and methodologically in the framework of international criminal 
justice. Experience required nationally does help, but is clearly not enough 
for an efficient and effective performance of duties at an international level. 
A special requirement is having a good understanding of the dynamics of mas-
sive criminal violations and, consequently, approaches to investigation, pros-
ecution and some specifics of international criminal proceedings. 
The challenges posed in the investigation and prosecution of large-scale crimes or 
massive criminal violations committed years ago in a foreign sovereign 
country are unique. Thus, it is both remarkable and surprising in many ways 
that tools of investigation available to the Prosecutor have produced results 
that one can see and quantify. It is important to remember that these legal 
tools were developed in an environment with contributions from common 
law and civil law systems, and were always geared towards answering the 
essential question of how to execute a fair and expeditious trial. Although 
challenges remain, the work of the Prosecutor in international criminal 
justice is a considerable achievement in the fight against impunity for serious 
violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
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Although not always widely known, the existence of “opinion tribunals” has been a 
reality for the past decades. As a rule, they act in the international arena. 
Even when dealing with internal issues of a particular country, they address 
global issues and the echoes of their deliberations extend beyond national 
borders. The purpose of this paper is to critically reflect on the nature and 
role of opinion tribunals, particularly the Permanent People’s Tribunal, cre-
ated in Bologna in 1979. This reflection is part of a research project about 
international jurisdiction conducted by OBSERVARE, the international rela-
tions research unit of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa1.
The term “opinion tribunal” encompasses two concepts: the idea of “tribunal” is 
immediately associated with the enforcement of justice based on a legal 
norm; the concept of “opinion” refers to the somehow diffuse idea of public 
opinion, in which collective feelings, widely shared trends of ideas and beliefs 
insistently emphasized in public manifest themselves. There is a peculiar dia-
lectic between law and public opinion – in our case, between national and 
1  When preparing this text I received valuable indications and suggestions from Gianni Tognoni (Secretary General  
of the PPT) and Piero Basso, former comrades in mobilizing causes, as well as from Simona Fraudatario (of the Lelio 
Basso International Foundation). My colleagues Mario Losano, of the University of Eastern Piedmont, and Miguel  
Santos Neves, of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, enriched the original text with important comments  
and suggestions and other colleagues, jurists Patrícia Galvão Teles, Constança Urbano de Sousa, Mateus Kowalski  
and Pedro Trovão do Rosário, helped overcoming my limitations in this field. Brígida Brito offered meticulous  
support in all methodological aspects. To all I give special thanks.
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international law and international public opinion. Due to their imperative 
nature and also to their gaps, laws enforced by the courts impact their influ-
ence on public opinion, projecting their values on them, disseminating rules 
of conduct and promoting consensus around commonly accepted principles, 
sometimes leaving issues unresolved; conversely, the sensitivity of public 
opinion displays interfere in the formulation of laws, require their enforce-
ment or refute their failure. As a French sociologist of international relations 
defined wisely: Public opinion and international law should not be confused and 
gain nothing if they were to be confused. It is the inevitable and necessary tension 
between them that may lead to a bit more fairness in the world. If lawyers were to be 
freed of the pressure of public opinion, they would risk becoming strictly technicians of 
the established order. If opinion was to be left to itself, it would risk wandering end-
lessly in search of its projects: only law can help it realize its ideal by providing it with 
the staff and the institutions of a new world. Accordingly, it is in the interest of the 
community of human beings that the dialogue between international law and public 
opinion never ceases. (Merle, 1985,p 97).
Having accepted this viewpoint, prior clarification is still required: one should not 
perceive “opinion tribunal” as a trial carried out by public opinion. The concept 
of public opinion is too volatile to support the consistency of a founded, dis-
passionate and weighted judgement. Justice cannot be at the mercy of the 
emotions of current opinion or of the vicissitudes of published views. Legal 
procedures, in their rigour and technical complexity, in their connection to 
the current legislation, in their respect for the guarantees of accused persons, 
are not comparable to floating perceptions and preferences, however wide-
spread they may be.  Still, that does not prevent, quite the opposite, consensus 
around certain principles from being gathered, so as to anticipate norms that 
have not yet been legislated which may later be legally enforced, or to protest 
against the insufficient implementation of international laws, or to fill legal 
loopholes or institutional omissions responsible for the impunity of criminals. 
OPINION MOVEMENTS AND COURT RULINGS 
The history of the twentieth century is dotted with examples of opinion movements 
that acted as critical conscience regarding controversial acts in the enforce-
ment of justice. Sometimes, their impact was limited to restricted circles of 
informed elites. In other cases, they had a long echo in public opinion. It is 
worth remembering some emblematic cases that were symbolic moments in 
the dialectic between law enforcement and international public opinion. 
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At the end of the nineteenth century, the famous Dreyfus Affair shook public 
French and international opinion, with the particularity of disclosing per-
verse anti-Semitism reactions and triggering vehement protests that later 
led to justice being made.   Alfred Dreyfus, an officer of Jewish origin, held 
posts of responsibility in the French army and in 1895 was accused of spying 
in favour of Germany, when the resentments of the Franco-Prussian war 
were still felt. After having been dispossessed of his post and deported to a 
distant island, Dreyfus always claimed his innocence and his case raised a 
wave of indignation that led to his credibility being restored.  
A few decades later, the United States were shaken by a tremendous miscarriage of 
justice that led to the death sentence of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo 
Vanzetti. These two Italian immigrants, anarchists, carriers of illegal weap-
ons, were suspected of murder and robbery,  arrested in 1920 and convicted 
in court for murder, despite the absence of evidence and the massive appeal 
against their conviction: solidarity committees were created, large demon-
strations were held in several countries and eminent international figures 
claimed for their release. All was in vain and Saco and Vanzetti were electro-
cuted seven years later. It was not until 1973 that the truth was officially 
restored and the memory of the two anarchists posthumously rehabilitated.
Meanwhile, the rise of National Socialism in Germany had a dramatic episode that 
marked both Hitler’s escalating seizure of power and the anti-Communism 
hatred of his regime: the fire at the Reichstag – the palace of the Berlin 
Parliament – in February 1933. The Nazi investigation identified a suspect, 
a young left wing Dutch who ended up sentenced to death, and the blame 
was attributed to the Communists, leading to the arrest of many thousands 
of people who resisted Nazism. However, in September of the same year, the 
“ Legal Commission of Enquiry into the Burning of the Reichstag” was set 
up in London and organized a counter-case that concluded that the Nazi 
leaders were likely to be guilty2.
Between 1936 and 1938, the Moscow Trials triggered major international reper-
cussions. On the orders of Stalin, a massive purge was carried out that 
physically killed most of the Soviet elite. Following forged complaints or 
“confessions” of convenience, the courts pronounced ruthless sentences 
against the ruling class, especially against Trotsky and his followers. The 
European Left reacted with ambiguity to the events, despite the severe 
criticism of people like the surrealist poet André Breton and the Marxist 
2 For a detailed analysis of this case see Klinghoffer, A.J. and Klinghoffer, J.A. 2002,pp 11-50.
208
Opinion tribunals and the Permanent People’s Tribunal
Victor Serge; an international investigation commission was created in the 
United States, chaired by the prestigious philosopher of morals John Dewey, 
who concluded that Trotsky was innocent, despite the fact that the majority 
of the members of the commission distanced from his ideas3. 
Another trial, also in the United States, that caused intense international outcry 
was the one involving the Rosenberg couple after the end of World War II. 
They were accused of spying on the nuclear program in favour of the USSR, 
which would have allowed the Soviet Union to accelerate the production of 
the atomic bomb.  Trialled in 1951 and executed in 1953, Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg were Jewish and communism sympathizers and even today there 
is controversy about their guilt, especially that of his wife Ethel. Numerous 
prominent world figures, such as Einstein, Pius XII, Sartre, and Brecht pro-
tested against the sentence, denouncing primary anti-communism and the 
latent anti-Semitism, asking for clemency for a couple that was convicted 
without conclusive evidence.
In their symbolic strength, all the above mentioned cases illustrate the tension 
between the enforcement of legal norms and international public opinion, 
as well as between formal bodies that have judicial authority and informal 
bodies that contest them. Like a kind of dialogue or confrontation between 
powers and counter-powers, a dialectical opposition and complementarity 
between legal judgments and currents of opinion emerges. The enforcement 
of justice, fallible as it is, vulnerable to all sorts of abuses, is not limited to 
the jurisdiction of the courts and extends itself to the social capacity of pro-
test, which does not mean that the latter has any guarantee of being right or 
any prerogative of “moral superiority.” By act or omission, whether due to 
deficit of interpretation or due to a legal void, the law, and especially inter-
national law, does not always respond to the demands of complex human 
situations. Hence this apparent historical necessity of creating correction, 
rehabilitation and contesting moments as an antidote to the potential per-
version of justice caused by its own agents.
Perhaps it is this very same need to do justice outside the conventional structures 
that leads to the creation of special bodies when regular courts do not seem 
to be the most appropriate places to judge collective or individual behaviour, 
as is the case of truth and reconciliation commissions. There are known ini-
tiatives in this area, such post-apartheid South Africa or Latin American soci-
eties after the military dictatorships. Seeking to avoid the settling accounts 
3 For more detailed information, see also Klinghoffer, A.J. and Klinghoffer, J.A. 2002, pp 51-101.
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that are likely to reopen wounds of the past, but also taking as inadmissible 
the impunity of those responsible for the crimes committed, such commis-
sions have had the role of preserving the memory of the facts and of deter-
mining the responsibility of political actors, with the aim of obtaining recog-
nition, disclosure, forgiveness and reconciliation, and not so much punish-
ment. In these cases, the wisdom of the transition phase with a view to con-
solidating democracy prevails, more than the mechanical enforcement of 
criminal laws.
There was a similar process in Rwanda as a therapy against the memory of the 
tragic genocide of the Tutsis perpetrated by Hutu militias between April and 
June 1994, which killed over 800,000 Rwandans and forced nearly two mil-
lion people to flee. A special international tribunal was set up to indict those 
responsible for the crimes, but a large number of prisoners, over 100,000, 
remained in the country, for which reason the official courts were unable to 
prosecute all cases. The local government encouraged resorting to the tradi-
tional conflict resolution institution – called Gacaca – as a way to mobilize 
the population for the fulfilment of justice, with emphasis on the role of the 
elders and the function of social integration, according to the best African 
traditions.
The aforementioned examples attest the variety of ways that have been used to find 
solutions to challenge or complement the role of established judicial sys-
tems, either through opinion movements, or international commissions of 
inquiry, truth and reconciliation commissions, or via customary practices, in 
the aforesaid tension between law and public opinion. Ultimately, this action 
can even be conducted by individuals, as shown in the special case of the 
blog of the great American jurist Richard Falk, one of the most influential 
names in the field of international law4. It is a blog he created on the day he 
turned 80 and is an impressive repository of his independent and critical 
thinking on legal and political issues, with a title that is, in itself, a pro-
gramme: Global Justice in the 21st Century.
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONS AND OPINION TRIBUNALS 
For centuries, international law has been regulated by treaties agreed between 
two or more states, which, despite the legal nature of the established rela-
4 See Falk, Richard (2014).Homepage.Acessed on Dezembro 29,2014 em http://richardfalk.wordpress.com/
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tionship, were only morally obliged to abide by their provisions, without 
the strict existence of an international jurisdiction with instruments to 
ensure compliance therewith, and, if necessary, by enforcement action. 
However, back in 1899, a Permanent Court of Arbitration was created fol-
lowing an international Hague Conference, and although there was already 
a Permanent Court of International Justice established under the Covenant 
of the League of Nations, it was only in 1946 that the International Court 
of Justice, based in The Hague, started functioning as part of the multilat-
eral framework of United Nations. Its role was clearly defined: to resolve 
conflicts between states. The European Court of Human Rights, based in 
Strasbourg, created in 1959 by the Council of Europe, had a different pur-
pose. Much later, in 2002, after its statutes were adopted in Rome, the 
International Criminal Court was created, coincidentally also based in the 
capital of the Netherlands, different from the ICJ due to its capacity to 
judge individuals accused of committing aggression, genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.
Meanwhile, at the initiative of the United Nations Security Council, three other 
tribunals were created to trial one-off concrete situations: the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, established in May 1993, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, set up in November 1994, and 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone, created in 20005, intended to judge the 
crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in these coun-
tries. Somehow, they are actual replicas of the special tribunals set up imme-
diately after the 1939-45 war to try crimes perpetrated by the Germans and 
the Japanese, the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, 
respectively. The latter, of course, had very particular characteristics, as they 
were military courts organized by the victors of the war; they created juris-
prudence as the decisions were based on norms that had not been previ-
ously legislated, thus calling into question the principle of non-retroactivity 
of criminal law; however, they had the merit of judging the individual 
responsibilities of political leaders – no longer sheltered behind the regime 
under which they were fulfilling orders – and of condemning crimes not 
previously explained, such as crime against peace, war crime, the crime of 
genocide and crime against humanity.
5  On this truly special case, since it was a hybrid national and International tribunal, see Paula, Thais and Mont’Alverne, 
Tarin “A evolução do direito internacional penal e o Tribunal Especial para Serra Leoa: análise da natureza jurídica e 
considerações sobre sua jurisprudência”, Nomos: Revista do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da UFC, Available at 
http://mdf.secrel.com.br/dmdocuments/THAISeTARIN.pdf, accessed on 30/1/2015.
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Thus, we have two kinds of international courts: the emergency courts, with ad 
hoc functions and powers limited to specific situations (Nuremberg, Tokyo, 
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone ...) and the regular or permanent 
courts – two in The Hague, the ICJ and the ICC, and the European Court of 
Human Rights – which are stable elements of the international legal archi-
tecture.
Opinion tribunals appeared in a totally different situation. One can doubt the rel-
evance of this designation, as we will see later. In any case, numerous initia-
tives of citizens without any official mandate have taken the form of judicial 
processes to enunciate pronouncements on issues when fundamental human 
rights are at stake. Thus, they are a kind of informal international jurisdic-
tion arising from the civil society and not from established powers, devoid 
of coercive force but aspiring to sensitize international opinion and public 
authorities thanks to the moral value of their sentences, which are in fact 
based on current international law.
The most representative of these opinion tribunals is perhaps the Permanent 
Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT), which has been active since 1979 and is the central 
object of this study. Its creation, however, lies in a context that should be 
recalled. 
The PPT originated in a previous truly “founding” experience, the international 
tribunal against war crimes committed in Vietnam, known simply as the 
Russell Tribunal6, which was the source of inspiration for all subsequent 
similar actions. The initiative was taken by Lord Bertrand Russell, philoso-
pher, mathematician and Nobel Prize winner for Literature in 1950, who 
also stood out as an activist for the cause of peace and disarmament. He was 
joined by an extremely prestigious group of persons, including another big 
name in twentieth-century thought, Jean-Paul Sartre, at first reluctantly, 
then convinced by Simone de Beauvoir, accepting to chair the court sessions 
in London in 1966. The work was resumed in Stockholm (1967) and finally 
in Roskilde, Denmark, in the same year. It was due to be held in Paris, but 
General De Gaulle, then president of France, did not consent, although he 
opposed the US policy towards Vietnam. In a letter to Sartre he explained 
that his decision in no way restricted freedom of expression, but argued that 
“I shall not teach you that any justice, in principle and in its implementation, 
6 Very detailed analysis in Klinghoffer, A.J. and Klinghoffer, J.A. 2002: 103-162. 
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belongs exclusively to the State”7This is an issue of primary importance that 
shall be further addressed. In his response, Sartre defined the foundation of 
the PPT’s legitimacy: Why have we appointed ourselves? It was precisely because no 
one else did. Only governments or the peoples could have done it. As for governments, 
they want to retain the possibility to commit crimes without running the risk of being 
judged; therefore, they would create an international body empowered to do so. With 
regard to the peoples, except in case of revolution, they do not assign courts, for which 
reason they could not appoint us8.
Somehow, this first Russell Tribunal recovered the previous one constituted by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal (Jouve, 1981,pp 670-671; Merle, 1985,pp 56-59), 
dealing with a typology of crimes that included crimes against peace, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide9, with the key 
difference that it was a tribunal that was aware that it did not have the capac-
ity for physical coercion or to enact effective sanctions.
After Bertrand Russell died, a second Russell Tribunal with identical structure 
was summoned by Italian Senator Lelio Basso, who had integrated the jury 
of the first one and distinguished himself due to his intervention. Three 
sessions were held in Rome and Brussels between 1973 and 1976, dedi-
cated to denouncing and condemning the crimes conducted by various 
Latin American military dictatorships, namely Brazil and Chile but also 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Argentina and other Central American countries, with 
significant impact on the public opinion of this sub-continent10. The name 
of Lelio Basso reappeared later, definitely connected to the Permanent 
Peoples’ Tribunal: it is possible that the contact he maintained with the 
atrocities of Latin American dictatorships gave him intuition: there are 
governments that are at war against their own people, and these must be 
given voice, in addition to the states that are supposed to represent them.
7  General De Gaulle’s letter, dated 19 April 1967, is available online at http://bernat.blog.lemonde.fr/2008/06/10/
le-tribunal-russell-et-le-proces-du-11-septembre/ Accessed on 29/12/2014.
8  Ibid. There is a lot of information about the Russell Tribunal, including the complete list of members, technical 
contributions and individual testimonies available at http://911review.org/Wiki/BertrandRussellTribunal.shtml, 
accessed on 29/12/2014. The English version of Sartre’s inaugural speech can be read in http://thecry.com/
existentialism/sartre/crimes.html, accessed on the same date.
9  The term “genocide” is a neologism first used by the Polish Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin to describe the systematic 
Nazi persecution of Jews: information at http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007043, accessed 
on 29/12/2014.
10  The most detailed study on the Russell Tribunal II is available online in a PDF in academia.edu by Julien Louvrier: 
http://www.academia.edu/166082/Le_Tribunal_Russell_II_pour_l_Amérique_latine_1973-1976_Mobiliser_les_
intellectuels_pour_sensibiliser_l_opinion_publique_internationale, accessed on 29/12/2014.
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There are also brief allusions to a Russell Tribunal III which met in Frankfurt in 
1978 on a seemingly local theme – professional bans in West Germany – and 
a Russell Court IV based in Rotterdam in 1980 to denounce the “ethnocide 
“of the Amerindian peoples (Jouve, 1981,p 671).
In this context of the Russell Tribunal sessions, a remarkable initiative of similar 
contours took place in Portugal in 1977-78: the Humberto Delgado Civic 
Court (a general who opposed the Salazar regime, murdered by the PIDE 
– Salazar’s political police), created to trial the dictatorship crimes in 
Portugal. It was a brief but intense experience motivated by the lack of 
prosecution of those responsible for the dictatorial regime, in particular the 
political police. It brought together prestigious democratic individuals11 and 
made a final decision entitled “Judging the PIDE, condemning fascism”.
Shortly after, in 1982, the Russell Tribunal on Congo met in Rotterdam to judge 
the crimes committed during the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko12, 
President of Zaire. Seemingly, the name “Russell Tribunal” was taken as a 
“brand” used in different circumstances.
Meanwhile, the IPT – Indian Independent People’s Tribunal – also called Indian 
People’s Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights13, was created in 1993, 
in the tradition of the grassroots movements crossing the Indian society, 
focusing on human rights issues and particularly on environmental justice.
In 2000, an Opinion Tribunal was held in Tokyo (minshû hôtei in Japanese, meaning 
people’s court) on the “comfort women”14 used in military brothels: an ini-
tiative of the Violence against Women in War Network, the aim was to judge 
responsibilities relating to kidnapping and mass deportation of women for 
sexual favours made to Japanese soldiers in the territories occupied by the 
Japanese expansionism in the years 1930-40. This issue was well-known but 
had always been silenced, despite having affected women from Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, East Timor, China, and Vietnam.
11  See the analysis available at http://www.esquerda.net/artigo/tribunal-c%C3%ADvico-humberto-delgado-uma-
experi%C3%AAncia-breve-1977-1978/28229, accessed on 28/12/2014. The full sentence can be found at http://
ephemerajpp.com/2014/01/11/tribunal-civico-humberto-delgado/, accessed on 29/12/2014.
12  Check the brief description at http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tribunal_Russell_sur_le_Congo, accessed on 
29/12/2014.
13 The website is http://www.iptindia.org, accessed on 29/12/2014.
14  See Rumiko Nishino, «Le tribunal d’opinion de Tôkyô pour les « femmes de réconfort » », Droit et cultures [online], 
58 | 2009-2, made available on 1/10/2009, accessed on 29 /12/2014. URL: http://droitcultures.revues.org/2079.
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There are also references to the meeting held in Berlin in 2001 of the Court of 
Human Rights in Psychiatry15, also referred to as the Russell Tribunal, 
which had the particularity of having concluded its work with a double ver-
dict: a majority one that considered the existence of serious abuse of human 
rights in psychiatric practice, and a minority one that just alerted for pos-
sible deviations in the practice.
From the years 1998-2000 to the present, the Latin American Water Tribunal, also 
linked to the so-called Central American Water Tribunal, has been very 
active conducting activities on contamination and water resources issues in 
a number of countries in the region. There were  sessions in Rotterdam in 
1983 about the contamination of the river basin of the Rhine, as well as 
those held in 1992 in Amsterdam on ecological crimes in several continents, 
and also to the National Water Tribunal in Florianopolis, Brazil, in 1993, on 
the mining contamination and pesticide products16. Defending the democ-
ratization of environmental justice, these Latin American documents use the 
term “ethical court” (noted for its nature) and the category of “ecocide” (to 
characterize environmental crimes).
The Western military intervention in Iraq was one of the events that gave rise to 
several initiatives such as opinion tribunals. A World Tribunal on Iraq17  was 
created in 2003 in Brussels, also called the Brussels Tribunal or BRussells 
Tribunal (playing with the phonetic proximity of Brussels to Russell), con-
firming that the Russell Tribunal remains the key reference. It held sessions 
in Brussels and in Istanbul in 2004 and 2005 and examined the Project for a 
New American Century, of the American neo-conservatives and the result-
ing aggression against Iraq. A session took place in Lisbon in 2005, with the 
collaboration of several Portuguese lawyers18. Later the World Tribunal on 
Iraq became a permanent forum, evolving into an international network of 
“academics, intellectuals and activists.”
Since 2007 a commission has been active in Malaysia to investigate war crimes. It 
is called Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission (KLWCT), also known as 
Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Tribunal and is an alternative to the International 
15  See Ian Parker, “Russell Tribunal on Human Rights in Psychiatry & “Geist Gegen Genes”, PINS (Psychology in society), 2001, 
27, 120-122 30 June-2 July 2001, Berlin, available at http://www.pins.org.za/pins27/pins27_article12_Parker.pdf, 
accessed on 29/12/2014. See also http://www.freedom-of-thought.de/rt/accusation.htm, accessed on the same day.
16  See http://tragua.com, accessed on 29/12/2014, as well as http://www2.inecc.gob.mx/publicaciones/libros/363/
cap18.html, accessed on the same day. 
17 See its website http://www.brusselstribunal.org, accessed on 30/12/2014.
18 Documentation available at http://tribunaliraque.info/pagina/ap_tmi/o_que_e.html, accessed on 30/12/2014.
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Criminal Court, deemed to be ineffective19. It is chaired by the former 
prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad and in 2011 it condemned 
the intervention in Iraq, personally blaming President Bush and Prime 
Minister Blair for it. In 2013, it accused the Israeli state for the genocide of 
the Palestinian people. 
Again in Brussels, the opinion tribunal on the detention of foreign children in 
closed centres was held in 200820. At the initiative of the NGOs Coordinator 
for Children’s Rights, the verdict symbolically condemned the Belgian State 
for infringing the relevant international conventions.
Despite the distance in time with respect to the events, in 2009 the opinion tribu-
nal met in Paris on the use of “Herbicide Orange”21 (or “Agent Orange”), the 
name of a powerful chemical defoliant, comprising a mixture of two strong 
herbicides used by the US in the Vietnam War, whose impacts are still being 
felt. As a chemical weapon of devastating effects, this defoliant is prohibited 
by international conventions. The tribunal condemned not only the US gov-
ernment, but also the companies producing the product, such as Monsanto 
Corporation and Dow Chemical.
One of the most representative opinion tribunals is perhaps the Russell Tribunal on 
Palestine22, which held sessions from 2010 to 2013 in Barcelona, London, 
Cape Town, and New York and, more recently, an extraordinary session 
(September, 2014) in Brussels on violations of international law by Israel in 
Gaza. As a rule, however, the aim is not so much to condemn Israel (Israel’s 
violations of international law are all too familiar), but rather to show the 
responsibilities of the entities that objectively support Israel in its violations 
of international law. It described the situation in Israel as similar to the South 
African apartheid regime and introduced the category of “sociocide” to char-
acterize the attack on Palestinian identity.
In addition, an “informal” tribunal was held in Venice in September 2014 on the 
situation in the Ukraine23. Not entirely explicit and even dubious in nature, 
it also claimed to follow the Bertrand Russell tradition. It ended up con-
demning US President Obama and the Ukrainian President Poroshenko, 
19 See the respective website in http://criminalisewar.org, accessed on 30/12/2014.
20 Reference in http://www.lacode.be/tribunal-d-opinion-sur-la.html, accessed on 29/12/2014.
21  About the tribunal see http://www.mondialisation.ca/agent-orange-le-tribunal-international-d-opinion-de-paris-
condamne-les-tats-unis-et-les-firmes-tasuniennes/13667?print=1, accessed on 29/12/2014. Additional information at 
http://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/agent-orange, accessed on the same day.
22 Plenty of information available at http://www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/, accessed on 29/12/2014.
23 News in http://rt.com/news/187584-russell-tribunal-obama-ukraine/ accessed on 29/12/2014.
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NATO and the European Commission, charging them with war crimes 
committed in the East of the country.
Besides these initiatives, several appeals to the formation of opinion tribunals 
according to the Russell model on a range of issues have been reported. For 
example, in Paris, in 2010, there was an appeal for a world opinion tribunal 
on climate and biodiversity24, based on the lack of success of major interna-
tional conferences on the subject. The following year, a petition whose sig-
natories called for an opinion tribunal to judge nuclear crimes25 was started, 
prioritizing, in this case, nuclear disasters affecting civilians, as in the 
Chernobyl and Fukushima tragedies.
Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Brussels, Rome, Paris, Florianopolis, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, 
Lisbon, Venice, Cape Town, New York, London, Stockholm, Roskilde, Frankfurt, 
Berlin, Istanbul, New Delhi, San Jose in Costa Rica, The Hague – cities in three 
continents expressing the cultural and geographical dispersion of events that 
the organizers designate in many ways as courts, opinion tribunals, citizens’ 
tribunals, international courts, ethical courts, conscience tribunals26.... 
However, in addition to their geographic spread and variety of designations, 
they have some common features: they are civil society initiatives; they  are 
participatory processes involving intellectuals and activists; they are technically 
grounded on current norms of the community of nations; they seek to com-
pensate for shortcomings of international law or its implementation; they 
denounce and condemn the most serious crimes against human beings and 
against peoples; generally they  have a clear anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist 
ideological standpoint; they are carriers of causes of emancipatory intent; they 
use analogies with legal procedures to make their conclusions; they aim to raise 
public awareness and through it call the attention of powers that be.
24  News available at  http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2010/10/27/pour-un-tribunal-mondial-d-opinion-pour-le-
climat-et-la-biodiversite_1431693_3232.html, accessed on 30/12/2014.
25 As can be seen in http://www.rene-balme.org/24h00/spip.php?article1358, accessed on 30/12/2014.
26  The designated “peoples’ tribunals are very different from these, promoting summary sentences and sometimes 
summary executions, leading to a true perversion of justice, such as those conducted by the Red Brigades in Italy  
in the sentencing of Aldo Moro, or that have been promoted even by governments in periods of instability, as happened 
in Angola (see http://www.casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=04308.001.017, accessed on 27/1/2015).
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THE PERMANENT PEOPLE’S TRIBUNAL (1979-2014)
In the above context, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal (PPT) has special impor-
tance. Its main aspects include: Lelio Basso, senator of the Italian inde-
pendent left, of unusual political stance, had been part of the Russell 
Tribunal I and was the soul of Russell Tribunal II. He died in 1978, leaving 
incomplete a project involving three institutions: the Lelio Basso 
Foundation, the International League for the Rights and Liberation of 
Peoples and the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal. The Foundation is based in 
Rome and still exists today; the League, established in 1976, was an 
extended social movement of meritorious action but in the last years of 
the twentieth century its members dispersed to various causes; as for the 
Tribunal – already after Basso’s death – it was only formed in 1979 in the 
city of Bologna. Its first president was François Rigaux, an eminent 
Belgian jurist and a professor at the Catholic University of Leuven27. The 
general secretary was Gianni Tognoni, a physician in Milan professionally 
connected to health policies. 
This set of institutions used a kind of “magna carta” as a reference: the Universal 
Declaration of People’s Rights28, proclaimed by Lelio Basso in Algiers on 4 
July 1976, a symbolic day marking the 200 years of the independence of the 
United States. The Algiers Declaration, a document anchored in values that 
were emerging at the time, was characterized by some fundamental traits: 
it considered people as collective subjects of rights, in line with the UN’s 
own approaches, thereby complementing the current vision about human 
rights; it addressed a new kind of recently recognized rights, so-called “third 
generation”  rights (in addition to the civic-political, economic and social 
rights), such as the right of peoples to existence, cultural identity, political 
and economic self-determination, the right to scientific progress as the com-
mon heritage of humanity, the right to environmental protection and access 
to common resources of the planet, and the rights of minorities. Moreover, 
the spirit of the Declaration was fully in line with the claim for a “new inter-
national political and economic order,” which was then so insistently present 
in the political discourse of the leaders of the Third World and European left, 
and assumed by multilateral institutions.
27  François Rigaux died in December 2013; he had already been succeeded as Chairman of the PPT by Salvatore Senese 
and later by Franco Ippolito, Italian jurists.
28 Full text available at http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/?page_id=214, accessed on 30/12/2014.
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After describing briefly the circumstantial framework and ideological milieu that 
led to the creation of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal – PPT -, its charac-
teristics are described below. 
First of all, it is a permanent tribunal. The majority of other similar experiences 
were initiatives of opinion tribunals aimed at specific issues and particular 
cases, geographically defined and circumscribed in nature. Instead, the PPT 
has existed for 35 years (1979-2014) and deals with a large number of situ-
ations, since it is open to the variety of processes that come its way. Hence 
the relevance of being considered “permanent”, as it operates in the long run 
and is constantly ready to cater for those suffering from violations of funda-
mental rights.
Secondly, it is an international tribunal, for many reasons: a) its composition 
(the jury members come from 29 different countries); b) the topics it covers 
include many sensitive issues of world politics and the cases it addresses- 
even when they are local – have an impact across borders; c) its constant 
references to international law and human rights and peoples, bearers of 
universal values; d) it has the ambition to influence international public 
opinion, global decision centres and the initiatives of the community of 
nations.
Third, it is a tribunal of the peoples (regardless of the known ambiguity of the 
term “peoples”). Lelio Basso refused the possible designation of “citizens’ 
tribunal” for its alleged “bourgeois” connotations, preferring “peoples’ tribu-
nal” (Klinghoffer, AJ and Klinghoffer, JA 2002: 164). The  subject of rights 
that the PPT privileges is the collective subject, a particular people, a par-
ticular human community, a particular society as a whole. It is true that 
human rights are at the forefront of its agenda but, according to its status, 
“the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to rule on particular cases of single indi-
viduals, except where there is a relationship with the violation of the right 
of peoples”29 . This is in line with the Algiers Declaration (Universal 
Declaration of Peoples’ Rights) and the designation of the International 
League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples. In a context where states 
are conventionally considered to be the only subjects of international law, 
the PPT breaks away from this view and affirms the prerogative of the peo-
ple being themselves subjects of international law, so that they can act as 
interlocutors of international jurisdictions. 
29  Article 1 of the PPT Statutes, available at http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/?page_id=213, accessed on 
2/1/2015.
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Fourth, the PPT has a similar function to that of a tribunal. It is guided by  the 
“Nuremberg principles30”, its statute and practice set out a series of proce-
dures inspired in court cases: when a “complaint” is received, it can be filed 
(in case of inconsistency) or accepted for the inquiry to be open; the situa-
tions are examined in-depth in  a widely participatory process aiming to 
identify violations of international law, listing witnesses, hearing experts, and 
preparing reports; public sessions are chaired by a jury; the defendants are 
invited to attend and present their version of the facts (which rarely happens); 
the jury meets in closed sessions and prepares a final judgment for which 
there is no appeal; the judgment is made public and sent “to the United 
Nations, relevant international bodies, governments, and the media.” The 
entire basis for the decision is grounded strictly on existing international law 
and the formalism of the public sessions reproduces the model of a court 
hearing.  This analogy with the judicial process will be discussed later. 
In fifth place, the jury’s composition is also statutorily regulated, requiring the 
presence of seven members for a valid sentence. The current members31 
co-opted by the central structure are altogether 71 from 29 different coun-
tries and are called on a case by case basis for the PPT sessions. Over its 35 
years of activity, numerous other people formed this body of judges, many 
of them world-renowned. Most of the members are lawyers, academics, 
scientists, writers, established artists, leaders and former leaders, members 
with experience of international organizations, some Nobel laureates, and 
prominent figures of social movements. 
Finally, in sixth place, comes the financing of the PPT activities. The everyday 
functions of the secretariat have the logistical and operational support of the 
Lelio Basso International Foundation, while the costs of conducting public 
sessions are supported by public and private sponsors contacted for this 
purpose by the Tribunal’s secretariat and the entities interested in presenting 
the process.
THE SENTENCES OF THE PPT
With over forty sessions in very different cities in various continents, the cases 
proposed to the Tribunal were examined and the ensuing rulings are an 
30 Ibid. The following points always refer to the Statute.
31 The current list can be read in http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/?page_id=215, accessed on 3/1/2015.
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important collection of factual, legal and political documentation32. Given 
that it is impossible to analyse the contents of each of the sentences pro-
nounced by the PPT, a systematization of the topics is proposed here 33.
The first area has to do with minor aspects of unresolved decolonization 
processes, as in the cases of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony 
annexed by Morocco, Eritrea, a former Italian colony annexed by Ethiopia, 
and East Timor, a former Portuguese colony annexed by Indonesia, in ses-
sions that took place in Brussels (1979), Milan (1980) and Lisbon (1981), 
respectively. They were typical situations which concerned the principle of 
self-determination, in accordance with the rules of the international com-
munity, and processes were introduced by liberation movements recognized 
as such: the Polisario Front, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Eritrea 
and FRETILIN. The situation in Puerto Rico was also addressed (Barcelona, 
1989).
Another series of sentences were linked to violations of minority rights, a 
theme already referenced in the Algiers Declaration and the PPT statutes. 
The regime in the Philippines and the violation of the rights of the Bangsa-
Moro people was tried (Antwerp, 1980); Another sentence condemned the 
historical genocide of the Armenians (Paris, 1984); the rights of indigenous 
communities in the Brazilian Amazon were addressed in a session (Paris, 
1990); the violations of the Tibetan people’s rights were equally judged 
(Strasbourg, 1992); the rights of the Sri Lankan Tamil people, later silenced 
by military action, were the subject of two sessions (Dublin, 2010, and 
Bremen ,2013). 
The PPT also took on cases concerning regimes oppressing their own people, 
whether in the context of military dictatorships, or as part of systematic 
denial of the rule of law. This was the case of the session that condemned the 
military junta in Argentina (Geneva, 1980); shortly after the repressive El 
Salvador regime was judged (Mexico City, 1981); the following year the 
regime of Zaire’s President Mobutu was sentenced (Rotterdam, 1982); this 
was followed shortly after by the trial of authorities in Guatemala (Madrid, 
1983); the Philippine regime, which had already been tried in the session 
concerning the Bangsa-Moro people, was sentenced again (The Hague, 
2007). 
32  The sentences for the years 1979-1998 are compiled into a book in their Italian version in Tognoni, Gianni (org) (1998). 
To see the rest check http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/?cat=15, accessed on 3/1/2015.
33  Klinghoffer, A.J. & Klinghoffer, J.A. 2002, pp 165-181 proposed a systematization that is different from the one shown here. 
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Some of the Tribunals’  sessions focused particularly on human rights viola-
tions in different societies, starting with Latin America (Bogota, 1991), 
specifically against “impunity for crimes against humanity”; restrictions on 
the right to asylum in Europe were also judged (Berlin, 1994); the special 
case of violation of the rights of children and minors in the world was 
addressed in a process that unfolded in three cities (Trento, Macerata, 
Naples, 1995); the same theme on the rights of children and adolescents in 
the Brazilian society was judged (São Paulo, 1999); a session (Paris, 2004) 
was devoted to human rights violations in Algeria in the 1992-2004 period. 
On several occasions the PPT spoke out about situations of armed conflict 
where the fundamental rights of people were violated. First, the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan was described as “aggression” that went against 
the rules of the international community and the USSR was thus condemned 
as a country-aggressor (discussed in two sessions: Stockholm, 1981 and 
Paris, 1982); Likewise, crimes against humanity committed in the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia were treated in two sessions (Bern, 1995 and 
Barcelona, in the same year); earlier, there had been a statement condemn-
ing the US military aggression against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua 
(Brussels, 1984); a special historical case can be included in this area: the 
conquest of America and the denial of the rights of the Amerindian peoples, 
analysed five hundred years after the arrival of Columbus to that continent 
(Padua and Venice, 1992); Finally, predicting the imminent aggression (“pre-
ventive war”) against Iraq in 2003, the PPT organized a session on “interna-
tional law and the new wars” (Rome, 2012).
A separate chapter in the PPT’s sentences concerns environmental crimes of 
extreme gravity representing large-scale violations of human rights to life, 
health and sustainable environment. This was the case of the chemical indus-
try accident of the Union Carbide company in Bhopal, India in 1984, result-
ing from a gas leak that killed thousands of people and had health conse-
quences on hundreds of thousands (sessions on industrial risks and human 
rights in Bophal, 1992 and in London, 1994); the same applied to the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, tried ten years later (Vienna, 1996).
More recently, the economic policies of multilateral organizations and the 
activities of multinational corporations that affect the rights of the 
people have figured prominently in the PPT’s agenda, thus addressing the 
root causes of structural violence affecting our societies. The macro-eco-
nomic policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were 
the subject of two important sessions (Berlin, 1988 and Madrid, 1994), with 
a harsh judgment of their practices; clothing manufacturing companies were 
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condemned for disrespect for workers’ rights, including for subcontracting 
companies in the poorest countries (Brussels, 1998); the oil company Elf-
Aquitaine was judged for criminal activities in Africa (Paris, 1999); in gen-
eral, the role of multinationals was discussed in a PPT session (Warwick, 
2000); the specific case of human rights violations by multinationals in 
Colombia was judged  over a long period of time(2006-2008); in turn, the 
practices of the European Union and multinationals in the whole of Latin 
America were scrutinized and condemned (Madrid, 2010) for violation of 
often forgotten rights, such as the right to land, the right to food sover-
eignty, the right to public health, the right to the environment and so on; 
multinational companies operating in the agro-chemical sector had their 
own specific judgment (Bangalore, 2011); Finally, a series of hearings in 
several Mexican cities culminated in a final session in Mexico City in 2014, 
on “free trade, violence, impunity and peoples’ rights in Mexico”.
Now that the characterization of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal and the sys-
tematization of its contents34 have been done, the essential issues raised by 
previous observations will be analysed and the questions regarding the 
legitimacy and functions of the PPT and their relationship with interna-
tional law will be addressed.
WHAT IS THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PPT?
Earlier we quoted de Gaulle’s phrase: “any justice in principle and in its implemen-
tation, belongs exclusively to the state”. The classical theory is very clear in 
this respect, in that it considers the enforcement of justice as a sovereign 
function, in the framework of rule of law being based on the famous division 
of powers, where precisely the legislative and the judicial powers are cor-
nerstones of the sovereign state, with any non-public authority being 
excluded from its remit. In this respect, the initiative of the opinion tribunal 
is summarily deprived of legitimacy, further aggravated, according to the 
critics, by the fact that it stages a simulation of justice without any mandate 
to do so, at the service of a political struggle that swings according to ideo-
34  The  PPT obviously was interested in other cases and causes which, in one way or another, came its way, but never 
made it to a session. The problem of the Kurds, widely considered to be a stateless nation, was considered but it was 
blocked due to circumstances that led to breaks in contact.  Similarly, the issue of the Palestinian people’s rights was 
repeatedly raised, despite the difficulties caused by divisions between Palestinian nationalists and, dramatically, by the 
murder of three of its high-level interlocutors. 
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logical motivations. The aforementioned sociologist Marcel Merle uses the 
same harsh criticism, denouncing the “mockery of justice for propaganda 
purposes” (Merle, 1985,p 85). The composition of the tribunal is “somewhat 
elitist, rather than democratic, composed of self-appointed committees (...) 
selected more for their ideological preferences than for their legal right-
eousness” (Klinghoffer, AJ and Klinghoffer, JA 2002,p 7). By politicizing the 
supposed enforcement of the law, the opinion tribunal undermines the very 
idea of  justice, because it renounces the principle of impartiality as a pre-
condition for the correctness of the judgement. In this sense, the “sentence” 
is inevitably damaged by the absence of exemption and the process is noth-
ing more than the assembling of parts leading to the desired conclusion. The 
“accused” is previously “condemned” and the audience of the “tribunal” is a 
mere theatrical procedure for propaganda purposes.
These harsh critical questions should be taken seriously for, due to their vehe-
mence, they question the practice of opinion tribunals. If taken literally and 
to their ultimate consequences, they would end up disallowing these initia-
tives, removing credibility and even respectability from them.
In contrast, it is possible to reflect about opinion tribunals and in particular the 
PPT taking into account their real configuration and reconsidering the 
sources of their legitimacy. In this sense, it can be argued that their nature is 
“quasi-judicial” and that their legitimacy is founded on imperatives of con-
science, referring to existing international law and involving the broad par-
ticipation of witnesses to establish the facts where flagrant violations of 
human rights and the rights of peoples occur. 
First of all, the “quasi-judicial” nature should be examined. This expression is used 
here by analogy with another term that recently entered the vocabulary of 
international relations studies: “paradiplomacy”. Traditionally, diplomatic 
action is also considered to be a sovereign function and, as such, the exclu-
sive competence of states. However, at present, an increasing number of 
entities other than central powers conduct external relations initiatives that 
are close to the concept of diplomacy, as in the case of interests and coop-
eration projection actions undertaken by cities, regions, companies, founda-
tions, NGOs, and various other associations ... All these activities have been 
described by some authors as “paradiplomacy”35
35  See, for instance, Santos Neves, M. (2010 Fall) “Paradiplomacy, knowledge regions and the consolidation  
of ‘soft power’” . JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations, 1, (1) , pp. 12-32.
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Similarly, the “quasi-judicial” nature can be attributed to events outside the sphere 
of public powers but which have a formality similar to that of official courts 
and follow procedures based on both national and international legal pro-
ceedings. As was abundantly stressed at the outset, numerous initiatives have 
used this “quasi-judicial” paradigm, ranging from international commissions 
of inquiry to opinion tribunals.
In the case of the PPT, the procedures were described above, justifying the analogy 
now invoked. The indictment, the sentence, the opening of the inquiry, the 
right to a full defence, the testimony of witnesses and expert reports, the 
reference to the laws in force, bear resemblance to court proceedings, giv-
ing symbolic and moral strength to verdicts. As it turned out, all this is hap-
pening on the understanding that the term ‘tribunal ‘ is merely analogical, 
almost metaphorical, especially as we know that the decision is devoid of 
coercive power. In a word, it lies in the sphere of the “quasi-judicial”.
The term “quasi-judicial” has the advantage of pointing implicitly to some ambiva-
lence in the concept of justice. On the one hand, justice is the enforcement 
of the rule of law and in this sense one says that the courts do justice. But 
justice is also an ethical and social value, an ambition of fairness in the rela-
tionships between humans, and, in that sense, justice is something program-
matic into the future. Opinion tribunals stand somehow on the border of 
these two concepts: on the one hand they are close to the legal procedure 
and codified law, on the other they try to echo the aspiration of justice that 
positively permeates societies.
This being its specific nature, the question of its legitimacy is left open. On this, one 
can say that the legitimacy of the PPT is based on the fundamental demo-
cratic right to freedom of opinion and expression of thought and is based first 
and foremost on the shaking of consciences. Given the countless violations of 
people’s rights, the impunity of those responsible, the omission of both 
national and international judicial bodies, it is natural that the conscience of 
those reacting with nonconformity to these situations wants to be heard, like 
a cry.  It is as if the authority of ethics comes to the aid of non-compliance 
with legal authority with the aim of replicating its action, as if it stood at 
“post-conventional level” (to use the expression used by Lawrence Kohlberg36), 
in the sense that respect for standard is superiorly  assumed and overcome by 
the apprehension of values. For some reason we found expressions such as 
36  See Kohlberg, L. (1981) Essays on Moral Development, I: The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages  
and the Idea of Justice. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
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“ethical tribunal” or “conscience tribunal” along the way: they illustrate the 
ambivalence where the legal and the axiological cross, on the side of “reasons 
of state” or the convenience of international jurisdictions.
Such legitimacy, however, is enhanced by a component of PPT sessions: the initiative 
of civil society and, even more, the broad participation of numerous grass-
roots institutions that collaborate in establishing the facts, the testimony of 
experienced situations in denouncing violations of rights. These facts act as an 
antidote against any arbitrariness temptation and  at the same time ensure the 
rooting in social reality, where the cry of the victims is heard louder.
If we take one example among many others, the PPT’s ruling on the social and 
environmental crimes in the Brazilian Amazon lists no less than 26 local 
organizations that formed the basis of the prosecution and supported the 
argument of the whole process37 of the session organized in Paris on 16 
October 1990. This is how the legitimacy of a citizenship exercise is built, 
deriving from collective perceptions, based on shared feelings and, above 
all, on verifiable facts, while giving voice to the voiceless. Its connection to 
social movements enables giving the PPT a counterpower quality that 
affirms itself, under democratic principles, against the established powers. 
This also helps legitimize its practices, because the existence of countervail-
ing powers is healthy in any society, and their action should not be regarded 
as abusive, since they act as balancing factors as a precaution against the 
pathology of “official truth” or single thought.
The PPT also benefits from another kind of legitimacy that is achieved a posterio-
ri. The fact that, as a rule, the majority of its deliberations is subject to 
recognition by the international community at a later stage can mean a kind 
of ratification that is legitimizing. This is illustrated by the cases the Tribunal 
has chosen to take on, such as the Western Sahara, Eritrea and East Timor 
ones, making us conclude that the alleged rights came to be widely acknowl-
edged. This retrospective look sheds new light on the set of sentences by 
giving them both legal and political relevance, timeliness and consistency.
37  These are: Centro dos Trabalhadores da Amazónia, Associação Brasileira de Reforma Agrária, Associação dos Geógrafos 
Brasileiros, Instituto de Apoio Jurídico Popular, Instituto Vianei, Conselho Indigenista Missionário, Comissão Pró-Índio, 
Campanha Nacional para a Defesa e o Desenvolvimento da Amazónia, OIKOS, Salve a Amazónia, Fase (Nacional), Amigos  
da Terra (Rio Grande do Sul), IBASE (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Económicas e Sociais), Movimento Nacional de Defesa 
dos Direitos Humanos, Sociedade Parense para a Defesa dos Direitos Humanos, UNI (União das Nações Indígenas), CPT 
(Comissão Pastoral da Terra), Campanha Nacional pela Reforma Agrária, Campanha Nacional dos Seringueiros, CEDI (Centro 
Ecuménico de Documentação e Informação), IAMA (Instituto de Antropologia e Meio Ambiente), MAGUTA (Centro  
de Documentação e Pesquisa do Alto Solimões), NDI (Núcleo de Direitos Indígenas), CTI (Centro de Trabalho Indigenista), 
INESC (Instituto de Estudos Sócio-económicos) and CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores). In Tognoni (org) (1998) p.358.
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Finally, the legitimacy of the PPT is further evidenced by the impartiality of its 
decisions.  It condemned both the US aggression against the Sandinista 
regime in Nicaragua and the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR troops. It con-
demned both the social and environmental crimes in Bhopal, India and the 
ones in Chernobyl, in the Soviet Ukraine. Against suspected ideological 
partisanship, the reference to the rights of people became a guarantee of 
impartiality and, therefore, of credibility.
THE PPT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In the context of the aforementioned “quasi-judicial” perspective, the deliberations 
of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal relate permanently, and logically as, to 
acquired legal norms. Thus, it resorts to the multiple codification of the 
rules that safeguard human rights and the rights of peoples, and regulates the 
roles of international political and economic agents and the relationships of 
the members of the world community.  A legislative and contractual collec-
tion of texts resulting from sedimentation and ripening over the centuries 
that the PPT uses as a basic reference is available. 
The example that follows is particularly illuminating: the resolution on the social and 
environmental rights in the Brazilian Amazon38, examined in October 1990. 
The sentence passed at the time listed the legal documents that informed it, 
starting with Brazil’s own Constitution and making reference to more than 40 
norms of national law, to which a further 24 documents of international law 
were added: declarations, conventions, agreements, resolutions, and relevant 
international treaties. This is a rule present in all of the PPT’s verdicts, namely 
the rigour of the reasoning based on positive law, emanating from both the 
national legislatures and the international community or contracted through 
treaties between states as well as the jurisprudence of other bodies. 
However, the PPT does not just reproduce the processes established by judicial 
bodies. Conversely, it has, with regard to them, the function to replace and 
complement them. An example of this was the decision made on crimes in 
the former Yugoslavia at a meeting in Bern in 1995, which explicitly stated: 
Asserting itself as heir to the International Tribunal on American war crimes in 
Vietnam and to the Russell Tribunal II on Latin America, the Permanent Peoples’ 
38  Available at http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/wp-content/uploads/1990/10/Amazzonia-brasiliana_TPP_it.pdf, 
accessed on 13/1/2015.
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Tribunal takes upon itself a supplementary role, due to the deficiency and inadequa-
cy of existing international tribunals, and the impossibility for peoples, individuals 
and NGOs to access such courts, which are exclusively entitled to judge conflicts 
between states or act upon a strictly regulated mandate39.
This need is particularly felt in the area of political and economic activities, which 
are outside the scope of international jurisdictions, despite its human and 
social relevance. For all the above reasons, it can be affirmed that the PPT 
seeks to fill a void and play a subsidiary role: “opinion tribunals played a 
relevant role since the end of World War II in the dispute to illuminate the 
historical and geographical gaps in the persistent selectivity of international 
criminal law” (Feirstein, 2013,p 118).
Another feature concerns the understanding of the judging function. More than 
punish, which would be out of the question due to the absence of coercive 
force, the PPT favours not the criminal role but awareness about the viola-
tion of rights and – by recognizing the role of people – the capacity of lib-
erating energies. The legal field thus seems to be brought back to its original 
vocation: The original role given to law is thus recovered. Far from being an instru-
ment of control, it acts as an instrument of liberation from all forms of domination, 
exclusion, and denial. The ‘judges’ also leave behind the traditional role of judiciaries, 
surpassing the criminal and punitive dimension of law, so as to become overseers whose 
role is to guide the interpretation of the facts for the reconstruction of the truth that 
legitimates complaints and resistances (Fraudatario & Tognoni, 2013,p 5) 40.
The initiatives of the PPT thus have the role of pointedly warning against the 
crushing of collective rights, aiming at bridging gaps and anticipating regu-
lations that may be imposed. The exercise of citizenship is consequently a 
contribution to the advance of positive law itself, in the manner of a “res-
ervoir of ideas” (Merle, 1985,p 58), becoming a pressure group for the 
improvement of international law in its normativity and applications. 
Therefore, we find a dynamic vision of law whose norms are always recep-
tive to innovation, not only to deal with the amazing vicissitudes of our 
history, but also to improve its humanization mechanisms.
39  See http://www.internazionaleleliobasso.it/wp-content/uploads/1995/02/ExYugoslavia_I_TPP_it.pdf, accessed on 13/1/2015.
40  See also the following: “Far from affirming itself as a producer of convictions, the real purpose and mission of the PPT 
is to give victims the recognition and the legitimacy of their truth – which never corresponds to the official one – so 
that it becomes an instrument of struggle and claim before the official bodies. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the 
Tribunal and of its sentences, truths and memory depends on the subsequent recognition of those same truths 
reconstructed by the victims, which turns the PPT into an instrument of anticipation of truths, minimizing any 
argument about their impotence”. In Fraudatario and Tognoni (2011) p.3.
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Interestingly, in this regard the texts on the PPT by the main authorities on the 
topic are instructive: François Rigaux, who was its president for many years, 
and Gianni Tognoni, who has always been its secretary general. More than 
any other, they theorized about the PPT and clarified their views on it. They 
have different views about the same reality that complement the identity of 
the PPT. Rigaux is essentially a jurist and so his views refer to the imperative 
nature of the law: The permanent peoples’ tribunal is not a people’s court, but an 
opinion tribunal. Its unique strength lies in rationality itself: gathering the facts, 
hearing witnesses, requesting clarification from the rapporteurs, and then verifying 
whether the facts that it declares to be proven are contrary to any legal norm. (...) The 
objective foundation of the activities of the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal can be 
inferred from the dynamism inherent in the rule of law. (Rigaux, 2012,p 168-
169).
Here the emphasis is placed on the rationality of the legal procedure and legal basis 
of its deliberations. The source of authority of the PPT’s pronouncements lies 
basically in its conformity to the international legal order. Gianni Tognoni’s 
views, in turn, are not distant from Rigaux’s, but he emphasizes a versatility 
and creativity that foster a different intellectual approach. His words fully 
illustrate his different stance. For him, the PPT is a “research exercise” involv-
ing “choosing intelligence over power, having the responsibility to seek the 
roots of things and of their future potential, more than manage the balance 
of the present”. He sees it as “a borderless exercise in listening and observing, 
out of respect for people with needs and those seeking a sense of liberation”, 
pursuing a” shared research logic “(Tognoni, 1998,p I). In another text writ-
ten with Simona Fraudatario, they state that the documentation produced by 
the PPT is like a “working agenda” and that its practice is primarily a “perma-
nent tool for exploring and experimenting” (Fraudatario & Tognoni, 2013,p 
2). When describing the backbone of the project underpinning the tribunal, 
they write that the PPT: Experiments practices and languages for the structural 
restitution of the role of active protagonists to the victims of violations, which were 
caused by invisibility, non-recognition, and impunity by the existing international law 
(...). Its deepest mission is the continued pursuit of observation instruments and to 
interpret reality with a comparative and critical stance directed at the capacity of the 
right to prevent, protect and guarantee the existence  of people, victims, and offended 
persons (Fraudatario & Tognoni, 2013 ,p 2, 4).
Research, observation, and experimentation: these words express a “laboratory” 
view of the relationship between the PPT and law. The vitality of the com-
munities, the unpredictability of history, the complexity of collective pro-
cesses, and the deepening of awareness of the values in question, require 
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legal innovation. This “experimentalist” conception of international law 
seems especially interesting: the codification of rules of conduct is not a 
static and finished process, but rather an open process that seeks new solu-
tions, in reference to the social dynamics and the growing ethical require-
ments perceived by people. One can describe it as a constructivist perspec-
tive of law, understood as something in fieri, under construction. The legal 
normativity is thus a tool for progress and humanization. Opinion tribunals 
and in particular the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, coming from the private 
sector, citizenship, civil society, linked to social movements from the base, 
have shared responsibility for contributing to avoid the impunity of crimes 
committed and for fostering the enforcement of law, not as an oppressive 
norm, rather as a liberating matrix.
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INTRODUCTION
International criminal justice has developed mostly associated with international 
armed conflicts and international humanitarian law. The international human 
rights law was by and large ignored and the protection and role of victims seen 
as marginal in the context of a predominantly state-centric securitarian 
approach. In the post Cold War era the influence of a human rights perspective 
has been gradually increasing as a result of the interplay between three factors: 
the proliferation of non-international armed conflicts that led to the intensifi-
cation of levels of violence and serious mass violations of human rights; rap-
idly growing diffused power of Non-State Actors, namely transnational organ-
ized crime, which not only use more violence against communities but 
reached the point of developing new “businesses” based on the systematic and 
planned violation of human rights such as human trafficking; greater aware-
ness of human rights triggered by information technologies, global social 
networks and effective action of NGOs and civil society organisations. 
As a result, it is possible to depict a new dialectic relationship between human rights 
law and international criminal law in the sense that on the one hand human 
rights standards and values have been incorporated in international criminal 
law instruments and, on the other, the rules and operation of international 
criminal justice make effective contributions to enhance the protection of 
human rights. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
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is the main symbol of this new relationship. Although the main achievements 
of ICC are in general associated with its permanent nature, freeing interna-
tional criminal justice from the vagaries of political convenience, and the 
rigorous definition of international crimes thus strengthening the rule of law 
and legitimacy, the fundamental achievement from a human rights perspec-
tive is undoubtedly the new priority attached to victims and the enhancement 
of their status and rights in the judicial process and beyond.
This paper explores precisely the contribution of the ICC Statute and the Court’s 
recent practice and jurisprudence to promote human rights in general and 
a paradigm shift towards a victim-centred criminal justice, looking at the 
innovations introduced, their effectiveness, limits and systemic impact. The 
paper is structured in four parts. The first section looks at the broader pic-
ture of the ICC potential contribution to human rights protection and its 
different manifestations. Section two addresses the question of the historical 
precedents of ICC and critical aspects of the transition from the predomi-
nant retributive justice paradigm to the emerging restorative justice para-
digm taking into consideration the main aspects of the international regime 
of victims of human rights violations. The third section looks at the main 
innovations introduced in the ICC to enhance victims’ status and attain bet-
ter protection of their rights and discusses their strengths and weaknesses/
inconsistencies from the point of view of human rights standards. Finally, 
section four analyses the structural limitations of the ICC system to contrib-
ute to a more robust global system of protection of human rights thus sug-
gesting potential areas of reform to be considered.  
THE ICC AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW CONTRIBUTION TO 
HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION
The ICC can make three fundamental contributions to protect and strengthen 
human rights related to the consolidation and enrichment of the human right 
to a fair and equitable trial; to the streamlining and renovation of concepts 
crafted by human rights law; and to the enhancement of the status and rights 
of the victims of human rights violations in the context of the judicial process. 
Firstly, it contributes directly to ensure the respect and implementation of the 
human right to a fair and equitable trial insofar it incorporates and ensures 
in practice effective respect for all the fundamental guarantees of defence of 
the accused. At the same time it can have a powerful demonstration effect 
on States and national courts to consolidate this human right making clear 
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what are the requirements and the substantive contents of the right to a fair 
and equitable trial, thus adding to the relevant work carried out by the 
Human Rights Committee through the general comments1 and the 
European Court of Human Rights2. The ICC has been regarded by some 
authors3 as a promising platform for transference of regional interpretations 
of fair trial rights to the international legal order.
Secondly, the ICC Statute made an important contribution at the conceptual level 
to consolidate the international human rights law framework by contribut-
ing to streamline and renovate important concepts of human rights crafted 
in human rights instruments. One case in point is the concept of torture.
The ICC Statute contributes to widen and adapt to new circumstances the concept 
of torture insofar it introduces an innovation to the concept incorporated in 
article 1 (1) of the 1984 International Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment. The concept enshrined in the 
Convention implies three main structural elements: (i) an action, infliction of 
severe pain, physical or mental; (ii) a specific objective, to obtain information 
or a confession; (iii) a special quality of the person in control of the action 
who has to be a public official. The doctrine has added a fourth one, the req-
uisite of powerlessness as the victim must be impotent at the hands of his/her 
torturer, typically in reclusion/custody. This means that, according to the 
1984 Convention against Torture, only States can practice torture, it must be 
carried out by, or with the authorisation of, a representative of a State. 
In the definition contained in article 7 (2 e)) of the ICC Statute while the requisites 
of infliction of severe pain and custody are explicitly mentioned, the requisite 
of participation of a public official has been dropped. Therefore, the concept 
has been widened as Non-State Actors, rebel groups or transnational organ-
ized crime groups, can commit and be accused of torture just like States. This 
is particularly important in a context where Non-State Actors became increas-
ingly responsible for the violation of human rights, challenging the assumption 
that States were the exclusive violators of human rights prevailing in the post 
1948 initial structuring of the international human rights system. 
1  On the contents of the right to a fair and equitable trial and the detailed definition of the obligations of States see the 
General Comment of the Human Rights Committee nº32  “Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair 
trial” (2007) (available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/478b2b2f2.html)
2  European Court of Human Rights, 2014, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights – Right to  
a fair trial (criminal limb) (http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_criminal_eng.pdf )
3  See Nicolas Croquet, 2011, The International Criminal Court and the Treatment of Defence Rights: A Mirror of the European 
Court of Human Rights’ Jurisprudence? In Human Rights Law Review, Vol.11, Issue 1, pp.91-131.
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The widening of the concept also results from the fact that the specific purpose of 
obtaining information or a confession is no longer mentioned which means 
that this is a more open concept insofar a larger range of objectives are 
admissible. The change in the concept enlarges responsibility and ends the 
differentiation between state and non-state actors which was the object of 
some criticism and posed limitations to the implementation of the principle 
of “Non-refoulement”4. As a result we are bound to be confronted with the 
coexistence of two international law norms on the concept of torture which 
present relevant differences likely to originate divergent decisions in inter-
national jurisprudence.    
In contrast, in other matters the concepts adopted by the ICC Statute are not in 
line with international human rights standards and remain closer to interna-
tional humanitarian law standards whenever there is a contradiction between 
the two areas of international law. A good example is the concept of child 
soldier which according to IHL presupposes the direct participation in hos-
tilities as combatants of children under the age of 15 years according to 
art.77 (2) of Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conventions appli-
cable to international armed conflicts. Accordingly, the ICC Statute in arti-
cle 8 (e)vii considers the recruitment and use of children under 15 years 
who participate directly in hostilities to be a war crime, thus adopting a 
narrower definition of child soldier which is not in line with international 
human rights law. 
In fact comparatively the child soldier concept in international human rights law is 
wider in two respects. On the one hand in terms of age limit as it includes 
a prohibition of participation in armed conflicts of all children under 18 
years in military hostilities seen as a violation of children’s rights as foreseen 
in Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict5. On the other, in terms of cat-
egories it is considered that the prohibition covers not only combatants 
4  See Committee on Torture, the Guclu case report, Communication No. 373/2009 Munir Aytulun, and Lilav Guclu vs. 
Sweden  CAT/C/45/D/373/2009, published in 2010 (available at http://www.manskligarattigheter.se/Media/
Get/355/ladda-ner-dokument-pdf,). In the proceedings Sweden argued that there was no risk of torture in relation  
to PKK terrorist group based on the argument that torture could only be committed by States. As Sweden also 
considered that there was no risk of torture committed by the Turkish State it supported the idea of legitimacy  
of forced return to Turkey in a case where, as the Committee recognised, there were serious risks and  
as a consequence Sweden was violating its obligation of “non-refoulement”.
5  According to the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, States or armed groups 
can not recruit under 18 years; children could voluntary join the armed forces from 16 to 18 but can not take part 
directly in hostilities.
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participating directly in military operations but also children performing 
other support functions, involved in logistics or forced to become sexual 
slaves as set out in the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (1997) and 
the Paris Principles (2007)6, two soft law instruments that resulted from the 
cooperation between UNICEF and several NGOs.  
Thirdly, the ICC Statute makes an important contribution to consolidate the rights 
of victims insofar it attaches greater priority to, and enhances the status of 
victims of violations promoting a transition to a victim-centred judicial pro-
cess in line with human rights requirements. This is certainly the most impor-
tant systemic impact of ICC on international human rights practice and 
protection which justifies a more detailed analysis to be developed below.
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND A HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACH: EMERGING NEW PARADIGM OF VICTIM PROTECTION
The ICC Statute represents a fundamental shift in the international criminal justice 
paradigm not only because of the creation of a permanent court with all its 
implications but also because it promotes a transition from the traditional 
“retributive justice” paradigm to a “restorative justice” paradigm which puts 
greater emphasis on victim’s participation, protection and reparation, thus 
adopting for the first time an approach more consistent with human rights 
requirements. 
From international retributive justice to restorative justice
The traditional paradigm was dominated by the concept of “retributive justice” 
geared towards the punishment of criminals and restoration of order, peace 
and security while paying little attention to victims. As a result it does not 
provide neither for the participation of victims in the proceedings nor for 
the enforcement of their right to reparation. Victims are marginal to the 
system and perceived mainly as instrumental procedural actors that are only 
relevant in their capacity as witnesses and as long as they accept to collabo-
rate in the administration of justice to condemn criminals. 
6   The Paris Principles – Principles and Guidelines on Children associated with armed forces or armed groups, February 
2007 (https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf, acceded on 20 November 2016)
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Furthermore, it can be argued that this view is associated with a securitarian 
approach based on a state-centric view focused on the security of the State 
and restoration of State authority rather than on human security. This was 
clearly demonstrated, as argued by Schabas7, by the fact the Nuremberg 
Tribunal considered aggression as the “supreme” crime, not the crimes 
against humanity, although ironically the concept of the latter turned out to 
be the main contribution of the tribunal to the evolution of international 
criminal law. The focus was on the State and the crimes against the State and 
even the consideration of crimes against individual human beings were rel-
evant insofar they were linked with aggression and committed in the context 
of an international armed conflict. As a result the crimes against humanity 
committed by the Nazi regime before its involvement in World War II were 
not considered and remained unpunished. 
This “retributive justice” approach has been dominant in the post World War II 
international criminal justice both during the first phase with the ad hoc 
International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo, set up in 1945 in the aftermath of World 
War II by the winning powers to prosecute and punish defeated Axis powers 
war criminals; but also in the second phase with the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), set up by the UN 
Security Council in 1993 (Res. 808) and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR), set up by the UN Security Council in 1994 (Res. 955), 
created by the international community in the post-Cold War to respond to 
the atrocities committed in the context of non-international armed conflicts 
(common art. 3 of the Geneva Conventions). 
It is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the second phase developed in 
a different context marked by the consolidation of international humanitar-
ian law with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the build up of the post-
1948 International Human Rights legal framework, paradoxically victims 
still remain by and large absent from the ICTY and ICTR Statutes. The only 
exception was article 22 of the ICTY Statute related to the protection of 
victims as witnesses but this still reflected the instrumental approach to 
victims seen as procedural actors as it refers to the protection of witnesses 
and the protection of the identity of victims in the context of the trial. 
7   William Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court, Cambridge University Press, third edition, 2007, 
pp. 324-325
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The Rome Statute has operated a major paradigm shift. For the first time ever in 
international criminal justice the ICC Statute adopted a “restorative justice” 
approach, even with some limitations, which is the most adequate to respect 
and enforce human rights standards. This approach implies three critical 
changes. Firstly, a greater focus on the effects of crimes, the harm caused to 
victims and to communities and not only on the punishment of criminals. 
Secondly, a greater emphasis on the importance to upgrade the status of 
victims and their role in the judicial process as a relevant mechanism to 
recognize their condition which by itself is an important component of reha-
bilitation. Thirdly, a new priority attached to the reparation of the victim. 
This approach is not only more consistent with human rights standards but also 
attaches greater priority to human security striking a better balance between 
State security and human security. The new priority attached to victims’ 
protection and reparation by the ICC system departs from the international 
criminal law tradition, associated with international armed conflicts and 
international humanitarian law where a state-centric approach prevails, and 
clearly reflects an increasing influence of the international human rights law 
and the protection of the individual human being on the restructuring of 
international criminal law. In other words, it depicts an evolving conception 
in the historical dialectic relation and tensions between the state sovereignty 
tradition and the human rights tradition, at odds since the origins of inter-
national law as reflected in Francisco Vitoria’s pioneer thinking, in particular 
in the De Indis8 a pioneer text on human rights where the universal natural 
rights of Indians (property, liberty, freedom of religion) constitute a limit to 
the sovereignty of the Spanish State and its alleged rights of “discovery” and 
conquest.  
Evolution of the international regime of victims of violations  
of human rights
To better understand the contribution of the ICC Statute to enhance victims’ status 
and protection it has to be analysed in the context of the evolution of the 
international regime for victims of human rights violations. This regime has 
been structured around two fundamental soft law instruments: the 1985 
“Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of 
Power” approved by the UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/40/34; 
8 Francisco de Vitoria , Relectio de Indis, 1538, CSIC, Madrid
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and the 2005 “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights 
Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law” approved by 
the UN General Assembly Resolution 60/147.
There is a clear continuity and complementarity between these two instruments 
but also relevant differences. Firstly, in terms of the subjective scope as the 
1985 Declaration applies to victims of domestic crimes resulting from the 
violation of domestic criminal laws, while the 2005 Principles and 
Guidelines apply to victims of international crimes resulting from the viola-
tion of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
Secondly, in terms of objective scope the 1985 Declaration applies to all 
violations, all types of crimes while the 2005 Principles and Guidelines is 
more restrictive applying formally only to “gross” violations. 
Thirdly, whilst the human rights approach is largely absent from the 1985 instru-
ment as crimes are not equated with violations of human rights, except in 
the reference to victims of abuse of power (para.18), it is strongly present 
as the dominant feature of the 2005 instrument. Fourthly, the 2005 
Principles and Guidelines incorporate a more comprehensive concept of 
remedies, in particular of reparation in contrast with the 1985 Declaration 
which contains a more limited concept referring only to restitution, com-
pensation and assistance. Moreover, the 2005 instrument is more prone to 
facilitate operational implementation as it presents a more detailed contents 
of different dimensions of reparation incorporating relevant field experi-
ence. It is particularly noteworthy that the 2005 Principles and Guidelines 
enlarges the scope for compensation in comparison with the 1985 instru-
ment insofar it goes beyond body or mental harm to include also lost oppor-
tunities and loss of earnings as criteria for compensation.         
Fifthly, the issue of access of victims to justice is more widely foreseen in the 1985 
Declaration which refers not only to judicial remedies to obtain reparation 
but also, unlike the 2005 instrument, to the need that the views and con-
cerns of victims should be considered and heard in the course of the judicial 
proceedings, in other words opens the door to victims’ participation. 
Finally, the 2005 instrument puts greater emphasis on the strategies of pre-
vention of violations of human rights while the 1985 Declaration does not 
attach a relevant role to prevention.
There was a relevant development in the discussions leading to the conclusion of 
the 2005 Principles and Guidelines. Even though they are built upon the 
framework of State international responsibility and influenced by the 2001 
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
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the issue of the international responsibility of Non-State Actors was raised 
in the discussions, in particular of insurgent groups exercising effective con-
trol over a territory. As a result there are timid and cautious references to 
Non-State Actors’ responsibility in art. 3 c) and principle 15 of the 
Principles and Guidelines. In spite of the modest outcome the 2005 instru-
ment left the door open and is a first contribution to undertake a global 
effort aimed at solving the serious blackhole in international law related to 
the non-accountability and non-responsibility of powerful transnational 
Non-State Actors. This is of great importance for human rights protection 
and enforcement insofar Non-State Actors became important systemic 
human rights violators in a context of inexistence of corporate interna-
tional criminal liability.
The definition of the concept of victim is one important common structural ele-
ment that registered a clear continuity insofar the 2005 Principles and 
Guidelines is clearly influenced by, and adopts the same concept foreseen in 
art.1 of the 1985 Declaration. A victim is defined as a person who has suf-
fered physical or mental harm, economic loss or impairment of his/her 
rights as a result of violations of criminal laws or international human rights 
laws. The concept has been widened and goes beyond the direct victim to 
include also indirect victims, i.e. the immediate family, friends or depend-
ents of the direct victim as well as the persons that suffered trying to assist 
the victim or to prevent victimization as foreseen in art.1 (2) of the 1985 
Declaration. In addition, the harm can be suffered individually or collec-
tively.  The 2005 instrument introduced a relevant innovation regarding the 
collective nature of violations of rights related to the possibility of groups of 
victims to present joint claims (art. 13)9.
9  This is an interesting example of an instrument originated in the continental roman law tradition but unknown to 
common law systems which illustrates the phenomenon pointed out by McCracken who noted that the 2005 Basic 
Principles and Guidelines includes different techniques from the common law, continental roman law and islamic legal 
systems, all blended in a creative manner. See Kelly McCRACKEN , “Commentary on the basic principles and guidelines 
on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law”, in Revue internationale de droit pénal, 1/2005 (Vol. 76), p. 77-79.
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THE ICC INNOVATIONS IN THE STATUS AND RIGHTS OF VICTIMS: 
RULES AND PRACTICE
As far as the status of victims is concerned the ICC Statute introduced three impor-
tant innovations which are interlinked depicting a comprehensive strategy to 
upgrade victims’ status. Firstly it allows victims and their families to par-
ticipate in the judicial process, to have access to the court and express their 
views article 68 (3). Secondly, the Rome Statute allows victims to claim 
reparation in article 75 (1) recognising their right to reparation. Thirdly, a 
Trust Fund for Victims was created in article 79.  
Victims’ Right to participation in the proceedings
Concerning the victims’ participation in the judicial process, the ICC Statute pro-
vides for a right to participation in the proceedings in art. 68 (3) which is 
regarded as one of the great innovations of the Statute and an important 
departure from the international criminal law tradition, thus initiating a new 
trend in international law likely to have a significant impact on States and 
change the practice of domestic jurisdictions. Traditionally victims were rel-
egated to the passive role of witnesses in international criminal proceedings, 
somehow used instrumentally to convict the accused. More recently victims’ 
active participation started to be seen as a key condition to ensure not only 
the effectiveness but also the legitimacy of international justice thus facilitat-
ing the restoration of peace and the social acceptance of judicial outcomes.
This ICC Statute provision, directly influenced by the 1985 Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims (art.6 b)), clearly contributes to reinforce 
the dignity of victims, facilitate healing and making clear they are not mar-
ginal to the judicial process and are not limited to participate exclusively as 
witnesses. Most importantly, the ICC Statute ensures victims an independ-
ent voice and role in the proceedings, namely in relation to the Prosecutor, 
as recognised by the Pre-Trial Chamber I jurisprudence10. Victims emerge 
10   See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ICC-01/04-101-t, Decision on the Application for Participation  
in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2. VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, VPRS6, 17.1.2006, para.51 “In the Chamber’s opinion,  
the Statute grants victims an independent voice and role in proceedings before the Court. It should be possible to exercise this 
independence, in particular, vis-à-vis the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court so that victims can present their interests.  
s the European Court has affirmed on several occasions, victims participating in criminal proceedings cannot be regarded as “either  
the opponent – or for that matter necessarily the ally – of the prosecution, their roles and objectives being clearly different” 
(consulted https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01689.PDF on 10.10.2016). See also, Policy paper  
on Victims’ participation, April 2010, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC.
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no longer as mere passive subjects but as actors that have the right to pursue 
their interests. 
However, there has been controversy over the merits of this “revolutionary” solu-
tion. Some authors adopt a very positive stand and consider that granting 
participatory rights to victims has a positive impact in terms of restoring 
victims’ dignity and increasing self-esteem, contributing to their rehabilita-
tion and even to a more robust investigation insofar it allows more evidence 
to come to light11. The opposite view adopts a more skeptical position argu-
ing that there are potential risks in this participation that can lead to longer 
proceedings, weaken the prosecutor’s investigation and bring about undesir-
able discrimination between different categories of victims12. 
The controversy extends to the definition of the limits of victims’ involvement. One 
view held that participation in proceedings should be restricted to the trial 
phase as sustained by the ICC Prosecutor. Another view supported the posi-
tion that proceedings should be interpreted in a more flexible way and should 
also include the earlier investigation phase. The latter position was supported 
by the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chamber I which in the decision of 
17.1.2006 allowed victims to be involved in the stage of investigation, making 
reference to jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights13.
The materialization of victims’ participation tends to face some practical obstacles 
when there is a large number of victims or/and the group tends to be very 
heterogeneous thus making it more difficult to coordinate a common posi-
tion14. In order to address this challenge the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICC foresee that the Court should encourage victims to 
choose a common legal representative and might even provide financial 
assistance to victims to enable them to be represented.
The extent to which the participation of victims has been effective and attained its pur-
poses remains to be seen and fully evaluated. To be consistent with the assump-
11  See Mariana Pena and Gaelle Carayon, “Is the ICC Making the Most of Victim Participation?,” in International Journal  
of Transitional Justice 7(3), November 2013, pp. 518–35 and  Luke Moffet, Justice for Victims at the International Criminal 
Court, New York, Routledge, 2014.
12  See ; Brianne McGonigle Leyh, “Victim-Oriented Measures at International Criminal Institutions: Participation  
and Its Pitfalls,” in International Criminal Law Review 12(3), 2012, pp.407.
13  ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo ICC-01/04-101-t, Decision on the 
Application for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS1, VPRS2. VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5, VPRS6, 17.1.2006,  
para.54 ” (consulted https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_01689.PDF on 10.10.2016)
14  In the Lubanga case the ICC granted 146 persons the status of victim authorised to participate in the proceedings ,  
see The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06 case Information Sheet (at https://www.icc-cpi.int/
drc/lubanga/Documents/LubangaEng.pdf, acceded on 15.12.2016)
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tions of a participatory approach it is essential that victims are fully involved in 
the assessment of results. Based on this principle, one of the most interesting 
exercises was the assessment carried out in 2015 by the Human Rights Center 
of the University of California, Berkeley, based on 622 interviews with victims 
(from Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire) who 
have taken part in the proceedings15. The results of the survey point to three 
fundamental findings. First, victims participants‘ main motivation is to receive 
individual reparations and to see convictions materialise, although there is a cer-
tain frustration with the fact the ICC does not trial lower levels offenders but 
only high level criminals. Second, the majority of victims do not want to par-
ticipate directly in trial procedures as they fear reprisals and being too much 
associated with the ICC. Third, victims consider as one of the most negative 
aspects the length of trials that delay reparations and increase security risks; in 
contrast valued very positively and showed satisfaction with their personal inter-
actions with ICC staff and their legal representatives.  
There is clearly a gap between real victims’ perceptions on participation and the prin-
ciples and aims of the ICC Statute which tends to see victims as an homogene-
ous, abstract and idealised whole. In general victims have a deficit of knowledge 
about the ICC and its role and adopt a pragmatic short-term view. A certain 
consensus seems to be emerging that the results are below expectations and 
that the victims’ participation system has to be reformed and strengthened.
Reparation of Victims
The right to reparation of victims foreseen in article 75 (1) of the Rome Statute 
constitutes one of the pillars of victims’ status and one of its fundamental 
rights. 
The regime of reparation in international law was defined in reference to the State 
and the international Responsibility of States and foreseen in the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 16. The commission 
of internationally wrongful acts generates two types of obligations: cessation 
15  Human Rights Center, 2015, The Victim’ Court? A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International Criminal Court, 
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
16  The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts were adopted in 2001 by the International 
Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, Fifty-third session, A/56/10, Chapter IV. The UN 
General Assembly has subsequently included the Articles as an annex to GA Res 56/83 (10.12.2001) and recommended 
them to the attention of governments. It is a soft law instrument but some of its provisions are hard law reflecting rules 
of international custom.
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of the activity (art. 30) and reparation (art.31). In this context reparation can 
assume three different forms: restitution (art.35), which implies recreating 
the existing conditions before the breach of the international norm; compen-
sation (art.36), implying the indemnity of the damages; satisfaction (art.37), 
a more symbolic form whose modalities are mentioned in a non-exhaustive 
way in art. 37(2) “acknowledgement of the breach, expression of regret, a 
formal apology or another appropriate modality”.
For obvious reasons this framework is not completely suitable to address the ques-
tion of reparation of victims of human rights violations. As a consequence 
the concept of reparation has been widened and the contents of different 
reparation modalities adapted to the specific circumstances of victims by the 
2005 UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the rights of victims. The rec-
ognition as a victim is an essential first step not only to the healing process 
of the person who suffered the violation, but also to gain access to all the 
other rights encapsulated in reparation through one of the different forms 
foreseen in the Principles and Guidelines:
Restitution, implying the reconstitution of the situation prior to the violation of 
rights (article 19 of the Principles and Guidelines) which might involve 
restitution of liberty, return to the place of residence, return of property;
Compensation, for the damages both material and moral suffered (article 20), 
including physical and mental harm, lost opportunities of employment and 
education, moral damages, costs with legal assistance and medical treatment;
Satisfaction, involving not only public apologies, but also search for the disap-
peared, recovery and burial of remainings, full disclosure of the truth, inclu-
sion of an account of violations in the IHL and International Human Rights 
training and educational materials (article 22);
Rehabilitation of victims, direct and indirect (article 21), involving medical, phys-
ical, psychological, legal;
Guarantees of non-repetition (article 23), involving human rights and humanitar-
ian law education to all sectors of society including the military, training of 
public officials, protection of human rights defenders, strengthen independ-
ent judiciaries.
The inclusion of art. 75 in the ICC Statute was largely influenced by the Draft Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the rights of victims which was in preparation since 
1989 by the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities and would finally be approved by the 2005 UN General Assembly 
Resolution on the “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law 
and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law”. 
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The influence of this fundamental soft law instrument reveals an interesting 
dynamic interaction between soft law and hard law, frequently seen in inter-
national law. As mentioned by Van Boven17 a rather complete version of the 
Draft Principles was already available in 1996 which influenced the works of 
the 1998 Rome Conference. In short, a soft law instrument in process has 
directly influenced the drafting of the hard law instrument, the ICC statute. 
In turn, the hard law instrument and its implementation has influenced the 2005 
UN Resolution that approved the final version of the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines, a soft law instrument – para. 5 of the UNGA Resolution refers 
to the Rome Statute and its articles 68 and 75 as positive examples. 
Furthermore, the influence of the ICC statute can be also detected to the 
extent that the Basic Principles and Guidelines adopted a restrictive view by 
concentrating on the “gross violations” (that can relate either to the gravity 
of violations or the type of human rights being violated) of human rights or 
grave breaches in international humanitarian law, as opposed to the consid-
eration of all violations, which basically correspond to international crimes 
under the Rome Statute. Although this restriction was formally adopted, it 
has to be made clear that the principles apply to all violations of human 
rights taking into account the general principle of non-discrimination and 
the principle of non-derogation foreseen in art.26.
As far as the contents of reparation is concerned the ICC Statute adopts formally 
a more restrictive concept of reparation than the 2005 Principles and 
Guidelines. According to art.75 (1) reparation includes only three forms, 
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, thus not including two other 
forms, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, foreseen in the 2005 
soft law instrument. However, this should not be seen as an exhaustive enu-
meration and the Court can adopt a wider perspective to ensure the best 
possible protection of victims. 
The ICC statute does not exist in isolation, the Court applies other instruments of 
international law both hard law, namely treaties and customary law on 
human rights, and soft law instruments such as the two declarations on the 
rights of victims or the jurisprudence of regional human rights tribunals and 
the Treaty Bodies of Human Rights treaties. Indeed, the ICC has already 
17  See Theo Van Boven, 2010, The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy  
and Reparation for Victims of gross violations of International Human Rights and serious violations of International 
Humanitarian Law, UN, UN Audiovisual Library of International Law. Van Boven was the Special Rapporteur  
of the Sub-Committee of the Commission on Human Rights on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection  
of Minorities that prepared the document.
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applied the soft law instrument in its decisions such as in the Lubanga case 
when the trial chamber of the ICC referred to the concept of “harm” fore-
seen in principle 8 of the Principles and Guidelines in order to fulfill the gap 
generated by the absence of any definition in the ICC Statute18.
As far as the concept of reparation is concerned both the ICC Statute and the 2005 
Principles and Guidelines confuse reparation with other concepts, namely 
rehabilitation and prevention, and do not contribute to its precision. The 
Principles and Guidelines adopt a too broad concept, everything is repara-
tion, eliminating relevant conceptual distinctions from other categories of 
actions. For example, it includes in reparation what is labeled as “guarantees 
of non-repetition” which in reality when we look at the contents are preven-
tion measures. Reparation is a response to violation of human rights and 
tends to minimize negative effects while prevention precedes violation and 
aims at deterring it. 
In this context it seems more accurate to follow a more structured approach 
inspired in the experience of fighting human trafficking involving three layers 
from the more general to the more specific19. In the first layer there are the 
4 Ps, four dimensions of a strategy to fight human rights violations: Protection 
(of the victim); Punishment (of perpetrators); Prevention (changing condi-
tions to reduce the risk of violations occurring); Partnership (institutional 
and operational cooperation between the three sectors, public, private and 
NGOs, to attain effective action). These are complementary and should be 
pursued in a coordinated manner on the basis of a holistic approach. 
The second layer involves the detailed components of each of the Ps. The Protection 
of victims involves the 3 Rs, i.e. Reparation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
which have to be implemented in a coordinated and mutually reinforcing 
way although the rationale and responsible actors are different. In the third 
layer, we consider the forms of reparation which include restitution, com-
pensation and satisfaction as already established in international law in the 
context of the international responsibility of States. 
In short, it seems from a conceptual and operational point of view more adequate 
to consider that rehabilitation and prevention are not forms of reparation 
but distinct concepts. Furthermore, making the distinction contributes to 
better protect the rights of victims insofar it prevents the funds devoted to 
18 Case Prosecutor vs. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, decision of 18.1.2008 ICC-01/04-01/06
19  On this see UNODC, 2012, A Comprehensive strategy to combat trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants , 
New York and Miguel Santos Neves and Claudia Pedra, 2012, A Proteção dos Direitos Humanos e as Vítimas de Tráfico  
de Pessoas – Rotas, Métodos, Tipos de Tráfico e Setores de Atividade em Portugal, IEEI, POAT_FSE,  e-book.
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grant the victim compensation for the damages suffered to be diverted to 
cover the costs of rehabilitation. This is an autonomous obligation of States 
and the international community and therefore should not be financed with 
the compensation due to the victim.
The implementation of the right for reparations by the ICC raises several ques-
tions. The issue of collective reparations decided in the Lubanga case20 is a 
very relevant matter from a human rights perspective and give rise to some 
controversy. Although collective reparations are adequate to respond to the 
consequences of mass atrocity crimes one should bear in mind that the rights 
of victims, like the right to reparation, are individual rights (including com-
pensation), and that different individuals suffered different levels of harm 
and damages that should be reflected proportionally in the awards. In other 
words, collective reparation awards should coexist with and complement, 
not replace, individual and differentiated reparation awards. The difficulty in 
dealing with large number of victims should not lead to treat victims as an 
homogeneous whole which is contrary to human rights standards consider-
ing that first and second generation human rights have an individual nature. 
The second problem is the potential violation of the non-discrimination principle. 
The management of reparations awards is a very delicate matter where the 
ICC runs into the risk of discriminating between victims paving the way to 
a violation of international human rights law, in particular the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination. 
Thirdly, in order to meet human rights standards the compensation awards must 
be adequate and prompt. From this point of view the ICC decision in the 
Lubanga case has violated both criteria. On the one hand the process lasted 
too long and so reparation has not been prompt. Moreover, in spite of the 
existence of the Trust Fund and the assistance dimension, the payment of 
compensation by the Fund is still dependent on the completion of the judi-
cial process, implying not only delays but also forcing victims to go through 
that ordeal thus promoting soft re-victimisation. The best practices involving 
20  The process of reparations award has lasted for too long with successive changes introduced by the Court, and became 
extremely confusing as a result of recurrent hesitations to take a decision. After the 2012 decision of the Trial Chamber 
I to grant reparations to the victims, the Appeal Chamber decided in March 2015 to amend that decision and to award 
collective reparations requesting the Trust Fund to draw up an implementation plan. This plan was presented in 
November 2015 to the Trial Chamber II which requested further changes postponing decision until December 2016. 
Meanwhile in October 2016 Trial Chamber II approved an intermediate plan for symbolic collective reparations and 
there will be a second and final non-symbolic collective reparations to be approved at a later stage. The Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06, Case Information Sheet (at https://www.icc-cpi.int/drc/lubanga/
Documents/LubangaEng.pdf, acceded on 15.12.2016).
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human rights treaties such as the Council of Europe Warsaw Convention to 
Fight human trafficking, point to the need to ensure payment of compensa-
tion autonomously without the victim having to wait for the result of long 
lasting trials.   
On the other hand, the decision to grant symbolic collective reparations by Trial 
Chamber II in October 2016, even if it is an interim decision, violates 
requirements as compensation can not be merely symbolic or involve ridic-
ulous sums which amounts in practice to a violation of the rights of victims. 
Even the total amount of 1 million euros available in the TFV to pay com-
pensation to victims of the Lubanga case seems clearly insufficient given the 
large number of victims involved. In this matter ICC member States have 
the obligation to provide the financial resources to ensure the payment of 
adequate compensations.
The Trust Fund for Victims
The Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) created under art.79 of the ICC Statute is a 
fundamental innovation with far reaching systemic implications as it can 
contribute to coordinate in a coherent triangle three different dimensions: 
the effective reparation for victims; prevention of mass atrocity crimes and 
other human rights violations; reconciliation of communities after violent 
armed conflicts contributing to long term positive peace.
The Fund is financed through contributions of States and marginally private sourc-
es which amounted in 2014 to €4.9 million. Between 2004-2015 the total 
amount of financial contributions reached € 24.7 million mainly coming 
from EU Member States with Sweden as the top donor followed by the UK 
and Germany. Overall 8 EU States are the top 8 donors with only Australia 
and Japan included in the top 10. However, it should be stressed that 
although the EU accounts for 84,3% of total donations, only 17 out of the 
28 EU members have so far contribute donations21.
The TFV operates on two legs reflecting a two-fold mandate: the “reparations man-
date” and the “assistance mandate”. The reparations mandate aims at ensuring 
the effective implementation of reparations awards for victims ordered by the 
ICC and constitutes the last chapter of the Rome Statute to become opera-
tional. In fact it started very recently in 2014 following the first conviction of 
21  See The Trust Fund for Victims Newsletter nº 01/2016, 15.2.2016  (http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/sites/
default/files/imce/TFV%20NewsletterFeb16%20-%20ENG.pdf,, acceded on 20.7.2016).
252
Human Rights, International criminal law and the challenges of a victim-centred restorative justice – the ICC contribution
the ICC in the case of Thomas Lubanga, convicted to 14 years in prison for 
war crimes involving the recruitment of child soldiers under 15 years in the 
Ituri area of Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The Courts Appeal Chamber awarded collective reparations to victims and set the 
basic rules for implementation and the related financial liability of the con-
victed person in March 2015 as mentioned earlier. Following the decision, 
the TFV has prepared the first draft implementation plan and submitted it to 
the Court in November 201522.  It should be stressed that the ICC repara-
tion paradigm is based on three fundamental principles (i) the perpetrator 
pays, a manifestation of his/her responsibility to compensate for the harm 
caused; (ii) collective reparations, as the ICC deals with mass atrocity crimes 
and mass victimization is a dominant trait; (iii) complementarity, as the 
Fund ensures effective reparations to complement reparations by the perpe-
trator which typically tend to be insufficient.
In contrast, the assistance mandate started earlier, in 2008, in Northern Uganda 
and the DRC and is aimed at providing assistance to victims, direct and 
indirect including communities, through programmes of physical rehabilita-
tion, psychological rehabilitation, in particular dealing with post-traumatic 
stress, and material support. These programmes do not follow simply con-
ventional lines but have important innovative distinctive features. First, the 
programmes are carried out in partnership with victims, families and com-
munities, following a participatory philosophy with a fundamental objective 
to contribute to the empowerment of victims and their communities. 
Second, the focus is on the wider victim population, not on specific individuals, so 
that the process in itself reduces the risk of stigmatization and promotes the 
social reintegration of victims. Third, the autonomy in relation to the judicial 
process so that there is a quicker and prompt response to victims problems 
which is not dependent and does not have to wait for the conclusion of 
lengthy judicial processes. Justice and reparation to victims becomes mean-
ingless if it comes too late. However, this has an important limitation 
because the autonomy principle does not apply to the reparations mandate 
where the victim is unable to receive reparations before the conclusion of 
the judicial process.
22  The Trust Fund for Victims, 2015, Assistance & Reparations Achievements, Lessons Learned, and Transitioning, 
Programme Progress Report 2015
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There are different projects that have achieved positive multimensional results. An 
interesting example is the Savings and Lending Groups and the Mutuelle de 
Solidarité (MUSO) model implementation in the DRC where victims sur-
vivors and their families participate in the savings and lending groups, along-
side non victims, which enables them to have access to loans to support 
small businesses at the same time this contributes to reduce stigma, restore 
a sense of dignity to victims and promotes community reconciliation. 
Another case in point is the project coordinated by the Centre de Jeunes 
Missionaires d’Afrique in the DRC (Ituri) involving the creation of a School 
of Peace, to promote a culture of peace among children and young victims 
of war crimes23. The main beneficiaries of these programmes are mainly 
most vulnerable categories of victims in particular orphans and vulnerable 
children, former child soldiers, widows, victims of sexual violence and 
human trafficking and family of victims.  
In spite of positive and promising results and the fact that more than 186.000 per-
sons have been direct or indirect beneficiaries of the TFV programmes, there 
are considerable limitations arising out of the insufficient funding showing 
that the international community is not yet mobilised to support and protect 
consistently victims of gross human rights violations, and the scale of impact 
which clearly contrasts with the very large number of victims affected by 
mass atrocity crimes in the last two decades. In addition, there is a certain 
concentration of intervention, mostly in two countries the DRC and Uganda, 
which might also reflect the insufficiency of funds and human resources.
In sum, the three main innovations introduced by the ICC Statute to promote a 
victim-oriented criminal judicial process make altogether a positive and 
relevant potential contribution to protect and enhance the status of victims 
of international crimes. Although all tend to enforce victims’ rights – par-
ticipation, reparation and rehabilitation/reintegration – there is not a com-
prehensive approach that ensures consistency and maximizes impact. In 
addition several limitations identified derive from the practical implementa-
tion of rules and the constraints created by limited financial resources. Some 
of the instruments and the orientation followed in their implementation 
display some aspects which are in contradiction with human rights stand-
ards. The Trust Fund has certainly a great potential and is the less problem-
23  On different projects see The Trust Fund for Victims Newsletter nº 01/2016, 15.2.2016  http://www.
trustfundforvictims.org/sites/default/files/imce/TFV%20NewsletterFeb16%20-%20ENG.pdf,, acceded on 
20.7.2016).
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atic instrument although the reparation mandate should be improved so that 
the payment of compensation to victims is not dependent on the conclusion 
of long lasting judicial processes when their suffering and damages require 
an urgent and immediate response.
ICC LIMITATIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION AND PROTECTION
In spite of the transition to a victim-oriented restorative international criminal 
justice more consistent with human rights standards operated by the ICC 
model, it still presents considerable limitations and inconsistencies in terms 
of human rights enforcement and protection. The system can not be seen in 
isolation but in dialectic interaction with the global human rights framework 
and has to be looked from the point of view of its contribution to meet the 
current challenges human rights have to face.
The first limitation regards the absence of corporate criminal responsibility under 
current international criminal law in general and in the ICC Statute in par-
ticular. Both the two ad hoc International Criminal Courts statutes and the 
Rome Statute only foresee individual criminal responsibility. Taking into 
account the nature of crimes under the ICC jurisdiction – genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, aggression – that require complex organiza-
tional capabilities to be committed, it is contradictory not to foresee corpo-
rate responsibility. Individuals do not act alone, they are part of complex 
organizational structures which are behind these international crimes. 
This constitutes a serious limitation to human rights protection precisely in a con-
text where powerful Non-State Actors are increasingly responsible for 
human rights violations, in particular large transnational conglomerates and 
transnational organized crime groups, in clear contrast with the dominant 
paradigm in the initial stage of consolidation of international human rights 
law which regarded States as the main violators of human rights. The impu-
nity of Non-State actors not only creates negative incentives for the con-
tinuation of violations but also prevents positive incentives related to the 
effects of loss of reputation and social pressure to change behaviour from 
materialising. 
The second limitation concerns the restriction to the most grave/gross violations 
of human rights, in practice with a strong link with armed conflicts, leaving 
aside other types of human rights violations. Moreover, even the list of gross 
violations of human rights is incomplete and biased insofar some gross sys-
temic violations such as human trafficking and modern forms of slavery, not 
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necessarily associated with armed conflicts, are not covered by the ICC. This 
establishes a logic of hierarchy of different levels of violations and conse-
quently between rights which is inconsistent with the principles of indivis-
ibility and interdependence of human rights. 
The third limitation relates to the deficit of priority to prevention of human rights 
violations, to some extent only marginally present in the work of the TFV. 
From a human rights perspective prevention is the priority but the interna-
tional system is still essentially conceived to react to violations and punish 
perpetrators rather than to prevent. This reflects the predominance of the 
sovereignty principle clearly asserted in art.2 (7) of the UN Charter. The 
emergence of the R2P soft law norm challenges precisely this paradigm and 
constitutes a case of antagonic soft law insofar it tries to partially limit sover-
eignty in specific situations and change the interpretation of art.2 (7) hard law 
norm. The R2P concept introduces a major innovation by considering that 
among the three dimensions of the responsibility to protect (prevent, react, 
rebuild) against mass atrocity crimes, priority should be attributed to the 
responsibility to prevent which presupposes closer monitoring of early warn-
ing mechanisms and earlier interventions of the international community.
The ICC is by and large influenced by the traditional logic and devotes little atten-
tion to prevention. It can be argued that by ensuring the effective punish-
ment of criminals this has a general prevention effect. However this argu-
ment runs into two types of difficulties. On the one hand the ICC, for 
budgetary and other constraints, has clearly focused so far on the punish-
ment of high level criminals, the leaders, leaving unpunished middle level 
and low level criminals who in many cases executed the acts and remain 
operational in the organizational structure able to act again under a new 
leadership. This strongly weakens any general prevention effect and for vic-
tims means that justice is still incomplete. On the other hand, punishment 
is not a sufficient condition to ensure an effective prevention of human 
rights violations which is a complex process requiring a holistic approach 
and a diversity of coordinated actions.    
To build a robust prevention strategy it is necessary to explore the interlinkages 
and act simultaneously at 5 different levels: (i) education for human rights 
since early age, to raise awareness about rights and existing protection 
mechanisms working with local communities to change attitudes; (ii) build-
ing grassroots institutions to defend human rights, NGOs and human rights 
defenders, with a capacity to protect victims and exercising lobby and advo-
cacy; (iii) training key actors, public officials, private sector managers and 
third sector institutions; (iv) develop research on human rights violations 
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and good practices for effective prevention; (v) effective communication 
through social media, including the digital space, to enhance a human rights 
contextualization and diffusion of functional positive messages, as well as 
developing periodic awareness raising campaigns. These dimensions, in par-
ticular education for human rights and promoting local NGOs and human 
rights defenders, could be more intensively explored by the Trust Fund 
programmes when seeking to promote the reintegration of victims in com-
munities which sometimes constitute a risk factor for human rights. 
The fourth crucial limitation derives from the inadequacy of the ICC system to 
deal with the cyberspace phenomenon which pose new and serious threats 
to human rights. Some of the international crimes can in certain conditions 
and in relation to some acts be committed through cyber attacks which 
produce effects equivalent to those generated by traditional methods of use 
of force, for instance directed towards civilian targets thus violating IHL and 
implying the commission of war crimes. This analogy and implications have 
been analysed in depth in the Tallin Manual process24 under the auspices of 
NATO which constitutes a relevant contribution to anticipate and tackle the 
problem. 
CONCLUSIONS
International criminal justice is undergoing a relevant process of transition in the 
direction of greater convergence with human rights standards. Although 
initially it was fundamentally structured under the influence of interna-
tional humanitarian law and with a strong armed conflict bias where the 
crime of aggression was paramount, more recently it addresses also the 
crimes committed outside a armed conflict context or in a post-conflict 
environment and show encouraging signs of moving to a more restorative 
justice paradigm where the rights and protection of victims of violations of 
human rights or IHL gain a new priority ceasing to be seen as mere instru-
mental procedural subjects.
The paper argues that the ICC Statute constitutes a watershed and a turning point 
in this process and that, despite other contributions, the enhancement of the 
24  The Tallin Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare” 2009, was produced by a series of 
independent experts and reflects on the applicability of existing norms of international humanitarian law and jus ad 
bellum to cyber attacks and cyber war- see NATO Co-operative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence ( https://ccdcoe.
org/tallinn-manual.html)
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status and rights of victims, both in the judicial process and beyond it, is by 
far the ICC’s major innovative contribution to human rights promotion and 
consolidation. This is pursued through the articulation between three instru-
ments, i.e. the participation of victims in the judicial proceedings, the right 
to reparations and the Trust Fund for Victims. Furthermore these rules and 
good practices can have a potential positive demonstration effect on nation-
al criminal justice and national courts which remain the primary instance of 
realization of international criminal justice.
In spite of the far reaching symbolic and conceptual progress, the system and its 
practical implementation also reveal important limitations which are not 
consistent with human rights standards and need to be addressed. Firstly, 
meaningful participation is hard to achieve in a context of large number of 
victims and limited resources of the ICC which put in question the aim to 
provide victims a space to have an independent and autonomous voice. 
Moreover, there is a gap between the victims’ own expectations about par-
ticipation and the ICC rationale all pointing to the need to rethink and 
improve the system. 
Secondly, in terms of reparations the ICC recent practice to grant exclusively col-
lective reparations and the fact that victims can only receive reparations after 
the completion of the judicial process are not in line with human rights stand-
ards insofar they do not ensure individual, prompt and adequate reparation, 
including compensation, and fail to protect victims from risks of soft re-vic-
timisation. In addition, there is some misconfusion regarding the concept of 
reparation and the absence of a sufficiently coherent and robust coordination 
between reparations and other dimensions of protection of victims, namely 
reintegration and rehabilitation, creating a risk that rehabilitation, which is an 
obligation of States, might be pursued at the expense of reparation. In that 
respect although the Trust Fund is a promising instrument its reparations 
mandate is not in line with human rights requirements and should be changed 
in order to delink the payment of reparations from the conclusion of the 
judicial process and further promote prevention of violations.
Finally, a structural problem of under-financing of the ICC poses one of the major 
threats to the implementation of the restorative justice paradigm. Member 
States, in particular the EU member States which have so far been the main 
providers of funds and political support, have a special responsibility but are 
not investing enough and granting all the support that is required. The allo-
cation of a total amount of 1 million euros to reparations to all victims in the 
Lubanga case is clearly insufficient and is not a promising sign for the future 
of victims’ rights.
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The main challenge ahead is the extent to which the ICC system can become part 
and parcel of the global system of human rights protection by absorbing and 
contributing to the main thrust of international jurisprudence on human 
rights, strengthening ties with regional courts and treaty bodies on human 
rights and making the adjustments necessary to comply with human rights 
standards25. Member States, in particular EU States, but also NGOs and 
civil society organisations have an important role to play in terms of provid-
ing finance and political support to the work of ICC so that it can meet the 
high expectations it generated with its creation nearly two decades ago.
 
25  On this interaction see the recent article of Annika Jones, 2016, Insights Into an Emerging Relationship: Use of Human 
Rights Jurisprudence at the International Criminal Court, in Human Rights Law Review (2016) 16 (4): 701-729 
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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC) witnessed an unprecedented level 
of judicial activity. This trend is expected to continue in 2017. Preliminary 
examinations are being conducted in 10 different situations in all regions of 
the world (including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq/UK, Palestine and 
Ukraine), there are 10 ongoing investigations (including Georgia) and 3 
judgments were concluded in 2016.
At the same time, the ICC is experiencing a delicate moment from a political point 
of view, with the withdrawal from the Rome Statute of 3 African States 
(South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia) and antagonistic signals coming 
both from Russia and the new American administration.
Concurrently, due to the lack of universality of the Rome Statute and deadlock in 
the Security Council, some situations where serious international crimes are 
being committed cannot be brought before the ICC and ad hoc mechanisms 
continue to have to be created, in spite of the existence of a permanent 
criminal court, such as for the cases of South Sudan and possibly Syria.
As to the issue of complementary, the conclusion of the Malabo Protocol in the 
African Union context has raised the novelty of, besides national jurisdic-
tions, a “regional” complementarity and the question of its compatibility 
with the Rome Statute.
The ICC at the Centre of an International Criminal Justice 
System: Current Challenges
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On the cooperation front, difficulties continue and they affect the capacity of the 
Court to accomplish its mission given the high level of dependence from coop-
eration from Member States. This has been especially evident concerning the 
outstanding arrest and surrender of persons indicted by the Court, in particular 
of Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan, a sitting Head of State, highlighting the tension 
between the traditional law on immunities and international criminal justice.
Another element of tension that will resurface in 2017 is related to the crime of 
aggression, since a decision on the activation of the Court’s jurisdiction with 
regard to this crime can now be taken and the crime of aggression has been 
a contentious element of the ICC Statute, in particular for the Permanent 
Members of the Security Council.
These four challenges continue to put on the spot the difficulties of operation of a 
judicial mechanism in a political environment. If all judicial work is done 
against this background, in no Court like the ICC this dichotomy of justice 
vs. politics seems more evident.
CURRENT CHALLENGES 
Universality 
The quest for universal ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC has been a con-
stant goal since the adoption of the Rome Statute. In 2016, 124 States were 
parties to the Statute, including the State of Palestine. Out of them 34 
are African States, 19 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 28 
are from Latin American and Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western 
European and other States.
In October/November 2016, South Africa, Burundi and the Gambia notified the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN), who is the depositary of the 
Rome Statute, of their intention to withdraw from the ICC – a decision that, 
according the to the Statute, only produces legal effect one year after noti-
fication. These countries have acted upon different reasons, including inter-
nal political reasons, but these decisions share an open criticism to the 
Court’s functioning.1
1  For South Africa’s full arguments see “Declaratory statement by the Republic of South Africa on the decision to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court” available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/
Publication/CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.
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In recent years, many African States developed a growing negative perception of 
the ICC, especially in view of the fact that the first cases brought before this 
Court were all concerning African situations, although most of them were 
sovereign self-referrals from the States themselves. This negative perception 
and concerns of selectivity were voiced in meetings of the African Union, of 
the UN General Assembly and Security Council and also at the Assembly of 
States Parties of the ICC.2
Though a mass exodus of the Rome Statute is not to be expected and while it may 
still be possible that these withdrawal decisions are reversed, they affect the 
credibility and legitimacy of the Court.
Another aspect that affects the credibility and legitimacy of the ICC and imperils 
its quest for universality, is the fact that out of the 5 Permanent Members of 
the UN Security Council (P5), only 2 are parties to the Rome Statute: 
France and the United Kingdom. The United States, Russia and China are 
not parties and this has made the ability of the Court to fully perform its 
functions very much dependent of the attitudes taken especially by the US 
and Russia in the context of the Security Council and more in general, 
which have varied over time, but risk at the moment to enter a particularly 
antagonistic phase.
Moreover, after the Bush years, the US may be headed toward a new showdown 
with the ICC. The ICC is reportedly launching an investigation into possible 
war crimes in Afghanistan that could include acts of torture committed by 
the US military from 2003-2014. Even if this does not materialize, given the 
signs given by the incoming President on issues of foreign policy, the UN 
and human rights, a defensive and hostile position towards the ICC could be 
expected.3
2  Cf. Waddell, N. & Clark, P.(2008)” Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa”, The Royal African Society;  
Arieff, A et al(2010) International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and policy issues. Diane Publishing,  Keppler, 
E(2012) “Managing setbacks for the International Criminal Court in Africa”. Journal of African Law 56,(1), 1-14;  
Guerreiro, A(2012) A resistência dos Estados Africanos à jurisdição do Tribunal Penal Internacional, Almedina ; and Galvão 
Teles,P (2014-2015) “The International Criminal Court and the evolution of the idea of combating impunity:  
an assessment 15 years after the Rome Conference” Janus.Net 5(2).
3  Cf. United Nations University Center for Policy Research, “The UN in the Era of Trump”, available in https://cpr.unu.
edu/the-un-in-the-era-of-trump.html.
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Russia, on its part, has in November 2016 formally “withdrawn its signature”4 from 
the Statute of the International Criminal Court – as the US5 had done a few 
years earlier in 2002 -,6 after the Court published a report classifying the 
Russian annexation of Crimea as an occupation. Besides the ongoing investiga-
tion into the crimes committed in Georgia in 2008, Russia may also be con-
cerned about a possible criminal investigation in Syria, where its forces have 
been repeatedly accused of carrying out war crimes in recent months. Russia 
had signed the Rome Statute in 2000 and cooperated with the court, but had 
not ratified the Treaty and thus remained outside the ICC’s jurisdiction. This 
means that this move, though highly symbolic, will not change much in prac-
tice, but is a sign of a more hostile future attitude towards the Court. 
Besides withdrawals and antagonist positions that threaten the universality aspira-
tion of the Rome Statute, the fact that the Statute is not universally ratified 
entails that the necessity for continuing to create ad hoc mechanisms – as it 
was done in the past for the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
Cambodia or Lebanon – continues to be present. Although more difficult to 
implement, due to political and financial difficulties, it is possible that such 
ad hoc mechanisms will come into play in, at least, in two pressing situations: 
South Sudan and Syria.
Since December 2013, serious violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights have been committed in South Sudan, with crimes including 
extrajudicial killings, ethnically targeted violence, rape and other forms of 
sexual and violence, and attacks on schools, places of worship, hospitals and 
United Nations and associated peacekeeping personnel. Calls for account-
4  In a communication received on 30 November 2016, the Government of the Russian Federation informed the Secretary-
General of the following: “I have the honour to inform you about the intention of the Russian Federation not to become 
a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which was adopted in Rome on 17 July 1998  
and signed on behalf of the Russian Federation on 13 September 2000. I would kindly ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, 
to consider this instrument as an official notification of the Russian Federation in accordance with paragraph (a)  
of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.” See https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en.
5  In a communication received on 6 May 2002, the Government of the United States of America informed  
the Secretary-General of the following: “This is to inform you, in connection with the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998, that the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty. 
Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising from its signature on December 31, 2000.  
The United States requests that its intention not to become a party, as expressed in this letter, be reflected  
in the depositary’s status lists relating to this treaty.” See https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&clang=_en.
6  Legally, the act of “unsigning” a treaty or “withdrawing the signature” does not exist. What Russia and the US have done  
is a communication of their intention not to become party to the Rome Statute, so as to avoid the good faith obligations 
that arise from signature as foreseen in Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.
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ability have been made in numerous fora, including the Security Council, the 
Human Rights Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, as 
well as by civil society. In August 2015 the parties to the conflict adopted an 
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict, in which they agreed to estab-
lish a Hybrid Court for South Sudan. The Hybrid Court shall be “an indepen-
dent hybrid judicial court” and it “shall be established by the African Union 
Commission to investigate and prosecute individuals bearing the responsibil-
ity for violations of international law and/or applicable South Sudanese law” 
committed after 15 December 2013. In October 2015, the Security Council 
requested the Secretary-General to make available technical assistance for the 
establishment of the Hybrid Court. This is the first time the United Nations 
has been tasked with providing technical assistance to a regional organization 
in the establishment of a hybrid tribunal. The United Nations has a wealth of 
expertise in the establishment and operation of international and United 
Nations-assisted criminal courts and tribunals and is liaising with the African 
Union Commission to share lessons learned from past experiences.7
After a Security Council Resolution to submit the Syrian situation to the ICC was 
vetoed by Russia and China in 2014, the United Nations General Assembly 
on 19th December 2016 voted to establish a special team to “collect, con-
solidate, preserve and analyze evidence” as well as to prepare cases on war 
crimes and human rights abuses committed during the conflict in Syria. 
According to General Assembly Resolution A/RES/71/248, the team will 
work in coordination with the UN Syria Commission of Inquiry, which was 
established by the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council in 2011 to inves-
tigate possible war crimes. The Commission of Inquiry, which has developed 
a confidential list of suspects on all sides who have committed war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, has repeatedly called for the UN Security Council 
to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court. The special 
team will “prepare files in order to facilitate and expedite fair and indepen-
dent criminal proceedings in accordance with international law standards, in 
national, regional or international courts or tribunals that have or may in the 
future have jurisdiction over these crimes.” A crackdown by Assad on pro-
democracy protesters in 2011 led to civil war and Islamic State/Daesh mili-
tants have used the chaos to seize territory in Syria and Iraq. Half of Syria’s 
22 million people have been uprooted and more than 400,000 killed.8 
7 Cf. http://legal.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/mss/speeches/MSS-ILC-statement-17-May-2016-EN-FR.pdf.
8 See https://www.un.org/press/en/2016/ga11880.doc.htm and http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN14A2H7?il=0.
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The quest for universality of membership and for making the ICC the effective 
centre of the global international criminal justice will certainly continue in 
the future, despite recent setbacks. Nevertheless, it has to continue to be 
borne in mind that the ICC is only a court of last resort, for the most serious 
of the most serious international crimes and that it will never have the 
capacity, nor it was intended to replace national jurisdiction and States’ pri-
mary responsibility for accountability for atrocity crimes. This is why com-
plementarity – at the national level or eventually at the regional level – con-
tinues to be a fundamental feature of the international criminal justice, as it 
will be discussed at the next section.
Complementarity
The ICC is based on the principle of complementarity according to Article 17 of 
its Statute. It is a Court of last resort9 that shall only intervene when the 
territorial or nationality State is “unable or unwilling” to prosecute the seri-
ous international crimes that may have been committed in its territory of by 
its nationals.
For the complementarity system to work, States have to have adequate national 
legislation and capable judicial institutions. This is, of course, a challenge on 
its own.
Central African Republic and Sri Lanka are two countries now developing, with 
the assistance of the United Nations and other organizations, their ability to 
promote judicial accountability for the crimes committed during their civil 
wars.
But if complementarity was initially seen as complementarity between the ICC and 
national jurisdictions, the possible creation of an African Regional Criminal 
Court, has raised the issue of “regional” complementarity.10
In June 2014, the African Union (AU) Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
meeting in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, adopted the Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (the Malabo Protocol) and called on AU member states to sign and 
ratify it.11
9 Mendes, E.(2010), Peace and Justice at the International Criminal Court: A Court of last resort, Elgar.
10 Jackson, F.M.(2016), “Regional complementarity: The Rome Statute and Public International Law”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 14,(5), 1061-1072. 
11  On this issue see Amnesty International(2016), Malabo Protocol – Legal and institutional implications of the merged and expanded 
African Court.
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The Malabo Protocol extends the jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (ACJHR) to crimes under international law and transna-
tional crimes. The original plan for the ACJHR was a court with two sec-
tions - a general affairs section and a human rights section. The Malabo 
Protocol introduces a third section: the international criminal law section. 
Thus, if the Malabo Protocol comes into force, the ACJHR will have juris-
diction to try the following 14 crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, the crime of unconstitutional change of government, piracy, 
terrorism, mercenarism, corruption, money laundering, trafficking in per-
sons, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in hazardous wastes, illicit exploitation 
of natural resources, and the crime of aggression. 
Thus the international criminal law section of the ACJHR could serve as an African 
regional criminal court, with the same objectives of the International 
Criminal Court but within a narrowly defined geographical scope, and over 
an expanded list of crimes. 
The adoption of the Malabo Protocol is apparently a step in the right direction. The 
regional criminal court could potentially play a positive role on a continent 
persistently afflicted by the scourge of conflict and impunity for interna-
tional crimes. In recent and ongoing conflicts, thousands of civilians have 
lost their lives or have been maimed and displaced from their homes. There 
are many accounts of killings, torture, rape, mutilation of bodies, recruit-
ment of child soldiers, and wanton destruction of property. Armed groups 
and government forces alike are responsible for the abuses and violations. 
Impunity is a common denominator in Africa’s conflicts, with those suspected of 
criminal responsibility for crimes under international law rarely held to 
account. Often national governments are unwilling or unable to conduct 
prompt, independent, impartial, and effective investigations into allegations 
of international crimes and to bring all those suspected of criminal respon-
sibility to justice in fair trials. A regional criminal court, as envisaged under 
the Malabo Protocol, has the potential to fill this accountability gap.
However, there are concerns about the motivations behind the proposal to estab-
lish the criminal chamber of the ACJHR. Some commentators12 have 
argued that the proposal is an attempt by the AU to shield African heads of 
state and senior state officials from being held to account when there are 
12  See, among others, http://kptj.africog.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Malabo-Report.pdf and http://www.
ejiltalk.org/a-case-of-negative-regional-complementarity-giving-the-african-court-of-justice-and-human-rights- 
jurisdiction-over-international-crimes/.
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reasonable grounds to believe that they are criminally responsible for 
crimes under international law. Furthermore, there are doubts as to the 
compatibility with the Rome Statute on the issue of complementarity, 
envisaged as a national complementarity, but also given the express provi-
sion on immunity of process regarding sitting heads of state, government 
or other seniors state officials.
An immunity clause is indeed considered to be the most controversial provision in 
the amended ACJHR Statute. The relevant provision (Article 46Abis) reads 
as follows: “No charges shall be commenced or continued before the Court 
against any serving African Union Head of State or Government, or anybody 
acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior state officials based 
on their functions, during their tenure of office.”
So far the Malabo Protocol is not yet in force, having been signed only by 9 States 
and ratified by none. A possible expansion of the Malabo Protocol of the 
African Court on Human and People’s rights should be achieved in a way 
that it ensures greater accountability, but does not undercut the ICC’s con-
tribution to criminal justice. Such an extension of the African Court must 
be developed in full respect and in conformity with the Rome Statute that 
does not foresee immunity from jurisdiction for sitting Heads of State. But 
it is precisely the issue of the irrelevance of the official capacity for criminal 
prosecution that is the most problematic aspect of the Rome Statute for 
African States, as it will be discussed in the next section.
Cooperation
Out of the 23 arrest and surrender requests issued by the ICC, 12 are still to be 
executed: (a) Ivory Coast: Simone Gbagbo, since 2012; (b) Democratic 
Republic of Congo: Sylvestre Mudacumura, since 2012; (c) Kenya: Walter 
Barasa, since 2013; (d) Lybia: Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, since 2011; (e) Darfur 
(Sudan): Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb, since 2007; Omar Al Bashir, since 
2009; Abdel Raheem Muhammad Hussein, since 2012; and Bahar Idriss Abu 
Garda, since 2014; (f) Uganda: Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti and Okot 
Odhiambo, since 2005. 
The arrest and surrender of indicted persons depends on the cooperation of the 
States Parties to the ICC, but also on the overall UN Members in the cases 
submitted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the Security Council, as 
it was the case of Sudan and Libya, that are not State Parties to the ICC. The 
ICC has asked, without success, the Security Council to act upon the non-
cooperation with regard to these two situations.
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These outstanding arrests have also significantly affected the credibility of the 
Court and of the system designed by the Rome Statute.
The Bashir case has been the one where tensions have been more evident. In par-
ticular, in June 2015 while attending an African Union Summit in South 
African, President Bashir’s arrest and surrender was object of an ICC 
request of cooperation to South Africa.  The High Court of South Africa 
issued an order requiring that he should not be permitted to leave the coun-
try, but the South African government permitted him to do so before the 
High Court could consider the request on the merits and the High Court 
subsequently held that this was unlawful. Under Part IX of the Rome 
Statute, States Parties – including South Africa – have obligations to cooper-
ate with the Court. This is also so regarding South African nation legislation 
implementing the Rome Statute.
South Africa’s government13 has argued that there is an unresolved legal question 
arising from the fact that international law provides that serving heads of 
state are immune from criminal jurisdiction of other states, including immu-
nity from arrest and personal inviolability. The question that arises is wheth-
er this immunity persists in cases in national authorities are asked to arrest 
a head of State wanted for prosecution by the ICC. The matter is further 
complicated when the head of state is that of a State not party to the ICC 
Statute, though the case has been brought by a Security Council Chapter VII 
Resolution.
According to South Africa, Article 2714 and Article 9815 of the Rome Statute rep-
resent the intersection of the law on immunities applying to Heads of State 
and Government, and the cooperation obligation of States Parties to the 
13  Cf., among others, “Declaratory statement by the Republic of South Africa on the decision to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court” available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/
CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.
14  “1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official 
capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected representative or a 
government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and 
of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.  2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to 
the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person.“
15  “1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person 
or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the 
immunity. 2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending 
State for the giving of consent for the surrender.” 
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Statute. The relationship between State Parties and non-State parties contin-
ues to be governed by customary international law that bestows on a Head 
of State immunity ratione personae. Arrest of such a person by a State Party 
pursuant to its Rome Statute obligations, may therefore result in a violation 
of its customary law obligations.
This argument has been rejected by the ICC16 (though not in a fully consistent 
way in terms of the legal arguments), many States and scholars, arguing 
inter alia that Article 27 of the Rome Statute, following the Nuremberg 
precedent, has made irrelevant the official capacity and customary law 
immunities for the purposes of prosecution by international criminal tri-
bunals for States Parties to the ICC. Moreover, since Sudan’s situation was 
brought to the ICC by the Security Council in a binding Chapter VII 
Resolution, the obligations of cooperation arising out from this case 
would also be binding upon all and with regard to all UN Member States 
and not only ICC States Parties17.
These different legal views on this question have persisted and it has been sug-
gested by commentators and even by the African Union that this matter 
should be the object of an advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice.18 Even if this is not the case, it would be important legally and 
politically to clarify this question in a definitive and consensual manner in 
order to alleviate some of the current tensions relating to the ICC.
The Crime of Aggression
In the run-up and during the Rome Diplomatic Conference in 1998 the discussion 
was rather about the inclusion or not of the crime of aggression along the 
other 3 core international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. The dispute was not so much about the possibility of criminally 
prosecuting aggression at the individual level, since there were post World 
War II precedents (namely Nuremberg and Tokyo) concerning the then 
16  Cf. Decisions on Malawi  (ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr of 13 December 2011), Chad  (ICC-02/05-01/09-151 of26 
March 2013) and South Africa (ICC-02/05-01/09-242 of 13 June 2015).
17  Cf., among others, the discussions on this issue by  Akande, D.(2004), “International Law Immunities and the 
International Criminal Court”, American Journal of International Law ,98,(3), 407-433;Gaeta, P (2009)“Does President Al 
Bashir enjoy immunity from arrest?”. Journal International Criminal Justice 7,(2), 315-332; and C. Jalloh,C. (2014) 
“Reflections on the indictment of sitting Heads of State and Government and its consequences for peace and stability 
and reconciliation in Africa”, African Journal of Legal Studies 7,(1), 43-59.
18  Cf. http://www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-court-of-justice-advisory-opinion-on-the-icc-head-of-state-immunity-
issue/ and http://au.int/en/sites/default/files/decisions/9651-assembly_au_dec_416-449_xix_e_final.pdf. 
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called “crimes against peace”, but whether to include a more narrow crime 
covering only “wars of aggression” or a broader one relating to “acts of 
aggression” contained in the 1974 General Assembly Resolution adopted in 
the meantime. The other thorny issue was the relationship between the ICC 
and the Security Council, namely if the ICC should only prosecute crimes 
of aggression once the Security Council had determined the existence of 
such act, or not.19
During the Rome Conference, proposals were made for the inclusion of the crime 
of aggression by several delegations. Many States supported the inclusion of 
this crime in the jurisdiction of the Court, as long as it was possible to agree 
on a definition and on the conditions for the exercise of such jurisdiction. In 
order not to jeopardize the overall result and derail the negotiations, a com-
promise was found in Articles 5/1 and 2, to include the crime of aggression, 
but leave the definition and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction for 
later consideration, namely at the first Review Conference. A mixed out-
come was there the possible compromise: the crime was in the Statute, but 
the Court could not exercise jurisdiction until further negotiations and 
agreement on the two tracks of definition and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction.
Resolution F of the Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference confirmed that this was 
an issue to be continued and mandated the Preparatory Commission for the 
ICC, or Preparatory Commission, to further work on the issue of aggres-
sion. Resolution F mandated the Preparatory Commission to prepare pro-
posals for a provision on aggression, including the definition and the ele-
ments of crimes, and the conditions under which the ICC shall exercise its 
jurisdiction. It also stated that the Commission should submit such propos-
als to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Conference, with a view to 
arriving at an acceptable provision on the crime of aggression for inclusion 
in the Statute.
Following the 1998 Rome Conference, the Preparatory Commission for the ICC 
(PrepComm, 1999–2002) and later the Special Working Group on the 
Crime of Aggression (SWGCA, 2003–2009) continued negotiations on the 
outstanding issues regarding the crime of aggression. In February 2009, the 
SWGCA found a consensus agreement on the definition of the crime of 
aggression. The 2010 Kampala Review Conference used that definition and 
could thus focus on other outstanding issues, i.e. the “conditions for the 
19 See  Barriga, S. &  Kreß, C.(2012) The Travaux Préparatoires of the Crime of Aggression, Cambridge University Press.
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exercise of jurisdiction”. States Parties seized the historic opportunity and 
adopted Resolution RC/ Res.6 by consensus. The resolution amended the 
Rome Statute to include, inter alia, new Article 8bis containing a definition 
of the crime of aggression and new Articles 15bis and 15ter, containing 
complex provisions on the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
Notably, the compromise included a clause that prevented the Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the crime of aggression immediately. Instead, 
the Assembly of States Parties would have to take a further one-time deci-
sion to activate the Court’s jurisdiction, no earlier than 2017, by a 2/3 
majority of the States Parties. Also, one year must have passed since the 
30th ratification, already accomplished in June 2016, before the Court 
could exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.20
The Assembly of States Parties is thus now in a position to take a decision on the 
activation of the ICC regarding the crime of aggression. The Permanent 
Members of the Security Council, including ICC parties France and UK, have 
always questioned this crime, especially the relationship between the Security 
Council, who has the political prerogative of declaring that an act of aggres-
sion has been committed, and the ICC who will have to do a judicial, and not 
political, analysis. Although the Kampala Amendments have safeguarded 
many of the P5 concerns, it is expected that the activation of jurisdiction on 
the crime of aggression may bring another layer of tension in the ICC realm 
in the current political context. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that 
this process continues to be built upon a solid basis at the next Assembly of 
States Parties and that the Kampala compromise is not reopened.
SOME CONCLUSIONS: JUSTICE VS. POLITICS
The Rome Statute of the ICC was, undoubtedly, one of the most significant inter-
national treaties to be signed in the post cold war period, at a moment 
where international law and international institutions lived a very positive 
moment. It was at the centre of the political discourse in the reaction against 
the gravest atrocities committed since World War II, namely in the Former 
Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. 
20  See C. Kreß & L. von Holtzendorff(2010) “The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression”, Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 8,(5), 1179-1217 and S. Barriga & L. Grover(2011) “A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression” 
American Journal of International Law 105,(3), 517-533.
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Today, it would most likely not be possible to repeat this feat and create on the 
most innovative institutions in the international arena, breaking away from 
the Westphalian model of sovereignty, but at the same time strongly 
anchored in that model, given the dependency on State voluntary participa-
tion and cooperation.
The ICC, together with States, strives to promote the rule of law, the respect 
for human rights and sustainable peace, in accordance with international 
law and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
With the increasing workload of the Court, all cooperation efforts are funda-
mental for the credibility of the Court and for the ICC to perform the 
role it was given by the Rome Statute, not only to ensure accountability 
of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole, but also to assure that the rights of the 
victims prevail. 
It also has to be highlighted that the ICC has a complementary nature and was 
not created to replace States. Bringing those responsible for the most seri-
ous crimes to justice is, first and foremost, a responsibility of States and 
the Court should only act where national authorities fail or are not in a 
position to take the steps necessary to ensure accountability for such 
crimes.
However, one cannot forget that the ICC, though a judicial institution, inhabits the 
world of realpolitik. As it has been said: “This is a harsh environment for the 
delicate plant of international justice. But it is also a world where the 
demand and need for accountability has never been greater.”21
As we have briefly seen, the challenges are immense and the political moment a 
delicate one for the institution. But the ICC is here to stay and is becoming 
an inherent feature of today’s world. Both aspects of justice and politics have 
to be taken into account in order for such challenges to be overcome, so that 
the mission of a permanent and central instrument for the fight against 
impunity, that historically started in Rome in 1998, becomes a definitive 
part of today’s world.
21 http://blog.oup.com/2015/11/three-challenges-international-criminal-court/.
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